Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The First Circuit affirmed the sentence imposed by the district court for Defendant’s convictions for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and illegal possession of a machine gun. The district court sentenced Defendant at the top of the Guidelines range to fifty-seven months’ imprisonment. The First Circuit held (1) the district court did not err in applying a two-level enhancement pursuant to United States Guidelines Manual 3C1.2 for reckless endangerment while fleeing from law enforcement; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing electronic monitoring and a curfew as conditions of Defendant’s supervised release; and (3) Defendant failed to demonstrate that his sentence was substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. Vega-Rivera" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant’s revocation sentence, holding that the district court did err in fashioning the sentence.While on supervised release following his term of imprisonment for a 2002 federal drug felony conviction, Defendant committed a second drug felony in 2014. Defendant was sentenced to up to 120 months’ imprisonment for that drug offense. In a separate proceeding, Defendant’s term of supervise release was revoked and replaced with a thirty-six month prison sentence, to be served consecutively to the 120-month sentence imposed on him for the new drug offense. Defendant challenged only his sentence on appeal. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Defendant’s sentence was neither procedurally nor substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. Mulero-Algarin" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court sentencing Defendant to concurrent prison terms of 108 months for his convictions for conspiring to distribute and possessing with intent to distribute twenty-eight grams or more of mixtures containing cocaine and cocaine base and for possessing with intent to distribute a substance containing bk-MDEA, or ethylene. The court held (1) the district court did not err when it refused to strike from the presentence investigation report paragraphs ten and eighty-three, which referenced information given by a cooperating source who claimed Defendant also was involved in purchasing firearms; and (2) the sentence imposed was reasonable. View "United States v. Murchison" on Justia Law

The First Circuit vacated the decision of Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) determining that the Massachusetts crime of assault and battery with a dangerous weapon (ABDW) is categorically a crime involving mural turpitude under the Immigration and Nationality Act. The effect of the BIA’s opinion was to render Petitioner ineligible for cancellation of removal. Petitioner had pleaded guilty to one count of Massachusetts ABDW, after which the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him. Petitioner applied for cancellation of removal. The immigration judge (IJ) denied relief, concluding that Massachusetts ABDW is categorically a CIMT because of the presence of an aggravating element - the use of a dangerous weapon. The BIA agreed with the IJ. The First Circuit remanded the case for further consideration, as there were too many questions about the BIA’s thinking on the mental state required for a Massachusetts reckless ABDW conviction for the court to review the BIA’s CIMT determination. View "Coelho v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s determination that Defendant’s prior convictions in Massachusetts state court for assault and battery with a dangerous weapon (ABDW) were not convictions for a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). Defendant pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and was sentenced to ninety-six months’ imprisonment. The First Circuit affirmed Defendant’s sentence after following and adopting the reasoning of Bennett v. United States, slip op. at 54 (1st Cir. July 5, 2017), holding that Massachusetts reckless ABDW is not a violent felony under ACCA’s so-called “force clause.” View "United States v. Windley" on Justia Law

Although the First Circuit identified in this case an unsettled question about the scope of a waiver-of-appeal provision, the court assumed, without deciding, that the waiver was inapplicable in this instance. After reaching the merits of the appeal, the First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court resentencing Appellant to concurrent sentences of 120 months’ imprisonment and 151 months’ imprisonment. Pursuant to a written plea agreement, Appellant pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of two firearms, distribution of cocaine base, and distribution of heroin. The agreement included a provision waiving Appellant’s right to appeal as long as the court sentenced him within the applicable guideline sentencing range. On appeal, the government argued that this appeal was barred by the waiver-of-appeal provision contained in the agreement. The First Circuit held that even if the appeal waiver did not extend to resentencing and Appellant had not forfeited his right to contest the waiver, the record disclosed no grounds upon which to vacate Appellant’s new sentence. View "United States v. Angiolillo" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder in a Massachusetts court. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Appellant’s conviction and sentence and declined to grant collateral relief. Appellant later pursued a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts denied Appellant’s petition. On appeal, Appellant argued that his trial was unconstitutionally unfair because the Commonwealth failed to turn over evidence that the Commonwealth’s chief witness was given inducements in exchange for favorable testimony and because the Commonwealth suborned the witness’s perjurious testimony to the contrary. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that no inducements were given and that the prosecution did not suborn perjury. View "Jackson v. Marshall" on Justia Law

The First Circuit held that, regardless of whether or to what extent USSG 2L1.1(b)(7)(D) incorporates a causation requirement, the district court did not err in applying the enhancement in this case. Defendant was convicted and sentenced for crimes related to his involvement in a scheme to smuggle migrants from the Dominican Republic into the United States by a small fishing boat. The district court did not err, let alone clearly err, in finding a causal connection between defendant's actions and the death of one of the migrants. The district court also did not err when it found it reasonable that defendant's actions could create the sort of dangerous circumstances likely to result in death. View "United States v. Ortiz-Carrasco" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of, among other federal crimes, violating 18 U.S.C. 922(g), which prohibits certain persons from possessing or transporting firearms if that defendant has at least three prior convictions for an offense that falls within the Armed Career Criminal Act’s (ACCA) definition of a “violent felony.” The sentencing judge applied ACCA’s mandatory minimum fifteen-year sentence to Petitioner’s section 922(g) conviction. Petitioner filed this federal habeas petition, challenging his overall prison sentence of thirty years. Specifically, Petitioner argued that he did not have three prior convictions for an offense that qualifies as a “violent felony” within the meaning of ACCA. The district court granted Petitioner’s habeas petition. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Petitioner’s two prior Maine convictions for aggravated assault did not qualify as violent felonies under ACCA insofar as aggravated assault in Maine may be committed with a mens rea of mere recklessness as opposed to purpose or knowledge. View "United States v. Bennett" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to the unlawful possession of a machine gun. While he was on supervised release Defendant pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. Defendant was sentenced to a forty-eight-month term of imprisonment to be followed by three more years of supervised release. Thereafter, Appellant conceded a violation of his original supervised release based on the conduct underlying his felon-in-possession charge. The district court evoked the original period of supervision and sentenced Defendant to a twenty-four-month term of immurement, to run consecutively to his forty-eight-month sentence on the felon-in-possession charge. The First Circuit summarily affirmed Defendant’s sentence, holding that his sentence was neither procedurally nor substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. Marquez-Garcia" on Justia Law