Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff began working as a letter carrier in 1980. In 1987, she tripped at work and injured her back. Her workers' compensation claim was allowed and she began to work four hours a day instead of eight. Plaintiff could walk, sit, and stand for up to one hour continuously or up to four hours intermittently. After a 2003 medical exam, plaintiff declined to agree to work five hours and, feeling that her supervisor had bullied her, filed an EEOC complaint. An ALJ ruled in favor of the Postal Service; the EEOC Office of Federal Operations affirmed. In 2008, she sued, alleging: hostile work environment harassment based on disability (Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794(a)); retaliation in violation of the Rehabilitation Act; failure to accommodate a disability in violation of the Rehabilitation Act; hostile work environment harassment based on gender (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16); and retaliation in violation of Title VII. The district court entered summary judgment for the Postmaster General. The First Circuit affirmed, reasoning that plaintiff was able to do her job and that she was not regarded as disabled. View "McDonough v. Donahoe" on Justia Law

While walking through defendant's supermarket, plaintiff felt a sensation, as though he could not lift his foot, which caused him to lose balance and fall to the floor. No one witnessed the incident, observed anything wrong with the floor, or saw any foreign substance. Plaintiff had a fractured hip and other injuries. The trial court entered summary judgment for defendant. The First Circuit affirmed. The "mode of operation" approach that may be applied to self-service stores does not displace the notice requirement of premises liability. Liability cannot attach without facts indicating that defendant reasonably should have foreseen the existence of a dangerous condition. View "Gomez v. Stop & Shop Supermarket Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Rhode Island resident and employee of Safety, a Massachusetts corporation, was driving one of Safety's vehicles in Massachusetts as part of her job and was seriously injured in an accident caused by the other driver. She filed a claim against the tortfeasor, whose insurer paid the full policy limit of $20,000.00. She also received workers' compensation through the Rhode Island system and settled a Underinsured Motorist claim against her personal automobile insurance company for the policy limit of $25,000.00. She sought to recover under the UIM provision of Safety's policy, provided by defendant. The First Circuit determined that Massachusetts law applied, under which an employee cannot recover under both WC and her employer's UIM policy, except where the employer has "explicitly purchased" the UIM coverage for employees injured in the course of their employment. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment to defendant. The First Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff had no evidence that the company explicitly purchased the coverage for employees injured in the course of employment that would permit a reasonable jury to resolve this case in her favor. View "Baker v. St. Paul Travelers Ins. Co." on Justia Law

An 11-year-old child suffered long-term horrific abuse and, in 2005, was beaten nearly to death by her adoptive mother and stepfather. The child's legal guardian, brought suit against Carson Center and one of its employees, a licensed social worker, alleging that they failed to detect or report signs of ongoing physical abuse. The state court suit led to insurance coverage litigation in federal court. Insurers sought a declaratory judgment that the allegations fell within exclusions to coverage. The First Circuit affirmed entry of declaratory judgment for the insurers. The language of the policy exclusions precludes coverage for abuse that occurs to anyone in the insureds' "care, custody or control." At the time of the abuse the victim was not in the physical custody of the insureds, but had been receiving bi-weekly outpatient therapeutic services from them for 14 months covered by the policies in question. The exclusions are unambiguous. View "Valley Forge Ins. Co. v. Field" on Justia Law

More than 7,000 named plaintiffs brought suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(b), 2671-2680, asserting injuries because of the U.S. Navy's alleged negligence in emitting pollutants during military exercises (which ended in 2003) at the Atlantic Fleet Weapons Training Facility on Vieques Island, Puerto Rico. The district court dismissed with prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. The First Circuit affirmed. The limited abrogation of sovereign immunity in the FTCA does not extend to these claims because of the discretionary function exception, which precludes FTCA actions against government conduct which is both within the discretion of the relevant government party and susceptible to policy-related judgments. The court rejected arguments that the Navy acted beyond its discretion because it allegedly violated mandatory directives concerning water pollution issued pursuant to the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251-1389; violated a pair of permits that purportedly forbid firing depleted uranium bullets on Vieques; violated unidentified internal regulations, policies, directives, and orders; and failed to comply with a purported duty to warn.

Plaintiffs' father was killed in an auto accident when the driver of a vehicle in which he was a passenger, attempted to flee police officers. Asserting federal constitutional and state tort claims, plaintiffs filed suit in Rhode Island state court against the officers, the city, the police department, and the police chief in his official capacity. The district court dismissed constitutional claims and declined to remand to state court. Following a trial, the court entered judgment for defendants as a matter of law. The First Circuit affirmed, upholding the court's exercise of supplemental jurisdiction and exclusion of deposition testimony of the driver. That he was in prison did not render him automatically "unavailable." The court was within its discretion in denying a continuance to secure his presence.

A federal jury awarded Fortin $125,000 in damages against a police officer after finding that the officer negligently used force in arresting Fortin in 2007. In a post-judgment ruling, the district court reduced the award to $10,000, the maximum set by the Maine Tort Claims Act for the personal liability of government employees, Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 14, 8104-D. On appeal, Fortin argued that the MTCA cap is inapplicable here because the officer was covered by an insurance policy that triggered a higher limit under the Act. The First Circuit determined that the issues were unresolved under state law and certified two questions to the Maine Supreme Court. Whether Fortin is limited to recovery of $10,000 depends on the unexplored relationship among several provisions of the MTCA governing damage awards against government employees. Analysis may also require determining what interpretive rule should be applied to ambiguous insurance policies providing MTCA liability coverage.

In the early 1980s, two women were murdered, apparently for domestic reasons. Their bodies were found in 2000 and Flemmi, a member of a Boston gang, confessed. The families filed claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(b)(1), 2401(b), 2671, 2675, alleging that the government was negligent in using and protecting Flemmi and his criminal associate, Bulger, as informants. The court awarded damages and sanctions against the government for misconduct. The First Circuit affirmed the finding of liability and award of damages, upholding a finding of causation under the Massachusetts' Wrongful Death Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 229, sect. 2. The court remanded with respect to sanctions.

In the 1970s, the decedent worked as a bookmaker in Boston and was involved with Bulger's Winter Hill gang. In 1979, decedent was charged with murder. While out on bail, he offered to cooperate with police in the investigation of an drug conspiracy involving Bulger. His attorney met with Boston Police and FBI agent Connolly to discuss this offer. Unbeknownst to decedent and his attorney, Bulger was a top echelon FBI informant and Connolly was his primary handler. Connolly and others were protecting Bulger from prosecution so that he could continue supplying information. Roughly three weeks later, decedent was murdered. Several years later, after a series of investigations disclosed leaks to Bulger, his estate filed a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(b)(1), 2401(b), 2671, 2675. The court awarded $1.15 million. The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the administrative claim was filed after the statute of limitations had run and that there was insufficient admissible proof that the leak occurred and that Bulger killed decedent; and that the estate failed to meet its burden for liability based on conscious pain and suffering. Whatever they suspected, the family did not have actual or constructive knowledge of the claim until 1999.

Police, responding to a 911 call, stopped plaintiff, a pedestrian. While he was standing near the cruiser, it was struck from behind by a second cruiser. Plaintiff, injured in the collision, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed, citing qualified immunity. The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the collision constituted a seizure. The facts could reasonably support the officers' suspicion that plaintiff was the subject of the 911 call and that the stop was reasonable.