Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A class of noncitizens with final removal orders challenged new Department of Homeland Security (DHS) policies issued in March and July 2025, which authorized their removal to “third countries”—countries neither designated in their removal orders nor identified in writing during prior proceedings. The plaintiffs alleged that DHS’s policy failed to provide effective notice or a meaningful opportunity to contest removal to these third countries based on reasonable fear of persecution or torture. The policies also relied on diplomatic assurances from receiving countries, sometimes removing individuals without further protective procedures.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts issued a temporary restraining order, granted class certification, and later a preliminary injunction requiring DHS to provide written notice and an opportunity for class members to assert fear-based claims before any third-country removal. After DHS appealed, the U.S. Supreme Court granted a stay pending appellate review. On remand, the district court dissolved the preliminary injunction and issued a final judgment, concluding that DHS’s guidance violated statutory requirements for sequencing removal destinations, and failed to provide notice and hearing for fear-based claims, including those under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court ordered declaratory relief and vacated the guidance as unlawful under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing on the “sequencing” claim and vacated the related declarations. However, the court affirmed the district court’s judgment that DHS must provide effective notice and a meaningful opportunity to contest removal to a third country based on fear-based claims, and upheld the vacatur of DHS guidance as unlawful under the APA. The court rejected DHS’s jurisdictional and remedy arguments, clarifying that declaratory and vacatur relief were permissible and not barred by statute. View "D.V.D. v. Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

Jose Miguel Pena de la Cruz, a citizen of the Dominican Republic, was indicted in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts on charges related to money laundering. After being released from criminal custody on conditions set by a magistrate judge, he was taken into Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) custody. The government then informed the district court that Pena de la Cruz would soon be deported. In response, the district court, treating the government’s notice as a motion to dismiss, ordered that the indictment be dismissed with prejudice upon his deportation.Before reaching the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, the district court had issued several orders regarding ICE custody and deportation of criminal defendants, including a standing order that generally barred ICE detention or removal until a criminal case concluded through dismissal with prejudice, acquittal, or judgment. The government opposed dismissal with prejudice, arguing that there was no bad faith or prosecutorial harassment, and that dismissal under Rule 48(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure should ordinarily be without prejudice. Defense counsel initially moved for dismissal with prejudice but withdrew the motion as unripe, and the district court ultimately dismissed the indictment with prejudice after ICE notified it of the impending removal.The First Circuit vacated the district court’s order dismissing the indictment with prejudice, holding that the circumstances did not meet the high bar required for such a dismissal. The court clarified that dismissal with prejudice under Rule 48(a) is appropriate only in cases of prosecutorial bad faith, harassment, or when dismissal without prejudice would create a patent threat of unfairness to the defendant—none of which were present here. The First Circuit also vacated the district court’s standing order and its modification, remanding with instructions to dismiss the indictment without prejudice. View "US v. Pena de la Cruz" on Justia Law

The petitioner, a native and citizen of El Salvador, entered the United States in 2000 on a visa and overstayed its expiration in 2001. In 2018, the Department of Homeland Security commenced removal proceedings against him. He conceded removability and sought cancellation of removal, arguing that his deportation would result in “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to his two U.S. citizen children. His main argument was that, if removed, he would not be able to provide his son with necessary asthma medication. He provided evidence of his son's medical history, his own role as the primary financial provider, and concerns about affordability and availability of medical care in El Salvador.An Immigration Judge conducted an evidentiary hearing and denied the application for cancellation of removal. The judge found that the petitioner had not demonstrated that his son's asthma constituted a serious medical condition or that, even if it did, treatment and medication would be unavailable or unaffordable in El Salvador. The judge also found insufficient evidence regarding the cost and availability of asthma medications, as well as the family's ability to afford them if relocated. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the Immigration Judge’s decision without issuing a separate opinion.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case, treating the Immigration Judge’s opinion as the final agency action. Applying a deferential standard of review, the court examined whether the agency correctly applied the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard to the facts. The court held that the Immigration Judge properly applied agency precedent and weighed all relevant factors in the aggregate. The court concluded that the petitioner failed to meet his burden and that the evidence did not rise to the statutory hardship level. Accordingly, the First Circuit denied the petition for review. View "Espinoza Benitez v. Blanche" on Justia Law

