Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a municipal employee since 1989, was diagnosed with fibromyalgia in 2005. She claimed of disability discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101 and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 701, and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000. The district court entered summary judgment for her employer. The First Circuit affirmed, upholding the court's refusal to consider evidence for which no corresponding English translation was provided to or properly filed, admission of summary charts prepared by a paralegal employed by the defendant's law firm, and dismissal of an alleged equal protection claim sua sponte. Plaintiff, who was absent more than 50 percent of the time starting in 2006, failed to establish that she was a "qualified individual" under the ADA; physical presence was an essential function. Her request for assigned parking was reasonable, but did not cause any of the claimed adverse employment actions.

Plaintiff, a 49-year-old Cape Verdean female who self-identifies as black, began working for defendant as a Budget Administrator in 2001. Between 2004 and 2008, she applied for, and was denied, promotion to four different positions. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the employer in her case, alleging discrimination based on gender, race, and national origin in violation of Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 151B and Title VII 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 623. The First Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff did not make a prima facie case; she failed to show that she was qualified for the positions at issue or that she was "similarly situated" to other candidates.

Plaintiff, a dental hygienist at defendant's dental health center for more than 10 years, claimed that supervisors subjected her to unpaid work hours because she is black and then to selective discipline and other malfeasance in retaliation for questioning her unpaid hours. The district court entered summary judgment for defendant. The First Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff established only "a litany of petty insults, vindictive behavior, and angry recriminations" that are not actionable.

Plaintiff, an employee of the USDA since 1977, claimed discrimination based on age and gender and retaliation for having complained about discrimination in the past. The district court entered summary judgment against her on claims under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(a). The First Circuit affirmed. Having failed to raise a claim of sex-based discrimination in her 1997 EEOC complaint, plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Her retaliation claim failed for lack of proof of causation. The passage of several years, coupled with the fact that the person in question merely had knowledge of plaintiff's prior complaints, made any inference of causation unreasonable. An age discrimination claim failed because no reasonable fact-finder could conclude that age was a motivating factor in the decision to promote another, rather than plaintiff.

Plaintiff, a small, family-owned firm, with Puerto Rican owners, does construction and related work on electrical utility lines, and had contracts with defendant. Plaintiff's employee was severely electrocuted and burned in accident that occurred while working on an project for defendant and defendant's manager ordered a work stoppage pending investigation, during which the contract expired. OSHA fined plaintiff. When defendant next put contracts out to bid, another company got the primary contract and plaintiff got the secondary contract, which it declined. When re-bidding became necessary, plaintiff did not participate, but filed suit, alleging discrimination in the early termination of the earlier contract and in the award and hostile work environment as well as unfair practices under state law (42 U.S.C. 1981, 1983, 1985 and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, 9, 11). The district court dismissed. The First Circuit affirmed, noting the lack of evidence of racial animus.

In 1996, when their company (LS&H) was bought out, defendants signed confidentiality and non-competition agreements for a term of "12 months after termination of my employment with LS&H;" each was paid $2,500 for signing the agreements, which were assignable and contemplated the sale. Each defendant accepted employment with the buyer, but refused to sign a new noncompetition agreement. They continued to work, even after the buyer merged with OfficeMax, until they were terminated in 2009 and 2010. Each found work doing essentially what they had done in the past. The district court entered a preliminary injunction, prohibiting defendants from selling office supplies. The First Circuit vacated. The contract is unambiguous; the triggering date for the noncompetition provision is termination of employment from LS&H. OfficeMax has not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits.

Plaintiff, a sales representative for the company and member of the National Guard was deployed to Iraq. When he returned, the company told him there were no positions available. The company eventually offered, and plaintiff accepted, a much lower position, but later terminated plaintiff for absenteeism. The district court awarded damages against the company for violating the Uniform Reemployment Rights Act, 38 U.S.C. 4311; Massachusetts anti-discrimination law, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, 4(1)(D); and the Massachusetts Wage Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, 148 and awarded attorney's fees. The First Circuit affirmed, first holding that the company. had waived a preemption claim. There wass ample evidence to permit a reasonable jury to conclude that the company acted willfully in refusing to reinstate plaintiff in his pre-service position and that its claim of absenteeism was pretextual.

A regional television personality was discharged from his employment with Comcast Network after he publicly protested the selection of political commentator Bill O'Reilly for a prestigious broadcasting award. He filed a claim of speech-motivated retaliation under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, 11H, 11I. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Comcast. The First Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff's employment agreement permitted Comcast to terminate him for any reason, or no reason at all; termination, or threatened termination, of an employee under such a contract is not coercive in the relevant sense under the MCRA.

A neurosurgeon sued her employer, a hospital, and her former supervisor, Day, alleging gender discrimination by disparate treatment and hostile environment; retaliation; violation of the Massachusetts Health Care Whistleblower Act; intentional interference with advantageous relations; equal pay violations; and slander. As the department's professionalism officer and representative to the Quality Assurance and Risk Management Committee, plaintiff investigated three of Day's cases, which ultimately were reported to the state Board of Registration of Medicine. After a couple of years of hostile interactions between plaintiff and Day, the hospital credentials committee conditioned plaintiff's reappointment on obtaining an evaluation within four months by an outside agency and agreeing to comply with its recommendations. The district court entered an injunction against the hospital. The jury awarded plaintiff $600,000 against the hospital on the retaliation claim; $1,000,000 against the hospital for hostile work environment; $20,000 against Day for economic harm on the interference claim; and nominal damages for the whistleblower claim against the hospital, the slander claim against Day, and non-economic harm from the interference claim against Day. The First Circuit affirmed.

Plaintiff worked for a temporary staffing agency and, on assignment to a pharmaceutical company, was cited and reprimanded for noncompliance with company rules several times. When she applied for a permanent position with the company she was seven months pregnant. She did not get the job and was not reassigned to the company. The district court rejected her claim of Title VII pregnancy discrimination on summary judgment and the First Circuit affirmed. The record demonstrated that plaintiff was not qualified for the position and that the company had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions.