Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In this case concerning arbitration agreements, nursing homes, and wrongful death claims under Massachusetts law, the First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court compelling arbitration after first certifying two questions to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC), holding that the SJC's decision compelled the First Circuit to affirmed the judgment compelling arbitration.The personal representative of a deceased former nursing home resident brought a state wrongful death action against a set of organizations that oversaw the nursing home (collectively, nursing home). The nursing home sued to compel arbitration. The federal court compelled arbitration. On appeal, the personal representative argued that she was not bound by the decedent’s agreement to arbitrate with the nursing home because her wrongful death right of recovery was independent of the decedent’s wrongful death claim. The First Circuit certified questions of law to the SJC. After the SJC answered that claims of statutory beneficiaries under the state's wrongful death statute are derivative of the decedent's own cause of action, the First Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that the SJC's decision required this Court to affirm the judgment compelling arbitration. View "GGNSC Chestnut Hill LLC v. Schrader" on Justia Law

In this class action lawsuit stemming from the 2011 nuclear disaster at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant (FNPP) in Japan, the First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissing Plaintiffs' suit under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that an adequate alternative forum was available in Japan.Plaintiffs were individuals and business entities who suffered property damage and/or economic harm as a result of the FNPP disaster. Plaintiffs filed suit against General Electric Company (GE) alleging that GE negligently designed the FNPP's nuclear reactors and safety mechanisms, both of which were implicated in the explosions. Plaintiffs alleged that venue was proper in the District of Massachusetts because GE maintained its corporate headquarters and principal place of business in Boston, Massachusetts. The district court dismissed the suit under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, determining that an adequate alternative forum was available to Plaintiffs in Japan and that dismissal was in the private and public interest. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Japan satisfied the forum availability requirement despite the jurisdictional idiosyncrasies presented in this case. View "Imamura v. General Electric Co." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment of the district court dismissing Plaintiff's case against various defendants, holding that the district court did not err in dismissing Plaintiff's federal law claims or state law negligent training/supervision claim but erred in dismissing Plaintiff's state law negligence claim.Kelsey Zell, a high school junior, was hit by a fellow student and sustained a concussion. Zell faced a one-day suspension for her role in the altercation. Zell and her parents (together, Plaintiffs) unsuccessfully challenged the suspension decision. Plaintiffs later filed a complaint against the school district's superintendent, the dean of students, and other school officials, alleging several claims. The district court dismissed the claims and denied Plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint. The court then denied Defendants' motion for sanctions. The First Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding that the district court (1) did not err in dismissing Zell's federal law claims or state law negligent training/supervision claim and Zell's motion to amend as it relates to these issues; (2) did not err in denying the denial of Defendant's motion for sanctions against Zell's counsel; but (3) erred in dismissing Plaintiff's state law negligence claim. View "Zell v. Ricci" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the district court's entry of summary judgment in favor of the Saco, Maine Shaw's Supermarket on Plaintiff's claim that Shaw's owed a duty to protect its patrons from foreseeable harm and that an attack on his wife in the store was foreseeable, holding that, under Maine law of premises liability, the harm must have been foreseeable, and the attack in this case was not foreseeable.Connor MacCalister attacked and killed Wendy Boudreau with a knife in the Saco Shaw's Supermarket. Jeffrey Boudreau, Wendy's husband and the executor of her estate, brought this action against Shaw's asserting wrongful death and conscious pain and suffering under Maine law. The district court entered summary judgment for Shaw's, concluding that Shaw's did not owe a duty under Maine wrongful death law to protect Wendy from the attack because it was not foreseeable. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Shaw's did not owe a duty to protect Wendy from MacCalister; (2) the district court did not err in how it viewed the facts; and (3) there was no error in the district court's evidentiary rulings challenged on appeal. View "Boudreau v. Shaw's Supermarkets Inc." on Justia Law

In this appeal concerning whether a settlement contract under Rhode Island law was formed after a personal injury lawsuit was filed the First Circuit certified to the Rhode Island Supreme Court the question of what is the definition of 'civil action' in R.I. Gen. Laws 27-7-2.2.Horace Johnson was the driver and Carlton Johnson was the sole passenger in a car accident. The accident occurred in Rhode Island. Both men were seriously injured. Horace was insured by Arbella Mutual Insurance Company. Arbella accepted Carlton's demand to settle for the policy limit of $100,000. Thereafter, Carlton filed a lawsuit against Horace, Arbella, and other defendants. A federal district court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The district court rejected Carlton's argument that Rhode Island's Rejected Settlement Offer Interest Statute, section 27-7-2.2, applied to the case. Carlton appealed, arguing that the statute rendered the settlement contract unenforceable because Arbella failed to accept his settlement offer within the timetable set forth by the statute. At issue was whether the court correctly determined that the statute's "[i]n any civil action" language requires that a legal proceeding in court needs to be underway to trigger the statute's application. The First Circuit certified to the Rhode Island Supreme Court a question concerning the definition of "civil action." View "Johnson v. Johnson" on Justia Law

