Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After Plaintiff defaulted on a mortgage loan secured by her property, a complaint was filed in the Massachusetts land court as a preliminary step to foreclose on Plaintiff’s house. Plaintiff subsequently filed this case in federal district court against Defendants, asserting multiple claims arising from the purportedly invalid transfer and assignment of the mortgage on her home. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. While this appeal was pending, the parties reached an agreement, which resulted in the mortgage loan becoming current and Plaintiff no longer being subject to any actual or threatened foreclosure proceedings. The First Circuit dismissed this appeal as moot, holding that the circumstances evolved in such a way that there was no longer a live case or controversy. View "Matt v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A." on Justia Law

In 2011, a tornado ripped through the downtown area of the City of Springfield, Massachusetts and caused significant damage. City officials quickly determined that the South Commons Condominiums were among the properties that suffered substantial damage. The City hired a private company to demolish most of those buildings the next evening. The owners of the condos brought suit against the City, its officials, and the demolition company that took down the buildings, claiming violations of the owners’ procedural and substantive due process rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983, as well as various violations of Massachusetts state law. The district court dismissed the federal claims for failure to state a claim and dismissed the state claims without prejudice as an exercise of its discretion to deal with pendent claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that when a city decides buildings are so damaged that they must be immediately demolished, and when the city does so pursuant to a state law that authorizes the use of summary procedure to respond to such an emergency, the remedy for any wrong, absent behavior that objectively “shocks the conscience,” must come from the remedies the state itself supplies rather than from a federal suit premised on the U.S. Constitution’s due process clause. View "South Commons Condo. Ass’n v. Charlie Arment Trucking, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff owned a vacant lot in Alton, New Hampshire. In 2002, Plaintiff deeded the lot to his son. Because the town of Alton then held a lien due to unpaid taxes, Plaintiff did not then hold complete title to the property. The taxes were later paid off by Plaintiff’s mortgage, and, in 2005, the town deeded the lot back to Plaintiff. In 2006, Plaintiff’s daughter purchased the property from the son. The daughter’s mortgage was eventually assigned to Defendant. When the daughter stopped making her mortgage payments, Defendant sought to foreclose on the property. Plaintiff brought suit claiming he held title to the lot. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendant. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court correctly granted summary judgment for Defendant where Plaintiff did not meet his burden to establish his good title to the lot and had no basis to contest either his daughter’s title to the property or her mortgage agreement with Defendant. View "Fadili v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff and his wife purchased a home in Massachusetts that was encumbered by a mortgage. The mortgage was eventually assigned to Defendant CitiMortgage, Inc. Defendant ultimately invoked its statutory power of sale and sent a notice of foreclosure sale to Plaintiff’s home address. Plaintiff sued, alleging breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. A federal district court granted summary judgment for Defendant on all counts and denied Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration, holding that none of the grounds advanced by Plaintiff for reversal of the district court’s denial of reconsideration warranted relief. View "Biltcliffe v. CitiMortgage, Inc." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether New Hampshire law requires a foreclosing entity to hold both mortgage and note before it can exercise a power of sale under N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 479:25, which authorizes a mortgagee to conduct a non-judicial foreclosure where, as in this case, the mortgage document contains a clause allowing them. Plaintiff executed a promissory note and a mortgage. The note and mortgage document and the note were subsequently assigned to different entities. After Plaintiff failed to make mortgage payments, Defendant, the mortgagee, moved to foreclose. Defendant removed the case from New Hampshire state court to federal court. The district court allowed Defendant’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the parties’ intent to separate the mortgage and note at the beginning of the transaction trumped any common law rule requiring unity, and thus, Defendant could proceed with the foreclosure under section 479:25. Plaintiff appealed. Because controlling state precedent did not provide definitive guidance on how to resolve the questions of whether the common law or state statute mandates the unity of a mortgage and note, and if so, whether parties can override that rule by agreement, the First Circuit certified the questions to the New Hampshire Supreme Court. View "Castagnaro v. Bank of New York Mellon" on Justia Law

