Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In this case a corporation abruptly cashiered a member of senior management, which prompted the employee to file suit for age discrimination and retaliation. After a protracted trial, the jury found the employer guilty of retaliation and returned a seven-figure verdict in the employee's favor. The district court allowed the liability finding to stand, trimmed the damages but doubled what remained, refused to grant either judgment notwithstanding the verdict or an unconditional new trial, and awarded the prevailing plaintiff attorneys' fees and an equitable remedy. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment below except vacated the previously remitted award of emotional distress damages and directed the district court to order the plaintiff either to remit all of that award in excess of $200,000 or else undergo a new trial on that issue. The Court also directed the district court to adjust its award of multiplied damages to reflect the plaintiff's response to this remittitur. View "Trainor v. HEI Hospitality, LLC" on Justia Law

In this appeal from the denial of a preliminary inunction, plaintiff labor unions claimed that sections 6.007-.010 of Law 222, Puerto Rico's campaign finance law, placed an unconstitutional burden on the union's First Amendment right to engage in political speech. Both the district court and the government declined to address the merits of Plaintiffs' claims. The First Circuit Court of Appeals issued an appellate injunction enjoining enforcement of the challenged provisions of Law 222 pending the final disposition of this appeal. In this opinion the First Circuit outlined the reasons it ordered entry of the appellate injunction, holding, among other things, that it was incumbent upon the district court to engage with the merits of Plaintiffs' claims. The Court also ordered the district court to enter a preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of certain sections of the law. View "Puertorriqueno v. Fortuno" on Justia Law

In this adverse employment action, Plaintiff appealed the district court's award of summary judgment to his former employer ("the Company") on his claims of age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. On appeal, the First Circuit Court of Appeals noted inconsistencies between the Company's stated reasons for dismissal and Plaintiff's performance record at the Company, the lack of credibility that could be ascribed by a jury to certain of the Company's justifications for dismissal, and the fact that in response to arguably similar conduct by Plaintiff's younger replacement, the Company took no disciplinary action. The First Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment, holding that there was sufficient evidence presented on summary judgment from which a jury could draw the permissible inference that the Company's claimed reasons for terminating Plaintiff were pretextual and that the decision was the result of discriminatory animus. View "Acevedo-Parrilla v. Novartis Ex-Lax, Inc." on Justia Law

After Mark Jones repeatedly failed to pass an examination to receive a license required by his employer of all persons in that position, by a date of which he had many months' notice, he requested for the first time that the date be extended due to his medical condition. When his employer declined, and Jones declined to pursue an open alternate position at lesser pay, his employment ended. He then sued under both federal and state disability laws. The district court entered summary judgment for the employer. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, bypassing the question of whether Jones met the definition of "disability" and holding that the reasonable accommodation provisions of both statutes did not save his case. View "Jones v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The issue in this case concerned a procedural requirement that must be satisfied in order to file suit under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). Pursuant to this requirement, a claimant must exhaust administrative remedies and file her Title I suit within ninety days after receiving a right-to-sue notice from the EEOC. The district court, citing this requirement, concluded that Plaintiff's Title I suit, which was filed 144 days after the EEOC sent the notice, was brought too late. To explain the delay, Plaintiff suggested that she did not receive the right-to-sue notice until nineteen days before she filed suit. The district court concluded that there is a presumption of timely receipt of a mailed notice and that Plaintiff did not furnish sufficient record evidence to rebut this presumption. The Supreme Court affirmed but on other grounds, holding that the action was time-barred, as Plaintiff had constructive notice of the ninety-day filing requirement, and yet her suit was commenced well after the expiration of that filing period. View "Loubriel v. Fondo del Seguro del Estado" on Justia Law

