Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Article 3 of Puerto Rico’s Law No. 80 requires companies that operate in Puerto Rico to pay a “mesada” - or a statutory severance - to employees who are terminated without “just cause.” Plaintiffs were the former, and least senior, employees in American’s sole Puerto Rico office. Plaintiffs could be entitled to a mesada only if their seniority was computed in relation to America’s offices worldwide. The district court ruled in favor of American, concluding that Article 3 counts only those transfers that occur in Puerto Rico and none that are made to or from an office outside of it. In January, the First Circuit certified a question to the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico concerning the proper interpretation of Article 3. The First Circuit received the Supreme Court’s response and, on that basis, affirmed the district court’s judgment ruling in favor of American. Specifically, the First Circuit held that because American has only one office in Puerto Rico, American does not make transfers that could trigger the method for computing seniority that would benefit Plaintiffs. View "Carrasquillo-Ortiz v. American Airlines, Inc." on Justia Law

Tang began working at Citizens' Boston Commercial Real Estate Group in 2007. After applying for a position as a portfolio manager in the Technology Banking Group, Tang interviewed with Nackley in 2010, who had arranged the interview at a restaurant that Tang characterized as a popular dating spot. During the interview, Tang alleges, Nackley focused on personal matters and topics not relevant to the transfer. Tang, who is Chinese, recalled that Nackley expressed his views that Asian women are obedient and mentioned live-in au pairs whom he had hired from Thailand. He told Tang that the au pairs did not wear sufficiently revealing swimsuits and offered to teach Tang to golf. Nackley asked whether Tang was married and enquired where she looked to find a boyfriend. Tang showed Nackley examples of her work. Nackley encouraged her to apply for a position as a senior portfolio manager. Tang got the position and alleges that similar incidents followed, that she reported Nackley to human resources, and that she was terminated in 2011. The district court rejected her sexual harassment and retaliation suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The First Circuit vacated, finding that Tang’s evidence was sufficient to survive summary judgment. View "Tang v. Citizens Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

The City of Boston and other Massachusetts communities and state employers, in selecting police officers for promotion to the position of sergeant in 2005 and 2008, adapted a test developed by a Massachusetts state agency. The test was the result of an effort to eliminate the use of race and other improper considerations in decisions involving public employment. Some of the Black and Hispanic applicants who were not selected for promotion filed suit, claiming that the use of the test resulted in an unjustified “disparate impact” in violation of Title VII. The district court entered judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that the test was a valid selection tool and that Plaintiffs failed to prove that there was an alternative valid selection tool available that would have resulted in the promotion of a higher percentage of Black and Hispanic officers. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court applied correct legal standards and that the record contained sufficient support for the court’s findings. View "Lopez v. City of Lawrence, Massachusetts" on Justia Law

The Massachusetts Delivery Association (MDA), a trade organization representing same-day delivery companies in Massachusetts, brought this suit on behalf of its members seeking a declaration that “Prong 2” of the Massachusetts Independent Contractor Statute is preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (FAAAA) as well as an injunction barring the Attorney General from enforcing Prong 2 against its members. After the First Circuit twice remanded the case, the district court held that the FAAAA preempts Prong 2 as to the members of the MDA as a matter of logical effect. Applying the logic of the First Circuit's decision in Schwann v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc., the First Circuit affirmed, holding that the application of Prong 2 to the members of the MDA is preempted by the FAAAA. View "Massachusetts Delivery Ass’n v. Healey" on Justia Law

