Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Jeffrey Neece sued the City of Chicopee, alleging that the mayor's decision not to renew his employment contract was retaliation for his testimony in a gender-discrimination case against the city. Neece claimed that his testimony undermined the city's defense, while the mayor argued that Neece was unproductive and unresponsive to his colleagues. The jury rejected Neece's retaliation claims. Neece appealed, arguing that he was entitled to a new trial because the district court limited the evidence he could present about a key event: a closed-door meeting between the city's attorneys and the city council about the merits of the gender-discrimination case and the impact of Neece's testimony.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit upheld the district court's decision, concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting evidence about the meeting. The court found that the mayor, who did not attend the meeting, was the decision-maker in not renewing Neece's contract. Neece was unable to show that the mayor ever learned about the details of the meeting, making the meeting irrelevant to the mayor's state of mind or alleged retaliatory motive. The court also found that the city did not waive its attorney-client privilege regarding the mayor's private conversations with the city attorney about the settlement of the gender-discrimination case. Therefore, the court affirmed the jury's verdict in favor of the city. View "Neece v. City of Chicopee" on Justia Law

A defamation lawsuit was filed by Dana Cheng, a New York resident and political commentator, against Dan Neumann and Beacon, a Maine news outlet, for characterizing Cheng as "far-right" and a "conspiracy theorist" in an article. Neumann and Beacon sought dismissal of the case under both federal law and a New York anti-SLAPP law, which applies to meritless defamation lawsuits. The district court conducted a choice-of-law analysis, decided that New York law applied, and granted the motion to dismiss under New York's anti-SLAPP statute.The district court's decision was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The appellate court agreed with the district court's ruling but for a different reason: it decided that Cheng's lawsuit had to be dismissed under binding First Amendment principles protecting free speech by the press. Back at the district court, Neumann requested attorneys' fees under the fee-shifting provision of New York's anti-SLAPP law. The district court denied Neumann's request after determining that Maine, not New York, law applied to the specific issue of attorneys' fees.Neumann appealed again, arguing that the district court erred in its choice-of-law analysis. The appellate court, noting the lack of clear controlling precedent on the issue, certified to the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine the question of which state's law applies to the attorneys' fees issue. View "Cheng v. Neumann" on Justia Law

In this case, defendant Samuel Arce-Ayala, a leader of a drug trafficking organization, pled guilty to federal charges related to drug trafficking and firearm possession. He believed, based on his plea agreement and statements made by his lawyer and the district court, that his federal sentence would reflect "credit" for the prison time he served for related non-federal criminal convictions. However, after entering his guilty plea, Arce-Ayala discovered that such credit could not reduce his sentence below the applicable mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment. He moved to withdraw his plea before sentencing, arguing that he didn't understand the consequences of his guilty plea, but the district court denied the motion.The United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit vacated Arce-Ayala's criminal judgment of conviction. The court held that Arce-Ayala did not have sufficient "knowledge of the consequences of the guilty plea" because he was told by his defense counsel and the district court that the time he spent in Commonwealth custody would be credited toward his federal sentence. He did not know that the mandatory minimum prison sentence set an inviolable floor as to the amount of credit he could receive for time served on the Commonwealth sentences. As such, his plea violated a "core concern" of Rule 11, which requires a defendant to understand the consequences of a guilty plea, and must be set aside. The case was remanded back to the district court for further proceedings. View "United States v. Arce-Ayala" on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed the judgment of the federal district court imposing Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 sanctions against attorney Michael McArdle, counsel on a state court complaint, holding that the district court erred in imposing Rule 11 sanctions against McArdle based on the amended complaint and that Rule 11's procedural requirements were not met in this case.Nicholas Triantos, a lawyer, sued several defendants in Massachusetts Superior Court asserting various claims arising out of a foreclosure on his property. McArdle was counsel of record for Triantos and signed the state court complaint. After the case was removed to federal district court McArdle did not enter a notice of appearance. Triantos himself entered a pro se notice of appearance and signed and filed an amended complaint. The district court later dismissed the amended complaint for failure to state a claim. Appellant moved for sanctions against Triantos and McArdle under Rule 11, which the district court granted. McArdle moved for relief from this order under Rule 60(b), but the district court summarily denied the motion. The First Circuit reversed, holding that the district court made two errors in imposing Rule 11 sanctions against McArdle and that McArdle's Rule 60(b) motion should have been granted. View "Guaetta & Benson, LLC v. McArdle" on Justia Law

