Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a Kenyan national, married a U.S. citizen, who filed an I-130 visa petition seeking to classify Petitioner as a spouse of a U.S. citizen. Thereafter, Petitioner applied for adjustment of his immigration status. The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) denied the I-130 petition on the ground of marriage fraud. Removal proceedings were subsequently brought against Petitioner. Petitioner sought relief from removal under the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA). The USCIS approved Petitioner’s VAWA petition. Petitioner then asked the immigration judge (IJ) to adjust his immigration status. The IJ denied the requested relief and ordered Petitioner removed, finding that, although Petitioner was statutorily eligible for adjustment of status based on his approved VAWA petition, he had engaged in marriage fraud. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. While Petitioner’s petition for judicial review was pending, the USCIS revoked Petitioner’s VAWA petition. At issue before the First Circuit was whether it could consider the USCIS’s revocation of the VAWA petition, an action that took place outside the confines of the administrative record. The Court concluded that it could. Remanded to the BIA to determine whether the revocation of the VAWA was lawfully accomplished, and if, so, whether the BIA decision is now moot. View "Manguriu v. Holder" on Justia Law

After his arrest on state charges, Petitioner, a native and citizen of Guatemala, was placed in removal proceedings. Petitioner filed an adjustment of statute application and also applied for a waiver, claiming hardship to his lawfully admitted parents and citizen wife and step-daughter. An immigration judge (IJ) concluded that a favorable exercise of discretion was warranted and granted Petitioner’s waiver and adjustment of status applications. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) disagreed with the IJ, concluding that Petitioner was not entitled to a discretionary waiver. Petitioner did not seek review of that decision. Petitioner later petitioned the BIA to reopen the proceedings based on new evidence. The BIA denied the motion. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the BIA’s denial of the motion to reopen was not an abuse of discretion. View "Mazariegos v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of a felony requiring his removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed an order that Petitioner be removed. Petitioner petitioned for review, arguing that because Padilla v. Kentucky described deportation as a “penalty,” his removal violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment or related constitutional protections unless a court conducted an individual assessment to determine whether his order of removal was a proportional punishment relative to his underlying criminal conviction. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding that Padilla has not signaled a break from long-settled law that removal operates simply as “a refusal by the government to harbor persons whom it does not want,” not as a punishment within the meaning of the Constitution intended to acutely sanction a noncitizen for his underlying criminal conviction. View "Hinds v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner unlawfully entered the United States, was detained at the Arizona border, and failed to attend his deportation hearing. An immigration judge (IJ) ordered Appellant to be removed from the country. Petitioner asked an IJ to reopen the removal proceedings, arguing that he never received notice that his removal hearing had been scheduled. The IJ denied the motion to reopen, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. The First Circuit vacated the BIA’s decision, holding that the IJ applied the wrong legal standard in reviewing Petitioner’s motion, and the BIA abused its discretion by affirming the IJ based on that incorrect legal principle. Remanded. View "Renaut v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native of El Salvador living in the United States, was charged with removability. Petitioner sought relief from removal by requesting review of an earlier denial of his application for Temporary Protected Status (TPS) under 8 U.S.C. 1254a, which affords undocumented immigrants protection from removal upon a determination that conditions in the individual’s home country prevent his safe return. A non-citizen is ineligible for TPS, however, if he has been convicted of an “aggravated felony.” The immigration judge (IJ) denied Petitioner’s application for TPS on the ground that he had a 2006 conviction for third-degree assault under Connecticut law. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s ruling. Petitioner petitioned for review, arguing that the BIA erred in finding that his 2006 conviction constituted a “crime of violence” and therefore an “aggravated felony.” The First Circuit vacated the BIA’s decision and remanded, holding that Petitioner’s conviction did not render him ineligible for TPS. Remanded. View "Villanueva v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Bulgaria, was found by an immigration judge (IJ) to be removable under the alien smuggling provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act by easing or facilitating what Petitioner knew to be an attempted illegal entry by an alien into the United States. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed and ordered Petitioner removed to Bulgaria. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding that there was sufficient evidence on the record to establish that Petitioner knowingly and voluntarily assisted her friends as they attempted to cross illegally from Canada into the United States. View "Dimova v. Holder" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant, a member of a prominent political family allegedly involved in the Rwandan genocide, was convicted of two counts of procuring citizenship illegally by making false statements to the government. Specifically, the jury found that Defendant misrepresented her political affiliations and her participation in the genocide. The First Circuit affirmed Defendant’s convictions and sentence, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions; (2) any error in the court’s evidentiary rulings was harmless given the vast array of evidence against Defendant; (3) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion for a mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct; and (4) Defendant’s 120-month sentence was reasonable. View "United States v. Munyenyezi" on Justia Law

Defendant, a member of a prominent political family allegedly involved in the Rwandan genocide, was convicted of perjury and obstruction of justice based on false statements she made in connection with her application for asylum in the United States and subsequent removal proceedings. The false statements concerned Defendant’s truthfulness on previous immigration documents, in which she misrepresented her political affiliations and government employment, and her statement that there was no roadblock outside Hotel Ihuriro during her stay there at the start of the genocide. The First Circuit affirmed the convictions, holding (1) the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss on grounds of collateral estoppel, as collateral estoppel did not apply on the facts of this case; (2) the government succeeded in establishing that Defendant’s false statements were material to the immigration judge’s decision; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony of a professor of political science and an expert on the Rwandan genocide as to the existence of a roadblock in front of Hotel Ihuriro before Defendant’s departure. View "United States v. Kantengwa" on Justia Law

When the Department of Homeland Security commenced removal proceedings against Petitioner, a Dominican national, Petitioner conceded removability and applied for voluntary departure. While the immigration proceedings were pending, Petitioner was arrested and charged with offenses arising from a domestic disturbance. One of the police officers who arrested Petitioner prepared a report documenting the incident. In the immigration course, the police report was introduced into evidence. The immigration judge (IJ) found that, although the criminal charges against Petitioner were still pending in state court, the police report reliably disclosed a disturbing set of negative factors that outweighed any positive factors. The IJ then denied voluntary departure. While Petitioner’s appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) was pending, the criminal charges were dismissed. The BIA remanded the matter. The IJ again denied relief, concluding that reliance on the police report was appropriate under the circumstances. The BIA affirmed. The First Circuit denied in part and dismissed in part Petitioner’s petition for review, holding (1) the Court lacked jurisdiction to consider Petitioner’s claim that the IJ’s and BIA’s decisions reflected an abuse of discretion; and (2) neither the IJ nor the BIA committed any legal error by considering the police report as a negative factor weighing against discretionary relief. View "Arias-Minaya v. Holder" on Justia Law

In 2008, removal proceedings were commenced against Petitioner, a Guatemalan national. Petitioner conceded removability and cross-applied for discretionary relief under the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA) in the form of special rule cancellation of removal or for asylum, withholding of removal, or protection under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT). An Immigration Judge (IJ) denied Petitioner’s NACARA claim, concluding (1) special rule cancellation of removal under NACARA was not an appropriate exercise of discretion; and (2) Petitioner's remaining claims were without merit. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the IJ’s decision. The First Circuit dismissed Petitioner’s petition for judicial review for want of jurisdiction, holding (1) under the circumstances of this case, the Court lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denial of special rule cancellation of removal; and (2) Petitioner’s remaining claims of error were unexhausted and, thus, unsuitable for judicial review. View "Ramirez-Matias v. Holder" on Justia Law