Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff owned land near lots intended for development. The Puerto Rico Highway and Transportation Authority planned to condemn most of plaintiff's land, in aid of the development. Plaintiff's motion to dismiss the condemnation proceeding was rejected; he filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the developer, PRHTA, and PRHTA employees, alleging conspiracy to deprive him of his property without just compensation or due process and torts claims under commonwealth law. The district court entered summary judgment for defendants and awarded $92,149 in attorney fees. The First Circuit vacated the fee award. Puerto Rican law provides process to get compensation for property takings by the government. Plaintiff did not take advantage of that process. Those were the only facts that needed to be shown for the dismissal, so the award was not justified. View "Efron v. Mora Dev. Corp." on Justia Law

A three-mile public recreational trail runs through 32 acres owned by the state and is used, in part, to access the state-managed Scarborough Marsh Wildlife Management Area. In 1961 Maine purchased the land with federal funds under the Federal Aid in Wildlife Restoration Act, 16 U.S.C. 669-669k for the approved purpose of “waterfowl habitat, waterfowl management, and access to waterfowl hunting.” The state subsequently granted easements for sanitary pipelines and a town road and to private parties for access to adjoining property. An easement granted in 2005 allowed construction of a road over 766 feet of previously-restricted trail for access to a planned subdivision. Objectors sought injunctive and declaratory relief, alleging violations of the Wildlife Restoration Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 4321, and state law. The district court dismissed federal claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. The First Circuit affirmed, first holding that the federal agency’s decision to not enforce the funding provisions of the WRA is within its discretion. The federal government did not grant the easements, so NEPA did not apply. View "Scarborough Citizens Protecting Res. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv." on Justia Law

Siblings have previously filed multiple lawsuits in the Puerto Rico Commonwealth courts, claiming that under Puerto Rico inheritance law they were the rightful owners of property, including a farm and sugar mill. Each action was resolved against them. They filed suit in federal court, alleging that defendants violated a "panoply of federal laws by defrauding them of their rightful inheritances." The district court dismissed on res judicata grounds. The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting a public policy argument. Plaintiffs did not establish fraud in previous litigation and the claims all derive from the same core of operative facts. View "Garcia-Monagas v. Garcia-Ramirez de Arellano" on Justia Law

For 30 years, GE manufactured electric capacitors containing Pyranol, an insulation containing PCBs and stored scrap in drums. It sold the scrap to Fletcher, who used it as a paint additive. Fletcher purchased more than 200,000 gallons of GE's scrap Pyranol until 1967. After failing to pay for 14 shipments, Fletcher proposed that GE retrieve the drums. GE did not follow up. In 1987, EPA found hundreds of unmarked drums containing scrap Pyranol at the Fletcher Site. Several had leaked. EPA installed a temporary cap, added the site to the Superfund List, and sought to recover costs under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. 9607(a)(3). A 1994 consent decree stipulated that GE would pay costs incurred through April, 1993. GE did not concede liability. In 2006, the government sought recovery for post-1993 costs. The First Circuit affirmed the district court's entry of judgment for the government on "arranger" liability. GE was aware that Fletcher had drums that would not be used and made no effort to deal with it. The court also rejected a statute of limitations defense. View "United States v. Gen. Elec. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff asserted a right to rescind a mortgage loan on the ground that the disclosures made at closing did not comply with the Massachusetts Consumer Credit Cost Disclosure Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 140D, 10, the equivalent of the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. 1601. The bankruptcy court dismissed for failure to state a claim, finding that the disclosures complied with the law, and waiver of the right to rescind the transaction. The district court affirmed the judgment for failure to state a claim, but did not reach the issue of waiver. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that plaintiff knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights in exchange for a reduction in the interest rate. The court also found that the disclosures at issue were not deficient.

Mortgage deeds executed by the debtors three years earlier were still pending recordation when they filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Debtors sought to avoid the mortgages and to prevent any post-petition actions that would perfect them 11 U.S.C. 362(a)(5), 544(a), 547(b). The bankruptcy court ruled in favor of the lender. The district court and First Circuit affirmed. Debtors failed to establish the necessary elements of a preferential transfer.

Defendant failed to close on a real estate contract. The seller retained his $25,000 earnest money, resold the property, and assigned his claim for the $400,000 price differential to plaintiff. The district court rejected a claim that the contract showed an intent that the earnest money serve as liquidated damages. The First Circuit affirmed, finding the contract unambiguous.

In 2005, plaintiffs, residents of Puerto Rico, contracted with defendants, Florida corporations, to purchase condominiums to be built in Florida, and submitted earnest money. Because of the financial crisis, the units were not completed and defendant terminated the agreements. Plaintiffs sued for return of the earnest money. The district court dismissed, finding the defendants did not have minimum contacts with Puerto Rico necessary to establish jurisdiction. The First Circuit vacated and remanded, noting that there certain contacts that could establish jurisdiction that were not adequately addressed at trial.

Plaintiff, who signed documents presented by her husband without reading them, sought damages and to rescind two mortgages ostensibly encumbering titles to her residence in Massachusetts and a retreat in Maine. Her husband allegedly misrepresented the nature of the documents, which were powers of attorney. She claims she did not receive documents required by the Truth In Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. 1635 and the Massachusetts Consumer Credit Cost Disclosure Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 140D 10.1. The trial court dismissed, reasoning that notices to the husband were sufficient under the powers of attorney. The First Circuit vacated. The district court improperly made findings of fact on a motion to dismiss, in concluding that the powers of attorney suffered from identical scriveners' errors and should be read as if their expiration dates were May 31, 2009 (not 2008).

The FAA issued permits for modernization of the mixed-use Hanscom airport near the historic towns of Lexington and Concord. Opponents raised challenges under the Department of Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. 303(c), the National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. 470f, and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321-4347. The First Circuit rejected the challenges. The FAA adequately examined alternatives; the determination that none would be prudent was reasonable. The agency went beyond considering reasonably foreseeable impacts and considered worst case scenarios.