Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Appellant was employed by Appellees as a social worker when she suffered a work-related injury. Appellant sued Appellees, alleging that they failed to accommodate her disability in violation of the American with Disabilities Act (ADA). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees, concluding that Appellant did not qualify as a disabled individual under the ADA and that she was one responsible for the breakdown in communications concerning her accommodations. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court correctly found that Appellees could not be held liable for their failure to accommodate because Appellant was responsible for the breakdown in communications. View "Ortiz-Martinez v. Fresenius Health Partners PR, LLC" on Justia Law

Pumpernickel Express, Inc. carried automotive parts from warehouses in Mansfield, Massachusetts to Toyota dealerships in the region. Pumpernickel’s drivers were represented by a Union. Lily Transportation Corporation later obtained the portion of Pumpernickel’s business that involved distributing parts for Toyota. Lily hired many of Pumpernickel’s former employees, including drivers. The Union demanded that Lily recognize it as the drivers’ bargaining representative. Lily refused. Thereafter, the Union filed an unfair labor practice charge, alleging that Lily’s refusal to bargain violated the National Labor Relations Act. The administrative law judge found that, in distributing for Toyota, Lily was a “successor employer” to Pumpernickel, and therefore, Lily was required to recognize and bargain with the Union. The National Labor Relations Board affirmed and ordered Lily to recognize and bargain with the Union. The Board then asked the First Circuit to enforce its order over Lily’s objection. The First Circuit granted the Board’s application for enforcement of its bargaining order, holding that the Board did not err in relying on UGL-UNICCO Service Co.’s successor bar doctrine. View "NLRB v. Lily Transportation Corp" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were a group of current and former federal employees working in non-foreign areas located outside the contiguous United States. In addition to their normal salaries, federal employees working in these areas receive cost-of-living allowances (COLAs). Plaintiff filed a complaint challenging the Office of Personnel Management’s (OPM) regulations that exclude COLAs from the calculation of retirement and other benefits, alleging that these regulations are discriminatory under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and are arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The district court dismissed the complaint. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court properly concluded (1) that Plaintiffs’ disparate impact claim was barred by the location-based safe harbor provision of 24 U.S.C. 2000e-2(h); (2) that Plaintiffs did not exhaust their administrative remedies as to their disparate treatment claim; and (3) that Plaintiffs’ non-discrimination claims were precluded by the Civil Service Reform Act. View "Rodriguez v. United States" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether the delivery drivers for a Maine dairy company fell within the scope of an exemption from Maine’s overtime law. Specifically at issue was an exemption to the overtime law that covers employees whose work involves the “packing for shipment or distribution of” enumerated food products. The drivers argued that these words referred to the single activity of “packing,” whether the packing was for “shipment” or for “distribution.” The district court granted summary judgment to the dairy company, concluding that “distribution” was a stand-alone exempt activity. The First Circuit reversed, holding that the exemption at issue is ambiguous, and, under Maine law, must be construed in the narrow manner that the drivers favor in order to accomplish the overtime law’s remedial purposes. Remanded. View "O'Connor v. Oakhurst Dairy" on Justia Law

After James Walsh’s (Plaintiff) employment with Zurich American Insurance Company (Defendant) was terminated, he filed a complaint against Defendant, alleging breach of contract, willful violation of New Hampshire’s wage and hour law, and other claims based on Defendant’s substantial reduction of his incentive pay for a lucrative deal and failure to pay incentive on another deal. A jury found that Defendant willfully and without good cause withheld the compensation owed to Plaintiff and awarded him double damages and attorney’s fees. The First Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment insofar as it incorporated the jury’s verdict on one deal (the Great American Insurance Company, or GAIC, deal) and affirmed the judgment with respect to the other deal (the Automobile Protection Corp., or APCO, deal), holding (1) Defendant was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the breach of contract and wage claims; (2) the jury’s breach and willfulness findings stemming from Defendant’s withholding of incentive compensation for a deal made with GAIC were not in error; but (3) the district court erred in concluding that, if Plaintiff had an enforceable incentive plan when the deal was struck with APCO, Defendant lacked discretion as a matter of law to change Plaintiff’s incentive formula for that deal. Remanded. View "Walsh v. Zurich American Insurance Co." on Justia Law

