Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Injury Law
Contour Design, Inc. v. Chance Mold Steel Co., Ltd.
in this trade secret misappropriation and breach of contract case, defendant Chance Mold Steel Co. (Chance) appealed from a permanent injunction and from a jury award of damages. The injunction, based on a finding of contract breach, prohibited Chance from selling, displaying, manufacturing, or assisting others in manufacturing a number of ergonomic computer mouse products. The injunction barred sale of specific products that were materially identical to products Chance had previously manufactured for Contour Design, Inc. (Contour) and a new product known as the ErgoRoller. Chance challenged the scope of the injunction and contended that the jury improperly awarded lost profits damages. The First Circuit Court of Appeals (1) reversed the injunction as applied to the ErgoRoller, holding that the record did not support the finding that Chance breached the contract in producing the ErgoRoller; (2) affirmed the scope of the injunction as applied to the other enjoined products; and (3) affirmed the damages award. View "Contour Design, Inc. v. Chance Mold Steel Co., Ltd." on Justia Law
Fernandes v. Agar Supply Co., Inc.
Fernandes injured his back when he stepped into a hole in the floor of a tire "shed," an old shipping container, which was on property leased by AGAR to Fernandes's employer, Penske Truck Leasing. He sued AGAR on the theory that it owed him a duty of care to maintain and repair the tire shed under the lease. The district court granted summary judgment to AGAR under Massachusetts law. The First Circuit affirmed, finding that, under the lease, Agar had no duty to repair or maintain the shed. View "Fernandes v. Agar Supply Co., Inc." on Justia Law
Jones v. Secord
Plaintiff's decedent was shot and killed by a man wielding a stolen handgun. Plaintiff claimed that the gun owner's negligent storage of the weapon and his failure timely to report its theft proximately caused the decedent's death. The district court rejected the claims. The First Circuit affirmed. Applying New Hampshire law, the court stated that the record, even construed in the light most favoring the plaintiff, does not show either a particularized risk of harm or a degree of foreseeability sufficient to animate an exception to the general rule that there is no duty to protect others from third-party criminal predations. View "Jones v. Secord" on Justia Law
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Injury Law, U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals
Crowther v. CSX Transp., Inc.
In consolidated negligence actions under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. 51, against two railroad defendants, a former employee, alleged cumulative, or wear-out, injuries to the neck, knees, left elbow and thumb, and accidental injury to the left forearm while driving a spike. The district court entered judgment for defendants. The First Circuit affirmed. The aggravation claims were untimely, and no fact-finder could reasonably have inferred that plaintiff became aware of a work connection with his knee pain and neck injury only after mid-September of 2004. The court rejected claims based in negligence, alleging inadequate tools and failure to obtain ergonomic studies of the activities required to perform plaintiff’s jobs and upheld admission of evidence of malingering. View "Crowther v. CSX Transp., Inc." on Justia Law
Certain Interested Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London v. Stolberg
A worker, injured at a construction site while working for a subcontractor, sued the developer. The developer submitted the claim to the insurer, which obtained a declaratory judgment that it was not required to indemnify or defend. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that a Contractors Exclusion clause was unambiguous and precluded coverage for any injuries arising out of operations performed for the insured by independent contractors. View "Certain Interested Underwriters at Lloyd's, London v. Stolberg" on Justia Law
Randall v. Laconia, NH
In 1998, the city purchased a house, built before 1978, to provide storage. The seller provided a lead paint inspection report, based on a 1996 inspection, indicating the presence of lead-based paint. When the city sold the house in 2003, it provided a blank, pre-printed, standard lead-based paint disclosure form, which the buyer and his agent signed. The agent informed the buyer that the city would complete the form later. The city never completed the form nor did it turn over the 1996 report. The buyer moved into the home with his family. In 2008, tests taken at his son's two-year physical revealed an elevated blood lead level. The state of New Hampshire performed an inspection, which revealed lead-based paint hazards. In 2010, more than six years after the purchase, the buyer sued under 42 U.S.C. 4852d, which requires disclosure of lead-based paint hazards in sales of homes built before 1978. He alleged that he had received an estimate of approximately $126,000 to perform abatement. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the city based on a three-year limitations period. The First Circuit affirmed. The claim accrued when the city failed to disclose. View "Randall v. Laconia, NH" on Justia Law
Marrero-Rodriguez v. Municipality of San Juan
Training, simulating an arrest, took place at a police facility in San Juan without certified trainers. A requirement that weapons be emptied was not enforced and the highest-ranked officer gave the order that bulletproof jackets not be worn during the exercise. Loaded guns were present and the officer playing the suspect was shot and died. His family filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The trial court dismissed. The First Circuit reversed in part, first affirming dismissal of Fourth and Eighth Amendment claims. With respect to Fourteenth Amendment claims, plaintiffs adequately claimed that actions and inactions of the police and the use of a loaded firearm under the circumstances shock the conscience, and that defendants with supervisory responsibility were callously and recklessly deficient in the lack of any care for the safety of the officer. The mayor is not amenable to suit merely because he is mayor, nor may the municipality be sued, as pled, on a respondeat superior theory. Although the complaint alleges that there were insufficient regulations in place to govern the training exercise, it also describes several safety procedures that were intended to prevent exactly this type of accident. View "Marrero-Rodriguez v. Municipality of San Juan" on Justia Law
Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co., Inc.