In this insurance dispute, the First Circuit directed entry of summary judgment for Zurich American Insurance Company, holding that Zurich's decision to deny the insured's claim was supported by substantial evidence.Denise Arruda filed a claim for death benefits following the death of her husband, Joseph Arruda, in a car accident. Zurich denied the claim, concluding that Joseph's death was not within the coverage clause of the policy because the death was not independent of all other causes and that it was caused or contributed to by his pre-existing health conditions. Denise brought this action under 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)(B) alleging that Zurich violated ERISA by denying the insurance benefits. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Denise, concluding that substantial evidence did not support Zurich's decision. The First Circuit reversed, holding that Zurich's conclusion that Joseph's death was caused or contributed to by pre-existing medical conditions was not arbitrary or capricious and was supported by substantial evidence. View "Arruda v. Zurich American Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on Appellant's federal law claims under the Age Discrimination and Employment Act, and on the state-law claims for discrimination, retaliation based on a complaint of age discrimination, and failure to investigate and vacated the summary judgment on the state law claims for retaliation based on a report of gender discrimination, breach of contract, intentional interference with contractual relations, and defamation, holding that the court erred in granting summary judgment as to these claims.This lawsuit arose from events that led to Appellant's retirement from his position as Fire Chief for the Fire Department of the Town of Marshfield, Massachusetts. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Town on all of Appellant's federal and state law claims. The First Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding (1) summary judgment was properly granted as to some of Appellant's claims; but (2) as to the remaining state law claims, there was no analogue to the common law claims in the federal law claims that were addressed, and rather than attempt to resolve the state law issues that were in dispute as to these claims, their dismissal was directed without prejudice. View "Robinson v. Town of Marshfield" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment of the district court entered judgment for the pleadings on all of Plaintiff's claims, holding that Plaintiff's state certiorari claim did not fail to state a claim on the pleadings.Plaintiff, a former City of Haverhill police officer, brought this action against the city's chief of police and the city's mayor after Plaintiff was denied his request for an identification card to allow him to carry a concealed firearm across state lines under the Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act. Defendants removed the case to federal district court, which entered judgment on the pleadings for Defendants on all four of Plaintiff's claims. The First Circuit directed the dismissal of Plaintiff's state certiorari claim without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction and otherwise affirmed, holding (1) Massachusetts has, in its state certiorari procedure, provided a constitutionally adequate remedy precluding assertion of a federal procedural due process claim in this case; (2) Plaintiff failed to plead facts sufficient to support his federal substantive due process claim; (3) the district court properly dismissed Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 due process claim; and (4) Plaintiff's negligence claim and purported equity claim plainly failed to assert a claim under state law. View "Lambert v. Fiorentini" on Justia Law

In this case alleging negligent design, the First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court in favor of Defendants on the ground that Plaintiff failed to establish the applicable standard of care, a breach of duty, and that the accident giving rise to this action was foreseeable to Defendants, holding that judgment was properly granted for Defendants.When a vehicle was driven into another vehicle parked outside a building, the parked vehicle crashed into the building's open terrace, injuring several individuals sitting within the terrace, including Plaintiff, Plaintiff sued the owner of the building, his heirs, and his insurer, arguing that the terrace was negligently designed. The district court entered judgment for the defense. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiff failed to show damage through fault or negligence of Defendants. View "Aponte-Bermudez v. Colon" on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed the judgment of the magistrate judge concluding that Defendant, a state drug lab supervisor, was not entitled to qualified immunity from a claim brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and vacated the denial of Defendant's motion to dismiss an intentional infliction of emotional distress state law claim, holding that Defendant was entitled to qualified immunity from the section 1983 claim.Plaintiff's conviction was vacated after the discovery of the drug abuse of Sonja Farak, a chemist at the Amherst Drug Lab on the campus of the University of Massachusetts. Plaintiff brought this complaint alleged that Defendant's inadequate supervision Farak constituted deliberate indifference to Defendant's constitutional rights. Defendant also claimed intentional infliction of emotional distress. The magistrate judge denied Defendant's motion to dismiss the section 1983 claim and held that Defendant's behavior showing a disregard for "repeated red flags" was enough to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under state law. The First Circuit reversed in part and vacated in part, holding (1) Defendant was entitled to qualified immunity from the section 1983 claim; and (2) because the sole basis for federal jurisdiction was dismissed the judgment on the intentional infliction of emotional distress state law claim is remanded to state court. View "Penate v. Hanchett" on Justia Law