A Jamaican national entered the United States on a tourist visa in 2004 and remained beyond his authorized stay. He was arrested by U.S. authorities in 2009 and charged as removable. Following his marriages to two U.S. citizens—both ending in divorce—he sought various forms of immigration relief, including adjustment of status and asylum. His immigration history was complicated by criminal convictions for making false statements and misrepresenting a Social Security number when applying for a U.S. passport, as well as allegations of marriage fraud. After several procedural delays and changes in representation, he eventually filed applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, claiming fear of gang violence in Jamaica due to his brother’s work as a police officer.The Immigration Judge in Boston, Massachusetts, denied all applications. The judge found the petitioner ineligible for adjustment of status due to his criminal convictions and lack of a valid waiver, and further determined that even if eligible, the relief would be denied as a matter of discretion. The judge also found the asylum application untimely, not excused by changed or extraordinary circumstances, and lacking merit. The judge made an adverse credibility finding against the petitioner and concluded that his proposed social group was not legally cognizable. The judge denied withholding of removal and CAT protection on similar grounds. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the judge’s decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. It held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the discretionary denial of adjustment of status and the agency’s determination that the asylum application was untimely without excusing circumstances. The court dismissed the petition as to those claims. On the remaining claims, the court denied the petition, upholding the adverse credibility finding and the ruling that the proposed social group was not cognizable. View "Bromfield v. Blanche" on Justia Law

A family of four, natives and citizens of Brazil, entered the United States without authorization in October 2021 and were subsequently charged with removability. Through counsel, they conceded removability and sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, claiming persecution by Brazilian military police due to their association with Cristiana’s brother, who was a gang leader and imprisoned. The alleged harm included threats, intimidation, and witnessing violence against family members at Cristiana’s mother’s house, but neither Cristiana nor her husband suffered direct physical harm or arrest. After the mother’s death, Cristiana feared she would be targeted as her brother’s only remaining family in Brazil.An Immigration Judge from the U.S. Department of Justice’s Executive Office for Immigration Review denied their applications in December 2023, finding their testimony credible but insufficient to establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution. The IJ concluded that the harm experienced was indirect and limited, primarily occurring at the mother’s house, and could have been avoided by not visiting there. The IJ also found the applicants failed to show objective evidence of ongoing threats or that internal relocation within Brazil would be unreasonable. The IJ’s denial of relief was affirmed by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which also dismissed arguments based on the asylum grant to Cristiana’s sister, Poliana, distinguishing her circumstances as involving direct physical harm.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed both the IJ’s and BIA’s decisions under the substantial evidence standard. The court held that the applicants did not demonstrate past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution, nor did they show they were similarly situated to Poliana. The petitions for review were denied, and the disposition affirmed the decisions of the BIA and IJ. View "Pereira Alves v. Blanche" on Justia Law

A Canadian couple moved to Massachusetts with their two young children after both were granted E-2 non-immigrant visas to work at a family business expanding into the United States. Their move was described as a trial, intended to assess whether they liked living in the U.S. and to help launch the business. They left most possessions in Canada and maintained financial and familial ties there. After selling their Canadian home, they bought a condominium in Massachusetts. Over time, the spouses developed differing intentions about making the United States their permanent home. The father struggled to adapt to life in Massachusetts and expressed his desire to return to Canada, while the mother wished to stay. In August 2024, after the father traveled to Canada, the mother withdrew funds from joint accounts, changed the locks on the home, and refused to let the children visit their father in Canada.Subsequently, the mother filed for divorce in Massachusetts, and the father counterclaimed for custody and removal of the children to Canada. Temporary custody arrangements were made. The father then filed applications under the Hague Convention in both Canada and the United States, alleging wrongful retention of the children. The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts held a hearing and concluded that the mother’s actions amounted to wrongful retention under the Hague Convention, finding that the children’s “habitual residence” remained Canada. The court ordered the children returned to Canada.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision, applying clear error review to the findings of fact. The court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly identified Canada as the children’s habitual residence as of the date of wrongful retention. The court also rejected the mother’s defenses of “now-settled,” consent, and acquiescence, finding no clear error in the district court’s determinations. The judgment ordering the return of the children to Canada was affirmed. View "Giguere v. Tardif" on Justia Law

A Salvadoran national entered the United States without inspection in 2013 and lived in Massachusetts. In September 2025, he was arrested by immigration authorities during a vehicle stop and placed in removal proceedings, charged as inadmissible for being present without admission or valid documentation. Under longstanding practice, individuals in his situation could seek release from detention on bond while their removal cases were pending. However, in July 2025, the Department of Homeland Security issued guidance, later adopted by the Board of Immigration Appeals in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, that mandatory detention without bond applied to all noncitizens present in the U.S. without admission, shifting the legal framework and increasing the detained population.After his arrest, the individual challenged his detention without a bond hearing by filing a habeas petition in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The district court issued a preliminary injunction, requiring his release or a bond hearing, and later certified a class action for similarly situated noncitizens. The district court ultimately held that the new DHS policy violated the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), finding that those present in the United States without admission were entitled to bond hearings under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), not subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A).On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed whether the INA requires mandatory detention without bond for noncitizens present in the country without admission, or if they are eligible for bond hearings. The First Circuit held that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only to noncitizens "seeking admission"—that is, those seeking lawful entry at the border—not those already present after unlawful entry. Accordingly, detention and bond eligibility for class members are governed by § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), and the district court’s order was affirmed. View "Guerrero Orellana v. Moniz" on Justia Law