This appeal concerned a dispute between employees represented by a Union and their successor employer. The parties agreed to arbitrate this dispute regarding change in the terms of pension provision in a collective bargaining agreement. The district court refused to compel arbitration on the grounds that ERISA preempted the Union’s claims, and this, in turn, presented an issue of arbitrability properly decided by a judge, not an arbitrator. The First Circuit vacated the order of the district court and remanded with instructions to grant the Union’s motion to compel arbitration, holding that the issue of ERISA preemption in this case was not an issue of arbitrability but, rather, one that was squarely for the arbitrator to decide. View "Prime Healthcare Services - Landmark LLC v. United Nurses & Allied Professionals, Local 5067" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Puerto Rico’s Insurance Commissioner (Defendant), claiming that Defendant eliminated her job as a director within the Office of the Insurance Commissioner on account of her political affiliation. The district court denied Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as Plaintiff’s federal discrimination claims for damages, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief. In so holding, the court rejected Defendant’s argument that her qualified immunity defense entitled her to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s federal damages claim. The First Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity and remanded for further proceedings, holding that a reasonable official in Defendant’s position could have understood the First Amendment not to protect Plaintiff against politically motivated removal from her job. Remanded for further proceedings. View "Lopez-Erquicia v. Weyne-Roig" on Justia Law

Southeast Hospitals Group was formed through a merger of three hospitals, one of which had a union workforce. The union’s collective bargaining agreement granted union members a hiring preference when filling union positions. Southcoast, however, adopted a policy that grants nonunion employees a similar hiring preference for nonunion positions. The union commenced this action by filing an unfair labor practice charge with the National Labor Relations Board’s Regional Director. The Regional Director then filed a complaint with the Board, arguing that the policy unlawfully discriminates against union members. The Board concluded that the policy was invalid because it was not supported by a legitimate and substantial business justification and ordered Southcoast to rescind the policy and provide affirmative relief to affected employees. The First Circuit vacated the Board’s decision, holding that the decision was not supported by substantial evidence. Remanded. View "Southcoast Hospitals Group v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Eight police officers, a police cadet, and a provisionally hired 911 operator (collectively, the Officers) alleged that they suffered adverse employment actions by the Boston Police Department as a result of a racially discriminatory hair drug test. The Officers advanced a “disparate impact claim” under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The district court concluded that there was no actionable disparate impact. The first time on appeal, the First Circuit held that the Officers prevailed as a matter of law under the first prong of the three-prong disparate impact inquiry of that inquiry and remanded the case to the district court to consider the next two prongs. On remand, the district court again summary judgment for the Department. On appeal for the second time, the First Circuit vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the Department on the third prong of the disparate impact inquiry, holding that a material dispute of fact existed preventing summary judgment on this matter. Remanded. View "Jones v. City of Boston" on Justia Law

Jamie Rogers, a seaman, was injured on a fishing vessel owned and operated by Block Island Fishing, Inc. Block Island made some “maintenance and cure” payments to Rogers. Block Island then brought this suit against Rogers to dispute the duration and amount of maintenance and cure payments that it owed. Block Island filed a motion for summary judgment. The district court found that November 18, 2014 was the date on which Block Island’s obligations ended and reserved for a jury to determine the exact sum that Block Island owed Rogers for his living expenses. The court then ruled that Block Island had overpaid Rogers and that Block Island could offset the sum of overpayment against any damages award that Rogers might win at trial. The First Circuit affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part, holding (1) the district court erred by sua sponte replacing Block Island’s proposed date of July 31, 2014 with its own date without giving Rogers sufficient notice of opportunity to make his case against the new date; and (2) Block Island may offset any overpayment against Rogers’ potential damages award but may not sue for the sum in an independent action. View "Block Island Fishing, Inc. v. Rogers" on Justia Law