Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff began working as a letter carrier in 1980. In 1987, she tripped at work and injured her back. Her workers' compensation claim was allowed and she began to work four hours a day instead of eight. Plaintiff could walk, sit, and stand for up to one hour continuously or up to four hours intermittently. After a 2003 medical exam, plaintiff declined to agree to work five hours and, feeling that her supervisor had bullied her, filed an EEOC complaint. An ALJ ruled in favor of the Postal Service; the EEOC Office of Federal Operations affirmed. In 2008, she sued, alleging: hostile work environment harassment based on disability (Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794(a)); retaliation in violation of the Rehabilitation Act; failure to accommodate a disability in violation of the Rehabilitation Act; hostile work environment harassment based on gender (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16); and retaliation in violation of Title VII. The district court entered summary judgment for the Postmaster General. The First Circuit affirmed, reasoning that plaintiff was able to do her job and that she was not regarded as disabled. View "McDonough v. Donahoe" on Justia Law

PBA is a commonwealth-created public corporation that plans and maintains of physical facilities related to government services. During a reorganization, PBA's board eliminated some positions and created new ones. Plaintiff, a member of the NPP, one of Puerto Rico's two main political parties, applied for three PBA jobs after his position was eliminated. Those who interviewed him were PDP (the other political party) sympathizers. Plaintiff was offered one of the jobs, but considered it a demotion. He was reclassified, like many PBA staffers in both political camps. While his suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, 1985, and 1988 was pending, plaintiff was promoted into another PBA position. The district court entered summary judgment for defendants. The First Circuit affirmed, noting that plaintiff had no property interest in his particular job functions and that there was no evidence that the reorganization decisions were based on loyalties to political parties. View "Soto-Padro v. Pub. Bldg. Auth." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, hired as a technician in 2000, transferred to sales in 2001. In 2006, he informed his supervisors and that he had become a Seventh Day Adventist and had a religious obligation to abstain from work on Saturdays. The company responded that his position necessitated that he work rotating Saturday shifts and that the requested accommodation would be a hardship. The company suggested that he swap schedules with others and offered two positions that would not require work on Saturdays. Plaintiff declined because his income would significantly decrease in either position. He was unable to arrange a swap. In 2007 he applied for other positions within the company, but was not interviewed. He filed a charge with the EEOC. The company indicated that it would start disciplining plaintiff for any additional Saturdays he missed. Plaintiff was eventually notified that his sales were unsatisfactory and placed on active disciplinary status. He resigned. The district court awarded summary judgment to the employer, on his claims of religious discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000a-2000e. The First Circuit affirmed. The company made adequate efforts at accommodation and its reasons for discipline were not pretextual. View "Sanchez-Rodriguez v. AT&T Mobility, P.R., Inc." on Justia Law

In 1997, a new owner purchased the hotel and employed plaintiff, an employee since 1985 as executive housekeeper. Patel was the general manager; their relationship began to deteriorate in 2003. Plaintiff attributes the change to her age, claiming that Patel made ageist comments. The owner stopped giving plaintiff annual evaluations and raises in 2004, despite company policy. Plaintiff reported Patel's behavior to headquarters; a vice president met with Patel but did not take disciplinary action. The vice president testified that the company had financial difficulties and that plaintiff's salary had maxed out. The owner terminated plaintiff in 2006. After filing a complaint with the EEOC and the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination, she brought claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621-624, and the Massachusetts anti-discrimination statute, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of plaintiff only on her state law claim and awarded $7,650.00 in compensatory damages. The First Circuit affirmed, upholding the court's decision to give a "mixed motive" jury instruction without certifying the issue to the state supreme court and declining to give a limitations period instruction.

In 1998, the doctor sued his employer (a hospital) in a Puerto Rico court, alleging that the hospital had discriminated against him because of his age. In 2004, one day after he was deposed in connection with that lawsuit, the hospital terminated his employment. The termination decision had been made before the deposition. He then sued in federal court, under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. 623(d), and Puerto Rico's general tort statute, Article 1802, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, 5141 alleging that he was terminated in retaliation. A jury awarded nearly $2 million. The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments based on the statute of limitations, proof of causation, and jury instructions.

The Massachusetts Delivery Association claimed that a state law is preempted as to motor carriers under the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994, 108 Stat. 1569, which expressly preempts state attempts to regulate "a price, route, or service of any motor carrier," The challenged state law, part of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, sect. 148B(a)(2), which requires that an individual performing a service for another be classified as an employee unless "the service is performed outside the usual course of the business of the employer." The MDA also claimed that the state statute imposes an undue burden which violates the Commerce Clause. The district court found that Younger abstention was appropriate because, while the Association is not itself a party to relevant state litigation, three of its members are defendants in state civil proceedings brought not by the Attorney General (defendant in this case) but by private parties. The First Circuit remanded for the court to exercise jurisdiction, concluding that any decision will not interfere with pending state cases.

Plaintiff, a homosexual man, was employed by the city. He claims that he was taunted by unidentified coworkers and that, after he had a romantic relationship with a coworker, he was afraid for his safety and requested that they not work together. Plaintiff claims that his work assignments deteriorated after that request. He was transferred and claims that his work caused him to become nervous and depressed and require hospitalization. The district court rejected claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e and alleging violations of constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Plaintiff appealed only with respect to an equal protection claim. The First Circuit affirmed. The transfer was not an adverse employment action and plaintiff did not establish that similarly situated heterosexuals were treated differently. The court rejected a "continuing violation" claim alleging hostile work environment.

State environmental police officers brought state court litigation against their employer, the Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management, based on the DEM's handling of wage and benefit matters, relating to unorthodox work schedules. Based on a claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201, the case was removed to federal court. The district court held that the state had immunity under the FLSA and ruled in favor of the state on other claims. The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that a state waives its sovereign immunity by removing a claim to federal court. Waiver occurs only if removal confers an unfair advantage on the removing state. In this case, "removal did not change the level of the playing field."

Plaintiff, a tenured professor at the University-defendant, was arrested by campus police and charged with stalking and disorderly conduct after unleashing an expletive-filled tirade against a colleague whom he suspected of causing him to receive a parking ticket. Plaintiff was temporarily banned from campus, removed as department head, and required to attend an anger-management class. Although the charges were later dismissed, Collins sued for false arrest, defamation, and violation of his due process rights. The district court granted judgment for the defendants. The First Circuit affirmed, first rejecting an argument that the arrest was illegal because the "violation" was civil in nature. The warrant was supported by probable cause. Suspension with pay for two months was a minimal deprivation that did not entitle plaintiff to pre-deprivation process. Plaintiff was allowed to visit campus several times during the ban and was given adequate process for the minimal deprivation of liberty. An email indicating that plaintiff's presence on campus should be reported was not defamatory.

Plaintiffs brought a pre-enforcement declaratory judgment challenge to an ordinance requiring that, when there is a change in the identity of a hospitality employer, that employer must retain its predecessor's employees, subject to some conditions, for a three-month period. The district court rejected the challenge. The First Circuit affirmed, first holding that a pre-enforcement suit is not appropriate for determining preemption under the National Labor Relations Act. Nothing would prevent a successor employer from raising pre-emption in an appeal from the NLRB successorship determination based on the involuntary continuation of employment under the ordinance or in a state court enforcement action. The court rejected an argument that, by providing employees with benefits for which they otherwise would have had to bargain, the ordinance impermissibly enhances employee and union bargaining power and an argument that the law impermissibly interferes with hiring decisions.