The petitioner, a native of Sierra Leone and citizen of Liberia, entered the United States as a refugee in 2004 and later became a lawful permanent resident. After a troubled period as a youth, he was convicted in New Hampshire of witness tampering for retaliating against a friend whom he believed had reported him for shoplifting. His actions included physical assault and other forms of abuse. Based on this state conviction, the government initiated removal proceedings, alleging that his offense constituted an aggravated felony “relating to obstruction of justice” under federal immigration law.An Immigration Judge found the petitioner removable due to his conviction but granted deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), finding it more likely than not that he would face torture if returned to Sierra Leone. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the finding of removability based on the aggravated felony determination but reversed the deferral of removal under CAT. The petitioner then sought review of the BIA’s decision, challenging both the aggravated felony classification and the denial of CAT protection.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed whether a conviction under New Hampshire’s witness tampering statute qualifies as an aggravated felony “relating to obstruction of justice” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S). The court held that the New Hampshire statute does not require a specific intent to interfere with legal process, a necessary element for the federal generic offense of obstruction of justice. Therefore, the statute criminalizes a broader range of conduct than the federal definition. The First Circuit vacated the BIA’s decision and remanded the case, concluding that the petitioner’s conviction does not render him removable under the aggravated felony provision. View "Bangs v. Blanche" on Justia Law

A Salvadoran citizen entered the United States in May 2015 and was later apprehended by immigration authorities in July 2017. Removal proceedings were initiated, and she applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. Her application described fear of harm from her sister’s former partner, who was associated with MS-13, and detailed prior robberies by gangs in El Salvador. She claimed threats and harm related to her urging her sister to report sexual assault perpetrated by the partner, who subsequently threatened her and her family.An Immigration Judge denied her claims for asylum and withholding of removal, finding the asylum application time-barred and determining there was no nexus between the violence she experienced and any statutorily protected ground, such as gender, familial ties, or political opinion. The judge found the robberies were motivated by financial gain and the threats by personal revenge, not by protected grounds. The judge also denied Convention Against Torture protection. The applicant appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, arguing the judge failed to properly consider mixed motives and humanitarian asylum. The Board dismissed the appeal, holding that she failed to show a protected ground was a central reason for the alleged harm and also denied humanitarian asylum for the same reason.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the agency’s decisions as a unit, applying substantial evidence review to factual findings and de novo review to legal conclusions. The court held that substantial evidence supported the agency’s determination that there was no nexus between the alleged persecution and a statutorily protected ground. Because this finding was dispositive, the petition for review was denied. The court also concluded that the lack of nexus foreclosed claims for humanitarian asylum and withholding of removal, and rejected ancillary due process claims. View "Guzman v. Blanche" on Justia Law

A noncitizen who arrived in the United States from Cambodia as a child and later became a lawful permanent resident was convicted in Rhode Island state court in 1996 of a controlled substance offense. This conviction led to deportation proceedings, and an immigration judge found him deportable in 1998. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed his appeal in 1999. Over twenty years later, the Rhode Island prosecutor dismissed his conviction in 2020, citing equitable reasons. The noncitizen then unsuccessfully filed his first motion to reopen his removal proceedings with the BIA, which denied it as untimely and found no substantive or procedural defect in the original conviction.Following this, the noncitizen obtained a consent order from the Rhode Island Superior Court in 2023, vacating his prior plea and sentence based on a violation of Rule 11 of the Rhode Island Rules of Criminal Procedure, which relates to due process in plea colloquies. In April 2024, he filed a second motion to reopen his removal proceedings with the BIA, this time invoking the BIA’s sua sponte authority. The BIA again denied reopening, treating the motion as statutory, finding it time and number barred, and concluding he failed to demonstrate due diligence or a defect in the conviction.On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit found that the BIA committed legal error by mischaracterizing the second motion as statutory rather than sua sponte. The appellate court held that sua sponte motions are not subject to the same time and number limitations or equitable tolling standards as statutory motions. The court also found that the BIA erred by overlooking the Superior Court's order, which clearly indicated the conviction was vacated due to a procedural defect. The First Circuit granted the petition for review and remanded for further proceedings. View "Kim v. Blanche" on Justia Law