Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The National Labor Relations Board entered an order requiring NSTAR Electric Company, an electric and gas company, to bargain with a Union that seventeen of the company’s dispatch-center workers voted to join. The Board filed an application in the First Circuit to enforce that order. NSTAR filed a cross-petition for review, contending that the electrical workers’ responsibilities made them either “supervisors” or “manager[s]” rather than “employees,” and therefore, the National Labor Relations Act, which requires a company to bargain with a union that represents “employees” of that company, did not protect the workers’ right to have the Union represent them. The First Circuit granted the Board’s petition to enforce the Board’s order and denied the company’s cross-petition for review, holding that substantial evidence supported the Board’s finding that the NSTAR failed to show that the workers were either supervisors or managers, even though the workers were highly skilled and charged with critical tasks. View "NLRB v. NSTAR Elec. & Gas Co." on Justia Law

Fuad Atieh, a Jordanian national, was placed in removal proceedings. Fuad subsequently married Jamileh Khudari, a U.S. citizen. The couple later divorced. Thereafter, Fuad married Raniah Atieh, a U.S. citizen. Two months later, Raniah filed an I-130 petition on Fuad’s behalf. The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) denied the I-130 petition. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the decision, concluding that the Atiehs had failed to prove the bona fides of Fuad’s first marriage. The Atiehs filed a second I-130 petition. USCIS denied relief, and the BIA affirmed. The district court affirmed, concluding that the administrative record adequately supported the denial of I-130 relief. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the BIA did not err, misconstrue or ignore the evidence, or fail to consider the record in its entirety in concluding that Fuad’s first marriage was fraudulent. View "Atieh v. Riordan" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native of the Dominican Republic, was served with a Notice to Appear charging him with being removable from the United States for overstaying a nonimmigrant visa. The Notice to Appear explained that Petitioner was required to keep immigration authorities apprised of his current address. After being served with the Notice to Appear, Petitioner moved to a new address without updating his address with immigration officials. The immigration court sent notice of the hearing to Petitioner’s old address. Petitioner did not receive notice of the hearing and was ordered removed in absentia. Petitioner moved to reopen his removal proceedings on the basis that he had not received notice of the hearing. The Immigration Judge denied the motion. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding that Petitioner was not entitled to reopen in absentia removal proceedings on the basis of not having received the statutorily-required notice where Petitioner never apprised the government of his new address. View "Ledesma-Sanchez v. Holder" on Justia Law

An Immigration Judge found that Petitioner, a native and citizen of Guatemala, was removable because he obtained immigration benefits by fraud or material representation and because he entered the United States without valid documentation. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s decision and dismissed Petitioner’s appeal. Petitioner petitioned for review, arguing that equitable estoppel should be applied to terminate proceedings against him due to government misconduct. The First Circuit dismissed the petition, holding that because Petitioner did not raise his equitable estoppel claim before the BIA, he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with the BIA, and thus, this Court did not have jurisdiction to review the claim. View "Batres v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Honduran national, applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The Immigration Judge denied all of Petitioner’s claims for relief and ordered him removed to Honduras. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, concluding that Petitioner failed to establish either past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the record was consistent with the agency’s determination that Petitioner failed to establish past persecution and that Petitioner’s professed fear of future persecution was not objectively reasonable, and therefore, Petitioner’s asylum claim and claim for withholding of removal were properly denied; and (2) Petitioner’s claim for protection under CAT was waived. View "Villafranca v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, applied for withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied Petitioner’s applications based on an adverse credibility finding. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Petitioner’s appeal on the basis that the IJ’s adverse credibility finding was not clearly erroneous. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding (1) ample evidence supported the IJ’s credibility finding, and the adverse credibility determination supported the resulting denial of Petitioner’s removal and CAT claims; and (2) Petitioner failed to establish any violation of his right to due process. View "Cuatzo v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of China, was placed in removal proceedings in 1997. Petitioner filed applications for asylum and withholding of removal. In 1998, an immigration judge denied in part the applications based on adverse credibility findings. Petitioner was not removed, however, and remained in the United States. In 2014, Petitioner filed a motion to reopen his asylum and withholding of removal proceedings, arguing that his late motion should not be barred by the ninety-day statutory limit because of evidence demonstrating changed country conditions in China. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denied Petitioner’s motion to reopen, concluding that the motion did not meet the exception to the time bar for relief based on changed circumstances in Petitioner's country of nationality. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that Petitioner’s motion to reopen removal proceedings was time-barred. View "Wang v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native of Guatemala who entered the United States unlawfully, requested asylum, withholding of removal, protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), and voluntary departure. The immigration judge (IJ) granted Petitioner voluntary departure but held that he failed to meet his burden of showing that he was entitled to asylum, withholding of removal, or CAT protection. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for judicial review, holding (1) new case law did not require a remand for reconsideration in light of the “clarification of the BIA’s position on the social visibility requirement of the asylum statute; (2) the BIA did not err in finding that Petitioner failed to establish a protected ground for asylum because Petitioner’s proposed social group was not a legally cognizable particular social group; and (3) the BIA did not err in dismissing Petitioner’s appeal of the denial of his application for withholding of removal. View "Paiz-Morales v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Uganda, was served with a notice to appear in immigration removal proceedings. Petitioner petitioned for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the United Nations Convention Against Torture. Primarily on the basis of four incidents, Petitioner testified that he feared he would be detained or killed if forced to return to Uganda. An Immigration Judge (IJ) found that Petitioner’s testimony was not credible and, thus, denied relief. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed, concluding that the discrepancies in portions of Petitioner’s testimony provided specific cogent reasons for the IJ’s adverse credibility determination. The First Circuit vacated the BIA’s order, holding that the record did not support two of the purported inconsistencies that the BIA considered critical in discrediting Petitioner’s account. Remanded. View "Mboowa v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Maine dairy farmer, had a business dispute with Defendant, his neighbor, and the former Commissioner of the Maine Department of Agriculture (DOA). Soon after taking office, the Commissioner recused himself from regulatory matters involving Plaintiff. The DOA eventually took four adverse regulatory actions against Plaintiff, including the action of ceasing to protect Plaintiff from the regulatory authority of the Maine Department of Environmental Protection (DEP). The DEP then issued several notices of violation of Plaintiff’s license conditions. As a result, the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) began administrative and judicial proceedings against Plaintiff that resulted in Plaintiff losing his farm. Plaintiff brought this suit for damages against Defendant, claiming that Defendant had violated his First Amendment rights through the adverse actions taken by the DOA. The district court awarded summary judgment against Plaintiff. The First Circuit reversed in part, holding (1) summary judgment was correctly granted with respect tot he three adverse regulatory actions that the DOA was alleged to have taken after the Commissioner’s purported recusal; but (2) there was a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether the Commissioner’s retaliatory intent was a substantial or motivating factor in the one alleged adverse action that occurred prior to the recusal. Remanded. View "McCue v. Bradstreet" on Justia Law