Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2020, a federal grand jury indicted David DeQuattro, an architect, and Cedric Cromwell, Chairman of the Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Council and President of the Mashpee Wampanoag Gaming Authority. They were charged with various federal offenses, including bribery and extortion, related to Cromwell allegedly soliciting and DeQuattro allegedly providing checks and other items of value to protect a contract between DeQuattro's firm and the Gaming Authority for building a casino on tribal land.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts held a jury trial where DeQuattro was convicted of one count of federal-program bribery, and Cromwell was convicted of two counts of federal-program bribery and multiple counts of Hobbs Act extortion. However, the District Court later entered a judgment of acquittal on the Hobbs Act-related counts, determining that the Hobbs Act did not clearly abrogate tribal immunity. Both defendants appealed their § 666 convictions, and the government cross-appealed the judgment of acquittal on the Hobbs Act counts.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed both the § 666 convictions and the judgment of acquittal. The court found that the evidence did not suffice to show that the RGB contract was "business" of the Tribe, as required under § 666, because the Gaming Authority, which entered the contract, was a separate legal entity from the Tribe and received almost all its funding from a third party. The court also reversed the District Court's judgment of acquittal on the Hobbs Act convictions, holding that tribal officials do not enjoy immunity from federal criminal prosecution and that the evidence was sufficient to show Cromwell's intent to engage in a quid pro quo arrangement. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "United States v. Dequattro" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the decision of the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) to take two parcels of land in Massachusetts into trust for the Mashpee Wampanoag Indian Tribe, holding that the BIA's application of its legal interpretation to the facts was not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.Appellants brought this action challenging the Interior's 2021 record of decision reaffirming its 2015 decision to take the land into trust for the Tribe, arguing that the Tribe did not qualify as a "tribe" within the meaning of the Indian Reorganization Act, that the Tribe was not "under Federal jurisdiction," and that the parcel of land was not eligible activities under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. The district court granted summary judgment for the Interior and the Tribe. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Appellants were not entitled to relief on any of their allegations of error. View "Littlefield v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing Appellants' complaint against the Town of Lynnfield, Massachusetts and several of the town's agencies and employees (collectively, Lynnfield) in this dispute over Appellants' spring water business, holding that there was no error or abuse of discretion.Appellants owned and operated the Pocahontas Spring in Lynnfield, Massachusetts, which sat on protected wetlands subject to state and local regulations. When Appellants sought to revive their spring water business and to maintain the Spring for Native Americans as a source of healing water. Appellants brought this complaint alleging that Lynnfield conspired to have neighbors lodge false complaint about Appellants' allegedly unlawful activities at the Spring and Lynnfield would respond to intimidate Appellants and interfere with their business. The First Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint, holding that Appellants' failure adequately to brief their two First Amendment claims proved fatal in this case. View "Gattineri v. Town of Lynnfield, Mass." on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed the bankruptcy court's dismissal of Debtor's motion to enforce an automatic stay as to a subsidiary of the Lac Du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians, holding that the Bankruptcy Code unequivocally strips tribes of their immunity,Debtor sought to enforce the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay against one of his creditors, a subsidiary of the Lac Du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians (Band). Debtor sought an order prohibiting further collection efforts as well as damages and attorney fees. The Band and its affiliates moved to dismiss the enforcement proceeding, asserting tribal sovereign immunity. The bankruptcy court agreed and granted the motion to dismiss. The First Circuit reversed the decision of the bankruptcy court dismissing Debtor's motion to enforce the automatic stay, holding that tribes are governmental units and, thus, the Bankruptcy Code abrogates tribal sovereign immunity. View "Coughlin v. Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the order of the district court finding that the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) incorrectly approved the taking of two areas of land into trust for the Mashpee Wampanoag Indian Tribe, holding that the plain meaning of the text of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA) precluded the BIA's interpretation of 25 U.S.C. 5129.The Tribe planned to use land taken into trust in Mashpee, Massachusetts primarily for housing and planning to use land in Taunton, Massachusetts for economic activities. In approving the taking of the two areas of land into trust for the Tribe the BIA construed 25 U.S.C. 5129 to permit it to accept lands for the Tribe. The district court remanded the matter to the BIA, finding that the BIA incorrectly read the statute as giving it authority to take land into trust for the Tribe. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the IRA unambiguously foreclosed the BIA's interpretation of 25 U.S.C. 5129; and (2) therefore, the BIA lacked authority to take land into trust for the benefit of the Tribe. View "Littlefield v. Mashpee Wampanoag Indian Tribe" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the complaint filed by the Narragansett Indian Tribe against federal and Rhode Island agencies concerning a highway bridge reconstruction over historic tribal land, holding that the Tribe’s claim was not the type of claim federal courts may adjudicate.The Tribe filed suit in federal district court alleging breach of contract and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The heart of the Tribe’s claim contended that the state of Rhode Island broke a promise made to the Tribe. The district court granted Defendants’ motions to dismiss, concluding (1) as to the federal defendants, none of the three statutes identified in the complaint waived the federal government’s sovereign immunity as to the Tribe’s claims; and (2) as to the state defendants, the Tribe alleged no basis to support the court’s exercise of jurisdiction. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the National Historic Preservation Act does not waive the federal government’s sovereign immunity in connection with the bringing of this suit; and (2) as to the state agencies, the complaint lacked any basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction. View "Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Rhode Island Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

