Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A child was seriously injured when she was hit in the head by an object thrown by a lawnmower being operated at the federal building adjoining her childcare center. Separate entities provided child care and lawn maintenance, under contract with the federal government. The district court dismissed a suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(b), 2671-2680. The First Circuit affirmed. While noting that the landscaping and child care operators were independent contractors, the court applied the discretionary function exception to federal liability. The agreements and their actual execution show that the government did not carve out responsibility for safety measures from its otherwise comprehensive delegation of day-to-day authority to the companies. Federal law allows the government discretion to hire independent contractors and to adopt, or not adopt, safety measures suggested by the plaintiffs.

During a fight in a bar, the insured hit an individual with a glass mug, resulting in emergency surgery and permanent scars. The parties negotiated a settlement of civil liability that included the injured party's promise not to pursue criminal charges. The homeowner's insurance policy at issue covers only accidental injuries and prohibits the insured from making voluntary payments. The company invoked the voluntary payment clause and refused to pay the settlement or attorney fees. The district court ruled in favor of the company. The First Circuit affirmed, finding that, even if there was a duty to defend, the company did not breach that duty. The company had investigated the claim, as required, and the actions of the parties' efforts to avoid criminal prosecutions prevented its participation in negotiations.

Hospital records state that decedent died of a nonsurvivable head injury following an accidental fall at a casino. An insurer refused to pay, claiming that the fall was likely caused by a stroke, so that death was not "accidental" within the meaning of the policy. The company's expert testified accordingly. The district court entered judgment in favor of the company. The First Circuit affirmed. The district court did not err in admitting the expert's testimony; it fell within the scope of his previously disclosed report. The estate was not prejudiced by any difference between the report and testimony.

Plaintiff suffered a hand injury while operating a hand saw manufactured by defendant, while working at a construction site. A jury awarded plaintiff $1.5 and, although it found plaintiff to be 35 percent at fault, the finding did not reduce the award because it also found breach of implied warranty of merchantability. The First Circuit affirmed, finding the evidence sufficient to support the verdict and rejecting an argument that plaintiff had argued impermissible "categorical liability" rather than presenting an alternative, safer design. Statements by plaintiff's counsel, about "sending a message" and corporate earnings, did not mandate a new trial.

Plaintiff, left paralyzed from the chest down after an accident at work, sued the company that built a specialized trailer for his employer. A jury rejected negligence and implied warranty of merchantability claims. The First Circuit affirmed. The district court acted within its discretion when it instructed the jury that a defendant who manufactures a product according to buyer specifications could not be liable under either a negligence or implied warranty theory unless the design defect was so obvious it would not have been reasonable for the defendant to manufacture according to the design.

The city and stopped paying full reimbursement of certain medical expenses for former firefighters and police officers who had retired on disability pensions. The retirees alleged that the decision violated state statutes, constituted an ultra vires act, contradicted principles of equity, and offended the Due Process Clause.The district court entered summary judgment against all but three of the plaintiffs and resolved the remaining claims after trial. The First Circuit affirmed the summary judgment rulings. The state injured-on-duty statute does not require the benefit and there was no evidence that the city ever authorized such a benefit on a global basis or made specific promises to retirees, other than the three that went to trial.

The plaintiff was awarded $450,000 for injuries suffered when she was hit by a car registered to the company, driven by an intoxicated individual. The First Circuit affirmed, first holding that the court had diversity jurisdiction. The company is a citizen of Puerto Rico and testimonial evidence supported a finding that the plaintiff was a citizen of California at the time of the accident. The trial court correctly barred evidence that the intoxicated driver owned the vehicle and that the plaintiff had consumed alcohol. The company had stipulated to its ownership of the vehicle and the plaintiff was not driving, but standing outside her disabled car, at the time of the collision. The judge correctly refused to instruct the jury on contributory or comparative negligence and correctly denied a new trial request based on a closing argument remark that the defendant had been deported to Mexico.

The worker is a Massachusetts resident, whose services were obtained through a temporary labor firm's offices in Massachusetts, and was injured while working for a construction company at the Newport Naval Station. The temporary firm, which maintains workers compensation insurance, filed a Rhode Island workers compensation claim on behalf of the worker, but without his knowledge. The worker received benefits for 17 weeks, then sought Massachusetts benefits. A Massachusetts administrative law judge ordered the Massachusetts insurance company to assume responsibility for future payments. The district court entered summary judgment, rejecting the worker's suit against the construction company and a co-worker. The First Circuit reversed and remanded. Applying Massachusetts choice-of-law rules, the court concluded that the states' laws conflict and that Massachusetts law applies because that state has a more significant connection to the parties and the occurrence. Massachusetts prohibits suits against direct employers only; Rhode Island prohibits suit against "special employers" who contract with a general employer for the worker's services. The immunity of co-employees derives from employer immunity and does not apply in this case.