Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was employed as a custodial worker at a Coast Guard Air Station in Puerto Rico for four and one half years before being fired for allegedly pilfering various items. He filed suit against the federal government under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(b), 2671 , and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 701, alleging constitutional violations and negligence. The district court dismissed. The First Circuit affirmed. State law is the source of substantive liability under the FTCA; the Act does not waive immunity for constitutional tort claims. The district court, therefore, lacked subject matter jurisdiction.

Plaintiffs, former sales managers at defendant's banquet facilities, sought overtime wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201-219 and state statutes.The district court entered summary judgment, finding that they were exempt employees. The First Circuit affirmed. The district court properly applied the three-prong test for determining whether an employee qualifies for the administrative exemption. Plaintiffs, who were salaried, performed work directly related to the management or general business operations of the employer in working closely with clients to plan events. They exercised substantial discretion with respect to a number of tasks.

Employees of the fire department filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging cronysim and nepotism in employment decisions. The district court granted summary judgment for the department, finding that nothing linked the employment decisions to an identifiable political group, cause, or belief. The First Circuit affirmed. Preferential treatment in public employment decisions, unrelated to protected speech or association, does not infringe upon freedoms secured by the First Amendment.

Plaintiff brought suit under the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185, claiming that her employer violated the collective bargaining agreement when it reclassified a position for which she was hired, resulting in her subsequent removal from that position, and that the union violated its duty of fair representation in colluding with the employer to reclassify her position and in refusing to take her filed grievance to arbitration. The district court granted summary judgment to the employer and the union. The First Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff did not produce evidence that her employer breached the CBA when it reclassified her position from permanent to temporary before her actual start date and, therefore, did not establish that her termination amounted to a breach.

A TSA worker developed a diabetic ulcer on his foot, was unable to work, and, after missing several months of work, was terminated from his position. The district court dismissed claims under the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), 115 Stat. 597, and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 791. The First Circuit affirmed, concluding that the ATSA clearly eliminates any cause of action under the Rehabilitation Act for TSA screeners.

Plaintiff, an employee of the VA, was accused of committing fraud with respect to a work-related injury. Her employment was terminated. When mediation failed, plaintiff was notified that she had 15 days to file a complaint with the EEOC. Her attorney failed to comply with the deadline and the EEOC dismissed her complaint. The district court dismissed a complaint of disability discrimination. The First Circuit affirmed. Both the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12112(a) and the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, require exhaustion of administrative remedies. Plaintiff did not establish the factors required to toll the time limit: she and her attorney were aware of the limitation period; no motion for appointment of counsel was pending; the court did not lead plaintiff to believe she had done everything required; and no affirmative misconduct by the VA had lulled her into inaction.

The union that represents postal workers raised concerns that newly hired non-veteran employees had begun work earlier, and thus received higher seniority rankings, than veteran employees, despite the fact that the veteran employees had applied for their positions earlier than had the non-veterans. Because the post office hiring register includes tests scores and other confidential, USPS keeps the information confidential under the Privacy Act,5 U.S.C. 552a and refused to disclose information requested by the union. In a claim under the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(5), an ALJ ordered USPS to furnish the union with the complete 2007 hiring register. The NLRB narrowed the order to the records of 22 employees at issue. The First Circuit vacated, holding that the employees have a legitimate, substantial privacy interest in the records, so that the Board was required to engage in a balancing of interests that was not part of its original analysis.

Plaintiff, who suffers epilepsy, began working as a part-time kitchen assistant in 1999. His episodes would cause him to leave work three to six times each year, but generally he just stepped back and resumed work after the episode passed. He was denied a full-time position, filed a complaint with the EEOC, and obtained a right-to-sue letter. The court rejected his suit under the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, Title VII, and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The First Circuit affirmed, concluding that plaintiff was not substantially limited in his ability to work or in other work activities, within the meaning of the ADA,.

Plaintiff, a former municipal employee, claimed that he was harassed and terminated for political reasons. The district court dismissed his suit, alleging various claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The First Circuit affirmed in part, but vacated with respect to claims of political discrimination and free-speech retaliation against the mayor and municipality as involving unresolved issues of fact.

Plaintiff worked for defendant, primarily as a stevedore, for 57 years. In 2006-2007, he missed several months of work due to physical ailments and received disability benefits. Plaintiff claims that when he returned to work, his colleagues insulted his age and medical conditions, often in the presence of supervisors. Plaintiff, then age 71, was first suspended, then terminated, after the company's human resources department was informed that he had assaulted his supervisor (also more than 60 years old). In a case under the Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621-634, the district court entered summary judgment in favor of the employer. The First Circuit affirmed, finding no evidence of age bias.