With the threat of foreclosure looming on his home, Plaintiff sued Bank for failing to consider him for a mortgage loan modification, which a California class action settlement agreement required Bank to do before attempting to foreclose on Plaintiff’s home. The complaint alleged breach of contract, violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 244, 35A and 35B, violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The district court dismissed the complaint in its entirety. The First Circuit vacated in part and remanded Plaintiff’s claims for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, holding (1) Plaintiff’s statutory causes of action fell short of stating a cognizable claim; but (2) the district court improperly converted Bank’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s contract-based claims into a motion for summary judgment, warranting a remand of those claims. View "Foley v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s property was subject to a mortgage. Plaintiff discussed refinancing with a predecessor in interest to Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., as well as a mortgage broker and his firm, whom Plaintiff referred to as “agents” of Wells Fargo. Based on these discussions, Plaintiff began making improvements to increase the property’s appraised value. Ultimately, Plaintiff was unable to refinance her mortgage. Plaintiff brought suit against Wells Fargo, alleging, among other claims, a violation of N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 397-A:2(VI) (count one) and promissory estoppel (count five). The district court dismissed counts one and five of Plaintiff’s complaint, concluding both claims were inadequately pleaded. Plaintiff appealed, arguing, among other things, that although she could not claim a private right of action under section 397-A:2(VI), she did state a claim for common law fraud. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court properly dismissed any state law fraud claim that Plaintiff belatedly attempted to advance and correctly dismissed Plaintiff’s promissory estoppel claim.View "Ruivo v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

The states of Massachusetts and Rhode Island each tax the transfer of real estate. In separate actions, the Town of Johnston, Rhode Island and the Commissioners of Bristol County, Massachusetts (the municipalities) brought actions against Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Housing Finance Agency (collectively, the entities), seeking declaratory judgments that the entities owed transfer taxes as well as money damages and equitable relief to recover the unpaid taxes. Federal district courts granted the entities’ motions to dismiss based on statutory exemptions from taxation. The municipalities appealed, arguing that a real property exception in the entities’ tax exemptions applies to the transfer taxes and that the exemptions themselves are unconstitutional. The First Circuit affirmed the dismissal of all claims, holding (1) the transfer taxes are not included in the real property exception to the entities’ tax exemptions; and (2) the tax exemptions are a constitutional exercise of Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause and do not violate the Tenth Amendment.View "Town of Johnston v. Fed. Housing Fin. Agency" on Justia Law

Defendant, a law firm, contracted with Plaintiff for Plaintiff to provide title insurance on two mortgages that Defendant took as security from a client indebted to Defendant. Upon foreclosure of liens that were superior to those of Defendant, Defendant sought coverage from Plaintiff under the insurance policies, which seemingly provided coverage for priority liens. Defendant requested indemnification, and Plaintiff sought declaratory judgment, arguing that coverage for priority liens was not intended by either party. A federal district court granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff, concluding that because Defendant was aware of the prior mortgages, it could not expect to receive coverage it did not bargain for. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiff had conclusively shown that Defendant was aware that its bargain with the client for security of its debt would result in junior mortgages, and the insurance policies clearly excluded such encumbrances from coverage.View "First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Lane Powell PC" on Justia Law

Attorney Valeriano Diviacchi represented Camilla Warrender in an action brought against Warrender by her mortgagee, Sovereign Bank, which sought to collect on a loan secured by certain real property. Shortly after Diviacchi entered his appearance, Warrender, without Diviacchi’s assistance, agreed to a settlement pursuant to a stipulation that Warrender’s property be sold to a third party. Diviacchi filed a notice of attorney’s lien pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 221, 50 (section 50). The property was subsequently sold to a third-party, and Sovereign Bank dismissed its claims against Warrender. The district court denied the motion to enforce the attorney’s lien, concluding that the lien was not enforceable under section 50 because Diviacchi “failed to make a showing that he incurred reasonable fees and expenses….” The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Diviacchi’s lien was not legally enforceable against the sale proceeds.View "Sovereign Bank v. Diviacchi" on Justia Law