Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The company sought a preliminary injunction against a former employee to prohibit violation of his employment agreement by competition with the company, solicitation of its customers and remaining employees, and use of information gained while employed. The court granted a preliminary injunction as to the confidential information, but not as to competition or solicitation. The First Circuit affirmed, applying the law of Massachusetts. The contract limited the employee for only one year, which has passed. When the period of restraint has expired, even when the delay was substantially caused by the time consumed in legal appeals, specific relief is inappropriate and the injured party is left to his damages remedy.

Plaintiff, hired in 1998, filed suit alleging sexual harassment (42 U.S.C. 2000e and the Puerto Rico Anti-Discrimination Act, P.R. Laws tit. 29, 146) by his supervisor in 2001. The case languished for several years before the district court entered summary judgment for defendants. The First Circuit vacated. Plaintiff established a prima facie case of discrimination under a hostile work environment theory. He also established the elements of retaliation for his actions in reporting the supervisor's conduct and the company did not allege legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the conduct of its managers.

The district court entered summary judgment in favor of defendants on claims of sexual harassment, in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151(B) and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2; retaliation, in violation of Title VII, violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act; and state common law claims of negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent failure to provide a safe working environment, and breach of contract. The First Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff failed to show that the defendant company controlled the manner and means of her work so that she was its employee.

Plaintiff worked for the authority for 22 years while receiving treatment for schizophrenia, a condition diagnosed more than 30 years earlier. He received excellent evaluations. He claims that, beginning in 2005, his supervisors made plaintiff's life difficult in retaliation for his union activities. In 2006, plaintiff was barred from working until evaluated by a psychiatrist and was not allowed to work, even after a satisfactory report was received. The district court dismissed all claims. The First Circuit affirmed in part. The complaint did not articulate due process violations to support claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court vacated dismissal of an Americans with Disabilities Act 42 U.S.C. 12101-12213 claim. Although the complaint did not allege that schizophrenia substantially limited any aspect of plaintiff's life, the allegations did support a claim that the employer regarded him as substantially impaired in either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes, as compared with the average person having comparable training, skills, and abilities. Cases against the supervisors were properly dismissed; the Act reaches only the conduct of employers and does not impose liability on co-workers.

The company began requiring its field technicians to carry company-issued cell phones during work. The phones contain a GPS, which allows the company to monitor the locations of the technicians, who are represented by a union. An unfair labor practice, filed with the NLRB, is apparently in arbitration. The technicians filed a separate suit, claiming the policy violated their privacy rights under Article 14 of the Declaration of Rights in the Massachusetts Constitution and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 214, 1B, and their state-law rights as alleged third-party beneficiaries of a contract the company and its provider, which they say required the company to receive consent from its employees when it instituted the phone policy. The district court dismissed. The First Circuit affirmed. The claims are preempted by the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185(a); the technicians did not file a grievance under the collective bargaining agreement.

The city and stopped paying full reimbursement of certain medical expenses for former firefighters and police officers who had retired on disability pensions. The retirees alleged that the decision violated state statutes, constituted an ultra vires act, contradicted principles of equity, and offended the Due Process Clause.The district court entered summary judgment against all but three of the plaintiffs and resolved the remaining claims after trial. The First Circuit affirmed the summary judgment rulings. The state injured-on-duty statute does not require the benefit and there was no evidence that the city ever authorized such a benefit on a global basis or made specific promises to retirees, other than the three that went to trial.

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against a hospital network and senior executives, claiming to represent more than 12,000 employees deprived of compensation for work performed during their meal break, for work performed before and after shifts, and for time spent attending training sessions, based on the Massachusetts Payment of Wages Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, 148; the Massachusetts Minimum Fair Wages Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151, 1A and 15--or breach of contract or implied contract; money had and received; quantum meruit/unjust enrichment; fraud; negligent misrepresentation; conversion; equitable and promissory estoppel. Defendants claimed that the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185, precluded state law claims. The district court dismissed. The First Circuit vacated and remanded, stating that the district court. It is not clear that either named plaintiff is covered by a collective bargaining agreement.

Former employees of defendants participated in the Capital Accumulation Plan, under which they received portions of their earned commissions in the form of Citigroup stock, received at a 25% discount and on a tax-deferred basis. The stock was subject to a two-year vesting period during which transfer was restricted and rights would be forfeited if the employee resigned. Plaintiffs alleged that the CAP forfeiture provision violated the Colorado Wage Claim Act, Colo. Rev. Stat. 8-4-103 and Louisiana's labor statute, La. Rev. Stat. 23:631(A)(1)(a), 23:634(A) and breach of employment contracts, breach of the CAP contract, conversion, and unjust enrichment. The district court dismissed, based on a previous decision involving similarly-situated plaintiffs. The First Circuit affirmed. The Colorado law applies only to compensation that is "earned, vested, and determinable." The Louisiana law does not apply because the stock was not "then due" when the plaintiffs resigned. There was no breach of contract, hence no conversion; the claims of unjust enrichment failed because of the existence of a contract.

The former (2001-2006) Assistant Secretary of State for Protocol Affairs at the Puerto Rico State Department sued the Secretary of State under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the official fired him due to his political affiliation. The district court dismissed, holding that plaintiff could be terminated without cause because he held a trust position for which party affiliation was an appropriate qualification, and fined plaintiff's attorneys $1000 each, concluding that the pleadings and responses that they submitted violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b). The First Circuit affirmed; plaintiff's position was not federally protected against political discrimination. The pleadings at issue consisted, in large part, of speculation and conclusory allegations lacking evidentiary support.

Plaintiff claimed that her employer since 1990, the Puerto Rico Ports Authority, violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, when it failed to provide her with reasonable accommodations (flexible schedule) for her chronic fatigue syndrome disabilities and retaliated against her, including by terminating her employment, for engaging in protected activities. The district court granted the Ports Authority's motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close of plaintiff's case-in-chief. The First Circuit vacated and remanded, concluding that a reasonable jury could have found facts supporting plaintiff's claims. The district court erred finding that plaintiff was not "qualified" under the ADA without considering that the accommodation she requested was a flexible schedule.