Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a native and citizen of El Salvador, was charged with removability. Petitioner conceded removability and indicated her intent to seek asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. Before the immigration judge (IJ), Petitioner argued that she had suffered past persecution in El Salvador and had a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of her membership in the particular social group she defined as “Salvadoran women in intimate relationships with partners who view them as property.” The IJ denied Petitioner’s application for asylum and withholding of removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed, concluding that Petitioner failed to establish that her proposed social group shared immutable characteristics and had social distinction. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s finding that Petitioner failed to show either immutability or social distinction. View "Vega-Ayala v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Guatemalan national, entered the United States and was placed in removal proceedings. Petitioner cross-applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT), claiming both past persecution and fear of future persecution due to his anti-gang political opinion and his membership in a particular social group. An immigration judge denied relief. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for judicial review, holding that there was no error in the BIA’s determinations and that the BIA's determinations were supported by substantial evidence in the record. View "Alvizures-Gomes v. Lynch" on Justia Law

When Thomas was a child, he was lawfully admitted to the United States for six months, but he and his parents remained in the country beyond that date. Thomas’s mother later became a naturalized United States citizen and, three days later, Thomas turned eighteen years old. Thomas did not apply to become a lawful permanent resident thereafter but, instead continued living in the United States without a lawful admission for permanent residence. Thomas was subsequently convicted in a Massachusetts state court for armed robbery. An Immigration Judge ordered Thomas removed, finding that Thomas was removable as an alien who had been convicted of an aggravated felony. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. Thomas filed a petition for review, arguing that he satisfied the applicable statutory criteria for obtaining derivative citizenship in consequence of his mother’s naturalization. The First Circuit denied the petition, holding that Thomas did not satisfy the criteria set forth in the derivative citizenship statute that was in effect at the time he was still a minor. View "Thomas v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native of El Salvador with multiple convictions, was placed in removal proceedings. An Immigration Judge (IJ) rejected Petitioner’s application for Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA) special rule cancellation of removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Petitioner’s appeal. A Massachusetts district court later vacated Petitioner’s convictions, and the charges were subsequently dismissed for failure to prosecute. Thereafter, the BIA vacated its prior decision and remanded the case to the IJ for reconsideration. The IJ acknowledged that Petitioner was eligible for relief from removal under NACARA but exercised its discretion by declining to grant relief. The BIA affirmed. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Petitioner did not deserve a favorable exercise of discretion. View "Lima v. Lynch" on Justia Law

In 2000, Chen entered the U.S. illegally. Luo followed in 2002, with a visitor's visa, which he overstayed. They married 2008. They became members of the China Democracy Party Foundation, a group committed to political reform in China. In removal proceedings, an IJ found Chen removable under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), as present in the U.S. without having been lawfully admitted or paroled, and found Luo removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(B), for remaining in the U.S. longer than permitted. They unsuccessfully sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the U.N. Convention Against Torture, arguing that, if repatriated, they would be subject to persecution (or worse) because of their political activities in the U.S. The IJ did not find Chen credible and did not find that the petitioners had carried their burden of proving their claims. After the BIA upheld those denials, they moved to reopen, rather than seeking judicial review. After the motion was denied, three years passed before they filed a second motion to reopen, arguing changed country circumstances. The BIA denied the motion as time-and-number barred and found that the "changed country circumstances" exception did not apply. The First Circuit denied a petition for review, noting that motions to reopen are disfavored because of the compelling public interest in finality and the expeditious processing of immigration proceedings. View "Chen v. Lynch" on Justia Law

The Pandits, citizens of India, have lived in the U.S. for 21 years. They reside in Massachusetts with their 19-year-old daughter, Pooja, who is a U.S. citizen. In 2009, DHS began removal proceedings on the grounds that they had arrived without a valid entry document and were present in the U.S. without being "admitted," 8 U.S.C. 1182(a). The Pandits sought cancellation of removal, 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b), arguing that they had been physically present for a continuous period of not less than 10 years immediately preceding; were of good moral character during such period; had not been convicted of a qualifying offense; and that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to their daughter. They argued that that Pooja could not live in the U.S. without her parents and would be forced to move to India if they were deported, where she "would face difficulties acclimating to the different educational and cultural system." In 2013, the IJ denied their application, finding they had not shown "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" and that, even if they met all of the statutory criteria, they would not "merit a favorable exercise of discretion" because they had "engaged in fraud repeatedly in order to gain immigration benefits." Each had entered into (separate) fraudulent marriages, and a friend had filed a fraudulent labor certification on their behalf. The First Circuit affirmed the BIA’s refusal to re-open proceedings for consideration of Pooja’s medical problems. View "Pandit v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native of St. Vincent and the Grenadines, overstayed her visa and was subjected to removal proceedings. Petitioner applied for special rule cancellation of removal for battered spouses, a relief provision enacted pursuant to the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA). An immigration judge (IJ) denied the application on the ground that Petitioner’s testimony was unreliable and non-credible with respect to her abuse. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed on the basis that a good faith marriage must be shown before an applicant may be eligible for VAWA special rule cancellation of removal. The First Circuit vacated the denial of Petitioner’s application for VAWA special-rule cancellation of removal, holding that the BIA’s failure to adequately explain its decision that the operative statute requires an alien to prove a good faith marriage as an eligibility requirement for VAWA special rule cancellation of removal precluded meaningful judicial review in this case. Remanded. View "Tillery v. Lynch" on Justia Law

In 2009, an Immigration Judge (IJ) entered an order of removal of Petitioner, a native and citizen of the Dominican Republic. In 2012, Petitioner reentered the United States unlawfully. Thereafter, Petitioner was charged with criminal unlawful reentry. In 2013, Petitioner moved to reopen, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel during the 2009 removal proceedings. The IJ denied the motion to reopen, concluding (1) the motion was time and number barred, and (2) the ineffective assistance of counsel claim did not comply with the requirements enumerated in Matter of Lozada. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the BIA denied. Petitioner then petitioned for judicial review. The First Circuit dismissed Petitioner’s petition for judicial review in part for want of jurisdiction and otherwise denied it, holding (1) because Petitioner never filed a timely petition for judicial review of the BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen, the Court lacked jurisdiction to review that portion of Petitioner’s motion; and (2) the BIA did not err in denying Petitioner’s motion to reconsider. View "Garcia v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Colombia, sought to register permanent residence or adjust status. In support of his application, he submitted evidence, including a visa and Form I-94, that he was legally admitted to the United States when he was thirteen years old. The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) denied his application on the basis that the documents were fraudulent. Petitioner was then placed in removal proceedings. Emphasizing his young age at the time of his alleged admission, Petitioner asserted that he did not know that his documents were fraudulent. An immigration judge (IJ) determined that Petitioner had failed to establish that he was lawfully present in the United States following a prior admission. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding (1) the courts below did not err in their determinations that Petitioner’s testimony before the IJ was not credible; and (2) the BIA did not err by summarily affirming the IJ’s decision to give no weight to Petitioner’s favorable polygraph test. View "Acosta v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Honduras who entered the United States illegally, conceded removability but requested cancellation of removal. An immigration judge held that Petitioner was not eligible for cancellation of removal because he had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his Maine assault conviction was not a “crime of domestic violence.” The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. The First Circuit initially denied Petitioner’s petition for review. Petitioner then petitioned for rehearing, presenting a developed argument based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Moncrieffe v. Holder. The First Circuit granted the petition, vacated the BIA’s decision, and remanded, holding that Moncrieffe controls in this case and that, in accordance with Moncrieffe, Petitioner was not convicted of a “crime of violence.” View "Sauceda v. Lynch" on Justia Law