Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff owned a home on Grassy Pond Road in Hopkinton, Rhode Island. The Hopkinton Planning Board granted a developer's application to develop a residential subdivision on a tract adjacent to Plaintiff's land on the condition that Grassy Pond Road be reconfigured and reconstructed. The reconstruction required a permit from the Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management (DEM), which was issued. Plaintiff attempted to appeal the issuance of the permit. In the meantime, the developer sold its land, and the DEM permit expired. The subdivision proposal was subsequently abandoned, and Plaintiff's state-court appeal was dismissed as moot. Plaintiff, however, filed suit in federal district court against the State of Rhode Island, the DEM, the town of Hopkinton, the Board, the developer, and others, alleging various constitutional and pendent state-law claims, including a takings claim. The district court granted Defendants' motions to dismiss, holding, among other things, that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain Plaintiff's takings claim because Plaintiff failed to pursue available state procedures in an endeavor to secure just compensation. The First Circuit Court of affirmed for substantially the reasons limned in the district court's opinion. View "Marek v. State of Rhode Island" on Justia Law

This case involved legal challenges to recent federal management actions taken in New England's sensitive Multispecies Groundfish Fishery (Fishery). The challenges centered on the promulgation of a new groundfish Fishery Management Plan (FMP), Amendment Sixteen, which altered and expanded the Fishery's preexisting "sector allocation program" and established new restrictions on fishing activities to end and prevent overfishing. Plaintiffs filed suit in federal court alleging that Amendment Sixteen conflicted with the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Reauthorization Act's provisions governing "limited access privilege programs," with the ten "national standards" applicable to all FMPs, and with the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Plaintiffs unsuccessfully sought to enjoin implementation of Amendment Sixteen. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants as to all claims. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed entry of judgment for Defendants, holding (1) Amendment Sixteen was implemented with the protections required by the Reauthorization Act; (2) Amendment Sixteen was consistent with the ten national standards; and (3) Amendment Sixteen was implemented in accordance with the requirements of NEPA. View "City of New Bedford v. Locke" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted for illegally trafficking in sperm whale teeth and narwhal tusks. Specifically, the jury found Defendant's whale-tooth dealings violated CITES, an international compact implemented in the United States via the Endangered Species Act (ESA) and regulations authorized by the ESA. Defendant appealed, contending (1) the district judge should have instructed the jury on certain lesser-included offenses because he did not actually know his transactions were illegal, even if he should have known; and (2) smuggling convictions are legally wrong because his conduct violated only regulations, not statutes. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed after quoting a line from Moby Dick, holding (1) the district court did not err in failing to give the requested instructions because a rational jury could not have found that Defendant lacked actual knowledge that his whale-tooth transactions were illegal; and (2) the smuggling statute criminalizes violations of regulations like those implementing CITES because Congress intended the word "law" in the phrase "contrary to law" to include regulatory law as well as statutory law. View "United States v. Place" on Justia Law

The Blackstone River runs from Worcester, Massachusetts into Rhode Island. It becomes the tidal Seekonk River, flows into the Providence River, and empties into Narragansett Bay. During the industrial revolution, textile mills lined the River. Heavy metals and industrial wastes accumulated behind impoundments and damaged its ecology. Massachusetts and Rhode Island seek to put the River to new economic and recreational uses including tourism, recreation, and commercial fishing, but, as population has increased, sewage processing has not kept up. Conditions have deteriorated for years, posing a threat to public health and commercial fishing. Congress designated the Blackstone River Valley as a National Heritage Corridor in 1986; the EPA formed the Narragansett Bay Project in the 1980s. Massachusetts and Rhode Island have listed the Blackstone River as "impaired" under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1313(d): Rhode Island has also listed the Seekonk and Providence Rivers and Narragansett Bay as impaired. The First Circuit upheld limitations imposed in a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit on discharges from a Massachusetts sewage treatment plant. The plant's responsibility for serious pollution problems in important waterways is clear and cost considerations may not be considered in setting permit limits to assure compliance with state water quality standards.View "Upper Blackstone Water Pollution Abatement Dist. v. U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency" on Justia Law