The Wampanoag Tribe of Gay Head (Aquinnah) (the Tribe) decided to pursue gaming pursuant to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) on its trust lands in Dukes County, Massachusetts (the Settlement Lands). The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the Town of Aquinnah, and the Aquinnah/Gay Head Community Association (collectively, Appellees) argued that any gaming on the Settlement Lands should be subject to state, rather than federal, laws and regulations. The district court granted summary judgment for Appellees, ruling that the Settlement Lands were not covered by IGRA and hence were subject to the Commonwealth’s gaming regulations. The court found that the Tribe had failed to exercise sufficient governmental power over those lands, as required for IGRA to apply, and even if the Tribe had exercised sufficient governmental power the Wampanoag Tribal Council of Gay Head, Inc., Indian Claims Settlement Act of 1987 (the Federal Act), which provides that the Settlement Lands are subject to state laws and regulations, governed. The First Circuit reversed, holding (1) IGRA applies to the Settlement Lands; and (2) the Federal Act has been impliedly repealed by IGRA in relevant part. View "Commonwealth v. Wampanoag Tribe of Gay Head" on Justia Law

In 2012, a grand jury in the District of Rhode Island served the Narragansett Indian Tribal Historic Preservation Office (NITHPO) with a subpoena duces tecum directing NITHPO to appear before the grand jury with a series of documents. NITHPO refused to produce the subpoenaed records. The sitting grand jury was subsequently discharged, and in 2013, a new grand jury was empanelled. Thereafter, the government filed a motion to compel NITHPO’s compliance with the 2012 subpoena. The district court granted the government’s motion to compel and ordered NITHPO to comply with the 2012 grand jury subpoena. After NITHPO failed to appear on the agreed-upon date, the district court adjudged NITHPO in civil contempt and imposed a fine for noncompliance. On appeal, the First Circuit Court of Appeals (1) vacated the district court’s order holding NITHPO in civil contempt, holding that a subpoena duces tecum compelling the production of documents to a now-defunct grand jury cannot be enforced by civil contempt sanctions before a successor grand jury; and (2) rejected NITHPO’s contentions that tribal sovereign immunity shielded it from subpoena and that the subpoena was unreasonably broad in scope. View "In re Grand Jury Proceedings" on Justia Law

The federal Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. 2701-2721, establishes a cooperative federal-state-tribal regime for regulating gaming by federally recognized Indian tribes on Indian lands. The Massachusetts Gaming Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 23K, sect. 3(a), establishes a licensing scheme and other standards for gaming. KG, a potential applicant for a gaming license, argued that the state Act provides unauthorized preferences to Indian tribes and on that basis treats the southeast section of the state differently, and this constitutes a classification on the basis of race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause and is inconsistent with congressional intent in the federal Indian gaming statute. The district court dismissed. The First Circuit vacated with respect to the equal protection claim and otherwise affirmed. Whether the tribal provisions are "authorized" by the IGRA such that is subject to only rational basis review is far from clear, presents a difficult question of statutory interpretation, and implicates a practice of the Secretary of the Interior not challenged in this suit. There is apparently no judicial authority addressing the question of whether a state may negotiate a tribal-state compact with a federally recognized tribe that does not presently possess Indian lands. View "KG Urban Enters., LLC v. Patrick" on Justia Law

The former governor and former financial director of the Tribe were convicted for conspiracy to defraud the United States (18 U.S.C. 371), and of violations of 18 U.S.C. 287, 666 and 669, involving misuse of federal grant and tribal monies at the Passamaquoddy Tribe Indian Township Reservation in Maine. The First Circuit vacated the conviction of the financial director for making material misstatements about how grant money intended for HIV and substance abuse prevention was spent, but otherwise affirmed. The evidence that the director knew that his statements were false was insufficient. The district court had jurisdiction; several counts involved mismanagement of federal grants and contracts, which are subject to regulations that the Tribe is not free to ignore, and do not constitute internal tribal matters.