Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The company claimed that the union violated a collective bargaining agreement no-strike clause on four occasions in 2008 and 2009 as part of a pattern of behavior undercutting the arbitral process. Specifically, the company claims the union made representations that the union would fine members who brought required devices to work, engaged in a short concerted work stoppage, coordinated refusals to volunteer for overtime work, and protested at a company facility each morning for several weeks. The district court granted the union summary judgment, finding that the company had not shown future harm and declining to issue either injunctive or declaratory relief. The First Circuit affirmed denial of injunctive relief, but vacated with respect to declaratory relief. The alleged actions do not establish a repeated pattern giving rise to ongoing harm that would justify an injunction, but the matter is ripe for declaratory relief.

A medical social worker at the Health Department of San Juan sued the municipality and officials under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that they fired her in retaliation for statements she made on matters of public concern in violation of the First Amendment. The district court denied the individual defendants summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity. The First Circuit reversed. Defendants could have reasonably concluded that they did not have the necessary confidence and trust in plaintiff to continue her employment and that firing her would not violate her First Amendment rights: the city investigated plaintiff's much publicized allegations of serious improprieties by the executive director of her department, she refused to provide testimony or evidence to corroborate her claims, the investigation determined that the claims were false and baseless, and her actions were found to violate state and local regulations.

A jury awarded plaintiff $300,000 in damages in a Title VII suit alleging intentional discrimination by her former employer. Plaintiff had testified that during her employment as a construction worker, she was forced to perform oral sex on a supervisor multiple times, was subjected to extreme, continuing sexual abuse by coworkers and supervisors, that the job was her only means of supporting her family, and that the company ignored her complaints. The district court reduced the jury award to $50,000 under 42 U.S.C. 1981a(b)(3)(A), using the year of the award to measure the number of employees and determine the size of the applicable statutory cap. The First Circuit vacated and remanded for an award of $200,000,stating that the relevant year for determining the cap was the year in which the discrimination occurred and that the employer had the burden of proof with respect to the cap.

The employee of a firm that provides temporary workers signed a confidentiality agreement. After disputes about delays in compensation and reimbursement, he approached the employer's client (for whom he had been working) about the delays. He was terminated for violation of the clause and filed an unfair labor practices charge. The NLRB found the clause overbroad so that the termination violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by interfering with rights guaranteed by 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1). The First Circuit granted the NLRB's motion to enforce its order that the employer rescind the provision, reinstate the employee, and pay damages. The confidentiality language could be fairly read to cover disclosure of terms of employment to union representatives; a more narrowly-drafted provision could serve the employer's legitimate interests. The NLRB did not err in not considering that the employee would have been discharged regardless of violation of the clause.

Plaintiff sued her former employer for gender-based discrimination and hostile work environment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and Puerto Rico law. A jury awarded damages for emotional distress; the judge reduced the $350,000 award to $200,000. The First Circuit affirmed, finding the evidence sufficient to support the verdict and to support the jury's rejection of a defense that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct harassment and that the employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer.

In 2005 American Airlines began charging passengers a fee of $2 for each bag checked with porters providing curbside service (skycaps) at Logan Airport. Gratuities fell significantly, despite the posting of signs intended to clarify that the fee was not a tip. Skycaps sued and a jury awarded damages for tortious interference with economic advantage and for violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, 152A, which provides that no employer may demand or accept from any service employee any payment or deduction from a tip or service charge given to a service employee by a patron. The First Circuit reversed, noting that violation of the tips statute was the basis of damages itself and served as the improper conduct on which the jury based its tortious interference verdict. That statute is preempted by federal law; it is "related to" both price and service and it favors Massachusetts working for the national operation.

The employee claimed sex and disability discrimination and retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The district court granted the employer's motion to compel arbitration. The First Circuit affirmed. The company established the existence of a valid agreement. The court rejected an argument that the Spanish translation differed from the English version and held that the mutual obligation to arbitrate is supported by consideration. Claims under Title VII and the ADA are subject to arbitration; a contract reference to remedies available under the employer's rules is ambiguous and could be interpreted as allowing all of the remedies provided by the statutes. The employee, having signed a receipt, had adequate notice of the obligation to arbitrate.

In 2003 the hotel and the union entered into an agreement in anticipation of renovation of a dilapidated structure into the Renaissance Providence Hotel. The agreement allowed the union to organize hotel employees and seek recognition as their collective bargaining representative; the union would refrain from picketing or economic activity against the hotel. In 2010 the union requested recognition pursuant to the card recognition procedure described in the agreement; the hotel declined, claiming that the agreement had expired, and declined to participate in arbitration. The district court ordered arbitration. The First Circuit affirmed and awarded costs to the union. The meaning of the phrase "full public opening" in the duration clause of the agreement falls within the provision that "any dispute over ... interpretation or application" will be submitted to arbitration.

The plaintiff, employed by U.S. Customs and Border Patrol, was observed taking a security pass from a car. He shredded the pass, without reporting to his superiors. The Puerto Rico Police Department arrested, charged, and investigated, but because the employee was already under investigation for misconduct, an agent of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was dispatched and observed some of the ensuing questioning and hearing, without participating. The case against the employee was dismissed. The employee's claim of malicious prosecution through the DHS agent was rejected on summary judgment. The First Circuit affirmed, looking to state law, as required by the Federal Torts Claims Act. The DHS agent was not actively instrumental in the investigation and there was no evidence of malice.

The employee's complaint under the Americans with Disabilities Act was dismissed. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the employee was required to submit to alternative dispute resolution. After examining Puerto Rico contract law and the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 1, the court concluded that continued employment of the at-will employee was sufficient consideration to support the agreement, despite the fact that the agreement did not bind both parties to identical procedures. The "threat" of termination did not amount to intimidation that would invalidate consent; state law does not prohibit termination without just cause. The employee's claim that she did not understand the document because of limited English did not constitute an excuse and the agreement was not unconscionable.