The EPA initiated efforts to remediate contamination at the Rhode Island Centredale Manor Superfund Site under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. 9601-9675 and issued a unilateral administrative order to compel entities, including NE Container and Emhart to remove hazardous substances that had been disposed of at the Site as part of the former operations of several companies. Emhart sued NE Container and its insurers, which had provided general commercial liability policies to NE Container during different time periods from the late 1960s through the mid-1980s. Travelers agreed to contribute to NE Container's defense pursuant to a reservation of rights, while PWIC took the position that it had no duty to defend. Travelers has incurred significant defense costs and filed this suit, seeking contribution from PWIC. The district court ruled that PWIC was not contractually obligated to defend NE Container in the Emhart action, observing that the alleged property damage occurred before the commencement of the PWIC policy period between 1982 and 1985. The First Circuit vacated. The district court mistakenly focused solely on the timing of the insured's alleged polluting activities, rather than also considering the potential timing of property damage caused by those activities. View "Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. v. Providence WA Ins. Co., Inc." on Justia Law

A three-mile public recreational trail runs through 32 acres owned by the state and is used, in part, to access the state-managed Scarborough Marsh Wildlife Management Area. In 1961 Maine purchased the land with federal funds under the Federal Aid in Wildlife Restoration Act, 16 U.S.C. 669-669k for the approved purpose of “waterfowl habitat, waterfowl management, and access to waterfowl hunting.” The state subsequently granted easements for sanitary pipelines and a town road and to private parties for access to adjoining property. An easement granted in 2005 allowed construction of a road over 766 feet of previously-restricted trail for access to a planned subdivision. Objectors sought injunctive and declaratory relief, alleging violations of the Wildlife Restoration Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 4321, and state law. The district court dismissed federal claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. The First Circuit affirmed, first holding that the federal agency’s decision to not enforce the funding provisions of the WRA is within its discretion. The federal government did not grant the easements, so NEPA did not apply. View "Scarborough Citizens Protecting Res. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv." on Justia Law

For 30 years, GE manufactured electric capacitors containing Pyranol, an insulation containing PCBs and stored scrap in drums. It sold the scrap to Fletcher, who used it as a paint additive. Fletcher purchased more than 200,000 gallons of GE's scrap Pyranol until 1967. After failing to pay for 14 shipments, Fletcher proposed that GE retrieve the drums. GE did not follow up. In 1987, EPA found hundreds of unmarked drums containing scrap Pyranol at the Fletcher Site. Several had leaked. EPA installed a temporary cap, added the site to the Superfund List, and sought to recover costs under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. 9607(a)(3). A 1994 consent decree stipulated that GE would pay costs incurred through April, 1993. GE did not concede liability. In 2006, the government sought recovery for post-1993 costs. The First Circuit affirmed the district court's entry of judgment for the government on "arranger" liability. GE was aware that Fletcher had drums that would not be used and made no effort to deal with it. The court also rejected a statute of limitations defense. View "United States v. Gen. Elec. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, engaged in treatment and disposal of regulated biomedical waste, had trouble with its shredder and obtained approval from the Puerto Rico Environmental Quality Board to use autoclaves. After a few years, an inspector recommended that plaintiff's facility be shut down and ordered a landfill to stop accepting plaintiff's waste. Unable to resolve the matter with EQB, plaintiff sought a federal court injunction. The injunctions were denied, but plaintiff resumed handling waste. When a second shredder broke, an inspector again ordered the landfill to stop accepting waste and rejected several proposals for dealing with accumulated waste. Plaintiff's suit alleges more favorable treatment of a competitor and other constitutional violations. The district court dismissed for failure to link allegations to any particular defendant. The First Circuit affirmed, finding failure to meet minimal pleading standards. The complaint failed the plausibility test "spectacularly."

The FAA issued permits for modernization of the mixed-use Hanscom airport near the historic towns of Lexington and Concord. Opponents raised challenges under the Department of Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. 303(c), the National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. 470f, and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321-4347. The First Circuit rejected the challenges. The FAA adequately examined alternatives; the determination that none would be prudent was reasonable. The agency went beyond considering reasonably foreseeable impacts and considered worst case scenarios.

In 2000 the planning board approved a development and the developer began purchasing land. In 2002, the Department of Justice issued an opinion that the land could be sold without legislative action, although it was gained from the sea. Construction began; the developer invested $200 million. Because of protests, the legislature investigated and concluded that the developer lacked valid title. A 2007 Department of Justice opinion stated that the land belonged to the public domain. The governor suspended permits and froze construction. Pending a hearing, the developer filed a quiet title action. The Regulations and Permits Administration upheld suspension of construction. The Puerto Rico appeals court ordered the administration to hold an evidentiary hearing (which did not occur), but did not lift the stay on construction. The developer succeeded in its quiet title action; in 2008 construction resumed. The supreme court held that the developer's due process rights had been violated. The district court dismissed a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The First Circuit affirmed. Although the plaintiff did state a procedural due process claim, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. The defendants were not on clear notice they they were required to hold a meaningful pre-deprivation hearing.