Plaintiff's doctor prescribed, for shoulder pain, sulindac, a non-steroid anti-inflammatory, under the brand-name Clinoril; her pharmacist dispensed generic sulindac. She developed a hypersensitivity reaction, toxic epidermal necrolysis, with which the outer skin layer on a patient's body has deteriorated, been burned off or turned into an open wound. Plaintiff spent 70 days at Massachusetts General Hospital, more than 50 in its burn unit, with 60-65 percent of her skin affected. Her "truly horrific" injuries include permanent near-blindness. Her claims against the manufacturer included breach of warranty, fraud, and negligence, and products liability claims: design defect, failure to warn, and manufacturing defect. By trial, the remaining theory of design defect was narrowed to a claim that sulindac's risks outweighed its benefits making it unreasonably dangerous to consumers, despite the FDA having never withdrawn its statutory "safe and effective" designation. A jury awarded $21.06 million in compensatory damages. The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims including that the district court misunderstood New Hampshire law on design defect claims; that such claims as to generic drugs are preempted under federal law; that causation was not proved; and that damages were excessive and required a new trial. .View "Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co., Inc." on Justia Law
Elena v. Mun. of San Juan
Plaintiffs had a longstanding feud with neighbors, based on plaintiffs' "botanical menagerie" that served as a sanctuary for wild parrots. A marker tree spanned the boundary between the plaintiffs' and the neighbors' properties. Claiming that the tree threatened power lines, the neighbors obtained a permit to remove the tree from the Natural Resources Department. The Electric Power Authority temporarily shut off power to the lines and municipal employees removed all of the branches, so that the tree eventually died. Plaintiffs claim that the operation caused extensive damage to other plantings. Plaintiffs sued the municipality, the individual employees, and the neighbors under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming failure to provide pre-deprivation notice or opportunity to be heard, taking without just compensation, and intense pain and suffering. After a maze of cross-claims and counterclaims were filed, so that the electric authority became a party, the district court dismissed. The First Circuit affirmed, stating that, even if destruction of the vegetation was improper, plaintiffs did not state any constitutional cause of action.View "Elena v. Mun. of San Juan" on Justia Law
McCarty v. Verizon New England Inc.
An employee crashed a Verizon truck and admitted to snorting heroin earlier that day. When his supervisor visited his home to have paperwork completed, the encounter became hostile. Verizon fired him. He filed a Massachusetts workers' compensation claim, based on injuries from the accident and alleged psychological harm based on-the-job harassment by the supervisor before the accident and the supervisor's visit to the house. An ALJ rejected the claims and the review board affirmed. A state court affirmed. Employee filed a second workers' compensation claim pertaining solely to the incident at the house. The claim was rejected by the ALJ as res judicata; the board and court affirmed, with an award of double costs against the employee for frivolous appeal. Employee then filed suit against Verizon and the supervisor, charging intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and trespass. The court dismissed, based on preemption provisions of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185(a), and the exclusivity provision of the Compensation Act, Mass. Gen. L. ch. 152, 24. The court ordered plaintiff's attorney to pay $34,908.12 to reflect only defendants’ attorney fees incurred after the court's warning about the lawsuit's viability. The First Circuit affirmed. View "McCarty v. Verizon New England Inc." on Justia Law