Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 1991, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) placed Petitioner in deportation proceedings. In 2011, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) took action in Petitioner’s case. By that time, Congress had replaced deportation with removal, and DHS mistakenly regarded Petitioner as being in removal proceedings. The Immigration Judge (IJ) concluded that Petitioner’s conviction for aggravated identity theft was a “particularly serious crime” rendering her ineligible for withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. 2131(b). The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the IJ’s determination and ordered Petitioner deported. Without reaching the merits of Petitioner’s petition for review, the First Circuit remanded Petitioner’s case to the BIA to interpret and apply the correct law, former 8 U.S.C. 1253(h), holding that while the BIA acknowledged that Petitioner was in deportation proceedings governed by section 1253, the BIA incorrectly stated that the law governing the two proceedings was the same and improperly omitted any reference to section 1253(h)(3) in its review of Petitioner’s application. View "Valerio-Ramirez v. Lynch" on Justia Law

In 1999, Petitioner, a citizen of Jamaica, was convicted of third-degree assault under a Connecticut statute. The Department of Homeland Security later placed Petitioner in removal proceedings. Permanent resident non-citizens such as Petitioner are removable if they are convicted of an “aggravated felony,” which includes any offense defined as a “crime of violence.” An immigration judge (IJ) found Petitioner removable as charged, concluding that third-degree assault under Connecticut law qualified as a “crime of violence.” Reviewing the IJ’s legal conclusions de novo, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) ordered Petitioner’s removal, reasoning that the Connecticut offense was categorically a crime of violence and thus was necessarily an “aggravated felony.” The First Circuit granted Petitioner’s petition for review and vacated the removal order, holding (1) third-degree assault as defined by Connecticut law does not require proof of all of the required elements of a “crime of violence”; and (2) therefore, Petitioner’s conviction for third-degree assault, standing by itself, does not constitute proof that he has been convicted of an aggravated felony requiring his removal. Remanded. View "Whyte v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents were acting on an alleged tip that undocumented aliens were employed at the Michael Bianco, Inc. factory in New Bedford, Massachusetts when they raided the factory. Petitioner was detained during the raid and was subsequently arrested and detained. During Petitioner’s detention, an ICE agent interviewed Petitioner. The substance of that interview was memorialized in an I-213 form. Petitioner was later served with a Notice to Appear in removal proceedings. Petitioner denied removability and moved to suppress the I-213, arguing that the statements contained therein were obtained in violation of her Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. On remand, an Immigration Judge (IJ) denied the motion, concluding the government’s introduction of Petitioner’s birth certificate independently established Petitioner’s identity and alienage whether she established egregious misconduct by ICE officers that would warrant suppression of her I-213 form. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed, primarily on the ground that Petitioner had failed to show egregious violations of her constitutional rights. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding that Petitioner’s birth certificate was not tainted by any alleged constitutional violations and was sufficient to prove her alienage. View "Garcia-Aguilar v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Guatemalan national, entered the United States without inspection. Two years later, federal authorities instituted removal proceedings against him. Petitioner conceded removability and cross-applied for withholding of removal and protection under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT). An immigration judge denied Petitioner’s cross-applications and ordered him removed. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denied Petitioner’s appeal. More than one year later, Petitioner filed a motion to reopen his removal proceedings. The BIA denied the motion to reopen, concluding that the motion was untimely and, in any event, Petitioner failed to make a sufficient showing to warrant reopening the removal proceedings. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for judicial review, holding that the BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Petitioner’s motion to reopen as untimely. View "Mejia-Ramaja v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of the Dominican Republic, married a U.S. citizen and acquired status as a conditional lawful permanent resident. Petitioner and her spouse subsequently filed an I-751 joint petition (“joint petition”) seeking to remove the conditional nature of Petitioner’s residency status. The Immigration and Naturalization Service denied the petition based on a finding of marriage fraud. Petitioner and her spouse later divorced, and Petitioner was placed in removal proceedings. Petitioner then filed another I-751 petition (“waiver petition”) seeking a waiver of the joint petition requirements and arguing that she had entered into her marriage in good faith. The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services denied the petition, relying on the previous finding of marriage fraud. An immigration judge (IJ) upheld the denial of the waiver petition and found that Petitioner was ineligible for cancellation of removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for judicial review, holding (1) the IJ did not erroneously review the waiver petition instead of the joint petition; and (2) the BIA did not err in declaring Petitioner statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal. View "Cabrera v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Honduras who entered the United States illegally, pleaded guilty to assaulting his wife in violation of Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. 17-A, 207(1)(A). Petitioner was subsequently charged with removability as an alien present without being admitted or paroled. Petitioner conceded removability and requested cancellation of removal. An immigration judge (IJ) held that Petitioner was not eligible for cancellation of removal because he had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his assault conviction was not a “crime of domestic violence.” The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding that the IJ and BIA correctly found that Petitioner did not meet his burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that his Maine assault conviction was not a crime of domestic violence. View "Sauceda v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, who legally entered the United States on a visitor visa, adjusted his status to that of a conditional permanent resident based on his marriage to Nadine Woodley Davis (“Woodley”), a United States citizen. This status terminated upon the denial of Petitioner’s request for a waiver of the requirement that he file a joint petition with Woodley to remove the conditional status. Petitioner was subsequently charged with removability. Petitioner conceded removability but requested termination of proceedings, adjustment of status, and a review of the waiver application. The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied relief, finding that Petitioner did not enter into his marriage in good faith but rather for the sole purpose of circumventing immigration laws. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed and refused to remand the proceedings to the IJ given Petitioner’s recent marriage to another United States citizen. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding (1) substantial evidence supported the IJ’s and the BIA’s conclusions that Petitioner’s marriage to Woodley was not entered into in good faith; and (2) the BIA did not abuse its discretion in deciding to deny Petitioner’s motion to reopen. View "Davis v. Holder" on Justia Law