Defendant entered into a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with a Union under which Defendant remitted contributions to an array of Union-affiliated benefit funds (the Funds). After the Funds commissioned audits of Defendant's books, the Funds demanded additional remittances for previously unreported work allegedly covered by the CBA. Defendant demurred, and the Funds sued Defendant. The district court awarded Plaintiffs $26,897 referable to covered work performed by a specific employee but denied recovery for other work. In a separate judgment, the court awarded Plaintiffs $34,688 in attorneys' fees. The First Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of the First Circuit, holding (1) the appeal was timely as to all issues, and the judgment on the benefits-remittance claim and the judgment awarding attorneys' fees were open to appellate review; (2) Defendant's failure to keep appropriate records concerning work covered by the benefit-remittance provisions of the CBA triggered a burden-shifting paradigm under which Defendant had to show which hours represented covered work and which did not, and here Defendant did not rebut the presumption; and (3) because the district court's fee calculation rested appreciably on the plaintiffs' lack of success in recovering remittances referable to unidentified employees, the fee award required recalculation. View "Int'l Union v. Ray Haluch Gravel Co." on Justia Law

This appeal involved an award of $59,787 in attorney's fees against unsuccessful plaintiffs in a civil rights action against the Municipality of Adjuntas, its mayor, and Plaintiffs' direct supervisors. Plaintiffs argued that their lawsuit was not so frivolous or unreasonable as to justify an award of fees to Defendants. The First Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, except for one plaintiff's inferior working conditions claim and another plaintiff's claim against a supervisory defendant, as there was no reasonable basis for those claims. The Court vacated the fee award and remanded for further proceedings relating to any attorney's fees incurred by the Municipality of Adjuntas in relation to those claims only. View "Torres-Santiago v. Municipality of Adjuntas" on Justia Law

Employee was terminated from his job at a Walgreens store in Puerto Rico after a two-week absence from his job due to a medical condition. Following his termination, Employee and his wife (Wife) sued Walgreens, alleging that Employee was fired in retaliation for conduct protected by the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), that his termination was wrongful under Puerto Rico law, and that the loss of Employee's job caused Wife to suffer compensable emotional distress. The district court granted summary judgment for Walgreens on Wife's claim and the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the other Puerto Rico law claim. The FMLA claim went to trial, and a jury found in Employee's favor, awarding compensatory damages. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the district court in all respects, save its rejection of Wife's Puerto Rico law claim. Because the claim presented an important and unresolved issue of Puerto Rico law that the Court declined to address in the first instance, the Court certified the question to the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico and reserved judgment on this particular issue pending its response. View "Pagan-Colon v. Walgreens of San Patricio, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from entry of summary judgment against his claims of race-based disparate treatment and of hostile work environment against Employer. Plaintiff's complaint alleged Employer punished him more harshly for a rules violation, on the basis of his Hispanic heritage, than it did a similarly situated white co-worker and permitted other employees to harass him in violation of Title VII. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that summary judgment was appropriate on both of Plaintiff's claims, as (1) Employer's reasons for disciplining Plaintiff, on the record, did not allow inferences or pretext or discrimination, and there was no differential treatment; and (2) Employer took reasonable steps to address the alleged co-worker harassment. View "Espinal v. Nat'l Grid NE Holdings 2, LLC " on Justia Law

Lynch is a highway construction contractor and a signatory of the Construction Industries of Rhode Island's collective bargaining agreement with Local 251, as representative of truck drivers employed by Lynch. Lynch employed 26 Local 251 members in 1995, 16 in 1997, and only 10 in 2001. Local 251's vice president, Boyajian, testified that each time a truck driver retired, Lynch would sell a truck and replace that person with a subcontractor, gradually reducing the number of bargaining unit employees. The collective bargaining agreement states that employers are not permitted to use subcontractors unless employees of the subcontractors are paid the prevailing rate. Boyajian complained to Lynch about its use of subcontractors that did not pay prevailing rate and, in 1999, filed grievances with the NLRB. Lynch and the union entered into a letter of agreement, which was later challenged as violating the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158(e), by impermissibly preventing Lynch from doing business with two subcontractors. The NLRB upheld the challenge and subsequently sought enforcement. The First Circuit noted contradictory evidence that the Board failed to consider and reversed with respect to one company, while entering an order of enforcement with respect to the other.View "Nat'l Labor Relations Bd v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 251" on Justia Law