In this appeal arising from the post-settlement process of apportioning a $300 million recovery between a class and its lawyers the First Circuit affirmed the district court's Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b) sanction of Leiff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein LLP (Lieff) and otherwise dismissed as unappealable Lieff's challenges to the district court's criticisms of Lieff's actions, holding that there was no error.Lieff served as one of the principal law firms representing a class of investors in a successful challenge to charges imposed by State Street Bank and Trust Company on foreign exchange products. The district court awarded a $60 million fee to the lawyers representing the class but formally sanctioned Lieff for engaging in misconduct without imposing any monetary penalty. The First Circuit affirmed in part and dismissed in part, holding (1) the district court did not err in sanctioning Lieff; and (2) the remainder of Lieff's allegations of error were unappealable. View "Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Berns v. Labaton Sucharow LLP" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the order of the district court imposing a sanction against Appellant under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion.Appellant was a Massachusetts lawyer who brought suit on behalf of Gerald Alston, a black man who formerly worked as a firefighter. Defendant Stanley Spiegel eventually moved to dismiss and for sanctions. The magistrate judge recommended that the district court dismiss the claims against Spiegel with prejudice and ruled that sanctions were in order. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that because Appellant persisted in pursuing claims against Spiegel without an adequate basis in law or fact and despite a warning from the magistrate judge, sanctions were in order. View "Ames v. Spiegel" on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed the district court's order sanctioning Attorney for failing to appear at a status conference, holding that where Attorney was fined without first being given a chance to show cause or explain her failure to appear, the court's order was an abuse of discretion.After Attorney failed to appear at a status conference the district court opened the conference by imposing a monetary sanction on Attorney for her failure to appear. Attorney filed two motions for reconsideration asking the court to excuse her non-appearance due to "mistake" in scheduling. The district court denied the motions for reconsideration. The First Circuit reversed, holding that the sanctions were an abuse of discretion because (1) the district judge in this case does not uniformly sanction all counsel who fail to appear; (2) it cannot be determined which non-appearing attorneys are sanctions and which ones are not; and (3) the district court fined Attorney without first giving her a chance to show cause or explain her failure to appear. View "In re Pimentel-Soto" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the federal district court denying Appellant's request for a declaratory judgment asserting that a protective order that remained in effect in his now-closed state criminal case was unconstitutional, holding that the state court judge was protected from this lawsuit by the doctrine of judicial immunity.Appellant filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that the protective order violated his First Amendment rights. Appellee, the state court judge, responded with a motion to dismiss, arguing that she was protected by judicial immunity. The federal district court granted Appellee's motion to dismiss. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Appellee's actions were shielded from attack by judicial immunity. View "Zenon v. Guzman" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s lawsuit challenging the revocation of his attorney’s license, holding that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred his suit.After the Rhode Island Supreme Court suspended Plaintiff from practicing law for one year, Plaintiff filed this federal suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against nearly two dozen judicial officers and administrators who had participated in his disciplinary proceedings, alleging violations of his constitutional rights under both the Rhode Island and the United States Constitutions. The district court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss primarily on the grounds that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine divested the court of subject-matter jurisdiction. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court correctly ruled that Plaintiff’s suit was barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. View "McKenna v. Curtin" on Justia Law

Appellant, an experienced bankruptcy attorney, represented Debtor, who sought relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. During the proceedings, Appellant engaged in conduct that caused the bankruptcy court to order Appellant to show cause why he should not be sanctioned under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9011(b)(2). The bankruptcy court subsequently found that Appellant twice described the applicable law in a manner that it deemed to be misleading and imposed a sanction in the form of a non-monetary penalty. The First Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court’s order imposing a sanction on Appellant, holding that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in construing Appellant’s submissions as sufficiently misleading so as to warrant a sanction. View "Baker v. Harrington" on Justia Law