Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

At issue was whether the mailing of a claim filed pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) for wrongful death was timely presented to the appropriate federal agency where Plaintiffs mailed the notice through the United States Postal Service (USPS) via certified mail and USPS attempted delivery on the last day of the two-year period.The district court dismissed the FTCA suit on the grounds that Plaintiffs had not first timely presented their claim to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) because ICE did not come into actual possession of Plaintiffs’ mailed notice of their claim until after the two-year period had run. The First Circuit vacated the dismissal, holding that this case must be remanded for consideration of Plaintiffs’ contention that Plaintiffs’ claim had been timely presented by virtue of the fact that USPS arrived at ICE with notice of the tort claim on the last day of the two-year statutory period. View "Ortiz-Rivera v. United States" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the federal district court’s denial of Plaintiff’s motion for a default judgment against the Republic of Cuba seeking to enforce a Maine Superior Court’s default judgment of $21 million for the “extrajudicial killing” of Plaintiff’s father, a purported covert United States agent.The district court denied Plaintiff’s motion and dismissed her suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1330, 1602-1611, which generally bars suits against foreign sovereigns. The district court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the suit because of Plaintiff’s failure to show that the terrorism exception to foreign sovereign immunity applied. Specifically, the district court disagreed with the Maine Superior Court’s determination that Plaintiff’s father was “extrajudicially killed” by Cuba for purposes of the FSIA. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiff failed to provide any evidence that Cuba committed an extrajudicial killing, and therefore, Plaintiff could not establish that the terrorism exception to the FSIA applied. View "Sullivan v. Republic of Cuba" on Justia Law

Appellants’ action brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 1346(b), 2671-2680, seeking compensatory damages for the allegedly negligent act of a federal employee was time-barred under the FTCA’s statute of limitations.On April 22, 2013, Appellants filed a medical malpractice complaint pursuant to the FTCA against the United States Department of Health and Human Services (USDHHS). The district court granted summary judgment for USDHHS, concluding that the complaint was time-barred for failing to file compulsory administrative claims within the FTCA’s two-year statute of limitations. On appeal, Appellants argued that their claim was timely under the “discovery rule.” The First Circuit affirmed, holding that, at least by March 8, 2010, Appellants knew of sufficient facts for their cause of action to accrue, and therefore, Appellants’ action was time-barred. View "Morales-Melecio v. United States" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing this defamation action for lack of personal jurisdiction.The Deal, LLC posted to a subscriber-only website an attached to email newsletters three articles written by William Meagher that allegedly defamed Scottsdale Capital Advisors Corp. and John Hurry (collectively, Plaintiffs). Plaintiffs filed suit in New Hampshire. The only connection any of the parties had with New Hampshire was that Dartmouth College, one of The Deal’s institutional subscribers, was located there. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, concluding that Plaintiffs would have no reasonable basis upon which to establish that anyone in New Hampshire saw any of the articles as a result of the Dartmouth subscription. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that nothing in the record indicated that Plaintiffs’ only injury, reputational harm, arose in any way from Defendants’ only contacts with Plaintiffs’ chosen forum. View "Scottsdale Capital Advisors v. The Deal, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs within the zone of danger may recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress under the general maritime law.Plaintiffs brought this maritime action against Defendant, which they hired to ferry three construction vehicles and their drivers from Rockland, Maine to North Haven, Maine, after two of the vehicles tipped over onto the vessel’s port bulwark during rough seas. Plaintiffs claimed that the ship captain was negligent and seeking damages for property loss and emotional distress. The district court found in favor of Plaintiffs and awarded $257,154 in damages, including $100,000 for emotional distress. The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court in substantial part, vacating only one element of the damages award, holding (1) the district court properly found that the weather conditions that caused the incident were foreseeable; (2) the district court’s award for damaged plywood panels rested on a clearly erroneous view of the facts, but the remainder of the damages award was not in error; (3) maritime plaintiffs within the “zone of danger” can recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress in the First Circuit; and (4) the district court did not clearly err in determining that Plaintiffs were within the zone of danger and that they experienced physical consequences of emotional distress. View "Sawyer Brothers, Inc. v. Island Transporter, LLC" on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed the district court’s order granting summary judgment to Appellee Omni Hotels Management Corporation (“Omni”) in this negligence action brought by Appellant Henry Mu. Mu was assaulted by an unidentified group of individuals in the lobby of the Omni Providence Hotel, which Omni operated. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Omni, ruling that Omni owed Plaintiff no legal duty, Plaintiff failed to make out the relevant standard of care and show a breach of that standard, Plaintiff failed to show causation, and Plaintiff’s allegations of evidentiary spoliation did not warrant a negative inference in his favor. The First Circuit disagreed, holding that Plaintiff’s negligence claim was sufficient to survive summary judgment. View "Mu v. Omni Hotels Management Corp." on Justia Law

In this case alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. 1983 and tort claims, the First Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants following Plaintiffs’ failure to oppose the motion with the timeframe set by the court. Almost one month after Plaintiffs’ opposition to Defendants’ summary judgment motion was due, the district court granted Defendants’ unopposed motion for summary judgment. Two days later, Plaintiff filed a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) on the ground of excusable neglect. The district court denied relief, determining that Plaintiffs’ failure to oppose the summary judgment motion was not excusable. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court acted within its discretion in concluding that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate excusable neglect. View "Skrabec v. Town of North Attleboro" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in this action filed by the Town of Westport against Monsanto Company, Solutia, Inc., and Pharmacia Corporation alleging that Phamacia was liable for “property damage” caused by polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) contamination at Westport Middle School (WMS). When WMS was built in 1969, the contractor used caulk that contained PCBs. Monsanto did not make the caulk but sold plasticizers, a component of caulk, to the third-party manufacturer who did. On appeal, Westport challenged the entry of judgment against its breach of warranty and negligent marketing claims. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Monsanto did not breach the implied warranty of merchantability because it was not reasonably foreseeable in 1969 that there was a risk PCBs would volatilize from caulk at levels requiring premeditation; and (2) as a matter of Massachusetts state law, a negligent marketing claim cannot be maintained independent of a design defect claim on these facts. View "Town of Westport v. Monsanto Co." on Justia Law

The federal government’s sovereign immunity, as exemplified by the discretionary function exception, pretermitted Appellant’s effort to recover damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) for the loss of twenty-five of his shade trees.Appellant instituted this FTCA action alleging that twenty-five of his maple trees had been chopped down without his permission. The trees were removed by the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) pursuant to a quarantine order entered by the Massachusetts Department of Conservation and Recreation (DCR) in an effort to combat a bug infestation. The magistrate judge entered summary judgment in favor of the government, concluding that the discretionary function exception to liability under the FTCA barred Appellant’s lawsuit. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that APHIS’s decision to cut down Appellant’s trees without first securing his permission constituted a policy-driven exercise of discretion and therefore fell under the discretionary function exception. View "Evans v. United States" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of Defendants’ motion to strike many of the facts set forth in Plaintiff’s statement of facts in support of his summary judgment motion, as well as the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendants in this personal injury lawsuit.Plaintiff and the driver of a tractor trailer were involved in a vehicle collision. Plaintiff bought this negligence suit against the driver and the company that owned the vehicle and hired the driver. The district court granted Defendants’ motion to strike Plaintiff’s statement of facts and then granted summary judgment to Defendants. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly struck the expert reports attached to Plaintiff’s opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment; and (2) summary judgment was properly granted for Defendants. View "Amoah v. McKinney" on Justia Law