In 2011, Petitioner pled guilty to conspiracy to commit wire fraud, bank fraud, and identity fraud. The federal district court ordered Petitioner to pay restitution and to serve a term of probation but did not impose any incarcerative sentence. As a result of this conviction, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against Petitioner. An Immigration Judge ordered Petitioner removed, and the Board of Immigration Appeals upheld that decision. At issue before the First Circuit was whether an individual must serve a “term of imprisonment” to have committed an “aggravated felony” as that term is defined in section 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43). the First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding that a federal or state conviction may constitute an “aggravated felony” under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43) even when it is not accompanied by a term of imprisonment. View "Levesque v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of China, was ordered removed in absentia. Petitioner filed a pro se motion to reopen, which the Immigration Judge (IJ) denied. Almost fourteen years after he was ordered removed, Petitioner filed a motion to rescind the in absentia removal order and a motion to reopen his removal proceedings to apply for asylum and related relief. The IJ denied Petitioner’s motions as untimely and numerically barred. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Petitioner’s appeal. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding (1) Liu waived his argument that he exercised the requisite due diligence to warrant equitable tolling; and (2) the BIA and IJ acted within their discretion in determining that Petitioner did not qualify for the changed country conditions exception for filing motions to reopen. View "Liu v. Holder" on Justia Law

Appellant, a citizen of the Dominican Republic, was convicted of illegal reentry into the United States as a previously removed alien. On appeal, Appellant moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the underlying order of removal was invalid. The district court refused to dismiss the indictment, ruling that Appellant had not exhausted his administrative remedies and, thus, could not collaterally attack the underlying removal order. Appellant subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss. The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s order denying Appellant’s motion to dismiss his indictment, holding that because Appellant did not exhaust his administrative remedies in connection with the underlying removal, he could not collaterally attack that removal in his criminal case. View "United States v. Soto-Mateo" on Justia Law