After he was terminated from his employment Plaintiff sued his former employer and its parent company (collectively, Defendants) alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act and its Massachusetts analog. Plaintiff also alleged a state wrongful discharge claim. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err in its assessment that Plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination; and (2) correctly concluded that Plaintiff failed to carry his burden of establishing that his termination implicated a sufficiently important and clearly defined public policy in Massachusetts. View "Murray v. Warren Pumps, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a discrimination and retaliation suit against his Employer, alleging illegal harassment, discrimination and retaliation. Employer filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that it did not employ the minimum number of employees necessary to qualify as an “employer” under either the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) or the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). Plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to Employer’s motion for summary judgment, attaching a post-discovery sworn statement in support of his opposition. Employer requested that the district court strike the sworn statement. The district court granted Employer’s motions for summary judgment and to strike Employer’s sworn statement under the sham affidavit doctrine. The district court then sanctioned Plaintiff’s counsel for filing the sham affidavit after he received repeated warnings in earlier cases not to do so. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in (1) striking Plaintiff’s sworn statement; (2) granting summary judgment to Employer on the basis that Plaintiff did not meet his burden of showing that Employer had enough employees to qualify as a covered employer under either the ADA or ADEA; and (3) ordering sanctions. View "Escribano-Reyes v. Prof’l HEPA Certificate Corp." on Justia Law

While working for Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P., Plaintiff claimed a disability arising from her “pregnancy status.” Plaintiff, however, claimed she could perform the essential functions of her job with a reasonable accommodation. Wal-Mart refused Plaintiff’s accommodation request and later terminated her. Plaintiff brought this action against Wal-Mart claiming violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the New Hampshire Civil Rights Act. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Wal-Mart on all claims. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the trial judge correctly granted summary judgment to Wal-Mart on the ADA claim, as Plaintiff failed to create a trial worthy issue as to whether she could have performed an essential function of her job with or without reasonable accommodation; and (2) Plaintiff’s challenges to the dismissal of her state-law claims of unlawful disability discrimination and retaliation were without merit. View "Lang v. Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P." on Justia Law

In 2004, five structural steel contractors filed a complaint against a local union - Labor Union No. 7 of the International Association of Bridge, Structural, Ornamental & Reinforcing Iron Workers - alleging labor law violations under the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), antitrust law violations under the Sherman Act, and other violations under state law. The First Circuit reviewed the matter and found elements pertaining to the federal claims undeveloped. Therefore, the Court remanded for further proceedings. After a trial, the case once again reached the First Circuit, with both parties appealing and cross-appealing various aspects of the final judgment. The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s decisions upholding the LMRA jury verdict and award of damages for Plaintiffs D.F.M. Industries, Inc. and Ajax Construction Company, Inc. and granting summary judgment for Defendant on the antitrust claims, holding that the trial court did not err in its judgment. View "Am. Steel Erectors, Inc. v. Local Union No. 7" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, individuals who contracted with FedEx to provide pick-up and delivery services, filed a complaint claiming that FedEx should have treated and paid them as employees rather than as independent contractors because FedEx could not satisfy all three requirements under the Massachusetts Independent Contractor Statute (Massachusetts Statute). Plaintiffs sought damages for loss of wages, improper wage deductions, and loss of benefits. The district court ultimately granted FedEx summary judgment on all counts, concluding (1) application of one of the requirements of the Massachusetts Statute is preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (FAAAA), and this preempted requirement is not severable from the two remaining requirements; and (2) the remaining two requirements are preempted. The First Circuit reversed, holding (1) the express preemption provision of the FAAAA preempts the application of one of the Massachusetts Statute’s requirements to FedEx, but the preempted requirement is severable from the two remaining requirements; and (2) the district court erred by concluding, sua sponte, that application of the remaining two requirements was also preempted by the FAAAA. View "Schwann v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) fired Blair Hamrick after Hamrick told two Human Resources managers and several co-workers that he wanted to shoot some co-workers. Hamrick alleged that GSK had fired him in retaliation for initiating a qui tam action accusing GSK of fraud under the False Claims Act. The district court granted summary judgment to GSK. Hamrick appealed, challenging both the district court’s decision not to conduct an in camera review of the documents as to which GSK asserted attorney-client privilege and the district court’s grant of summary judgment to GSK. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not abuse its discretion in declining to conduct in camera review of the items on GSK’s privilege log; and (2) properly granted summary judgment to GSK because no reasonable jury could find that the qui tam action was GSK’s reason for terminating Hamrick. View "Hamrick v. Glaxosmithkline, PLC" on Justia Law