Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant’s sentence imposed for his conviction of attempting to enter the United States after previously having been removed from the United States due to an aggravated felony. Defendant was sentenced to a term of fifty-seven years’ imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release, subject to thirteen “standard” conditions. Defendant appealed both the term of imprisonment and the conditions of supervised release. The First Circuit affirmed the sentence, holding (1) the district court erred neither procedurally nor substantively in imposing the term of imprisonment; and (2) Defendant’s challenge to the nine separate conditions of supervised release to which he objected was without merit. View "United States v. Cueto-Nunez" on Justia Law

Police officers’ warrantless entry into the home of Plaintiffs and their subsequent arrest of one of the plaintiffs violated clearly established law. Plaintiffs, Charles and Lesa Morse, sued Defendants, police officers, alleging that Defendants’ warrantless entry into their home and the subsequent arrest of Charles violated their Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Plaintiffs also claimed that Defendants transgressed the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act and intentionally inflicted emotional distress. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that exigent circumstances justified their warrantless entry and that the events amounted to a doorway arrest. The district court refused to grant either summary judgment or, by implication, qualified immunity based on exigent circumstances. Defendants appealed. The First Circuit dismissed substantial portions of the interlocutory appeals for want of appellate jurisdiction and otherwise affirmed, holding that Defendants’ conduct violated clearly established law. View "Morse v. Cloutier" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant’s convictions of one count of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base and one count of conspiracy to possession with intent to distribute cocaine base and the denial of Defendant’s motion for a new trial based primarily on an alleged Brady violation. The court held (1) the district court did not reversibly err in denying Defendant’s Brady-based motion for a new trial; (2) the district court did not err in admitting certain testimony from two police officers concerning Defendant’s conduct during and immediately preceding the undercover drug purchase that led to the charges against him; (3) Defendant failed to show that certain statements made by the prosecutor during closing argument were prejudicial; and (4) the decision of the magistrate judge assigned to Defendant’s case to deny discovery on Defendant’s claim of vindictive prosecution was not an abuse of discretion. View "United States v. Spencer" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant’s conviction of being a felon in possession of a firearm. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress because there was not reasonable suspicion for the stop-and-frisk that resulted in the discovery of the firearm and that the district court erred by allowing him to direct his attorney not to pursue certain factual lines of defense at trial. The First Circuit disagreed, holding (1) there was reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify the stop and frisk, and therefore, Defendant’s motion to suppress was properly denied; and (2) there was no reversible error in the district court’s decision to allow Defendant to make certain choices in the conduct of his defense. View "United States v. Belin" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted, after a jury trial, of visa fraud, possession of firearms by a non-immigrant alien, bank fraud, and making materially false statements to a government agency. While he was being held in pretrial detention, Defendant continued to conduct his criminal enterprise over a prison telephone, using a language seldom heard in the United States. Before trial, the government sought to use translations of the recorded prison telephone calls. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion to exclude the translations, and, during trial, the government entered four transcripts into evidence. Defendant appealed, arguing that the introduction of the transcripts unfairly prejudiced him and that his trial counsel was ineffective. The First Circuit affirmed Defendant’s conviction and sentence, holding (1) Defendant failed to show that the admission of the transcripts prejudiced him; and (2) Defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel must be brought in collateral post-conviction proceedings. View "United States v. Kifwa" on Justia Law

The First Circuit upheld the finding of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) that Petitioner was eligible for removal because third-degree larceny under Connecticut law is an aggravated felony. Removal proceedings were commenced against Petitioner on the basis that his conviction was for a “theft offense” within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43) (G) and was therefore an “aggravated felony” that rendered him eligible for removal. The BIA dismissed Petitioner’s appeal. The First Circuit upheld the BIA’s decision, holding that Petitioner’s Connecticut conviction is a conviction for a “theft offense” because the range of conduct sufficient to sustain a conviction for third-degree larceny under Connecticut law is not broader than that which constitutes a “theft offense” under the Immigration and Nationality Act. View "De Lima v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of one count of carjacking by shooting and killing the victim and sentencing him to 365 months of imprisonment. Defendant pled guilty to the charge pursuant to a plea agreement. On appeal, Defendant argued that the government breached the plea agreement by “paying lip service to its obligation to recommend a sentence no higher than 300 months” and that the district court imposed a sentence that was both procedurally and substantively unreasonable. The First Circuit held (1) the government did not breach the plea agreement because it never explicitly or implicitly sought a sentence higher than 300 months; and (2) the sentence imposed by the district court was neither procedurally nor substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. Ubiles-Rosario" on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress certain evidence, including a loaded firearm found when law enforcement searched Defendant’s home.Defendant pleaded guilty to being a prohibited person in knowing possession of a firearm or ammunition, reserving his right to challenge the denial of his motion to suppress. The First Circuit held (1) the protective sweep of Defendant’s residence was not lawful in light of the circumstances surrounding Defendant’s arrest; and (2) therefore, the evidence that was recovered during and following the sweep should have been excluded as the illegal fruit of that sweep. View "United States v. Delgado-Perez" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the method and manner in which synthetic cathinone alpha-pyrrolidinopentiophenone (alpha-PVP), a drug not listed in the relevant tables incorporated in the sentencing guidelines, is converted into its equivalent for sentencing purposes. Here, the district court used a conversion metric grounded in its finding that methcathinone is the drug referenced in the sentencing guidelines that is most closely related to alpha-PVP. The court then imposed a downwardly variant sentence of seventy-two-months’ imprisonment. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) any error in the district court’s application of the sentencing guidelines was harmless; and (2) the sentencing court did not clearly err in determining that methcathinone was the controlled substance referenced in the sentencing guidelines that corresponds most closely to alpha-PVP. View "United States v. Giggey" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant’s conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of extortion under color of official right. Defendant was the former chief of police of the town of Lee, Massachusetts. The conviction stemmed from Defendant’s act of taking money from individuals accused of running a “house of ill repute” in return for a promise to halt their prostitution prosecution. Defendant appealed, arguing that the jury verdict must be overturned because he did not coerce the individuals into paying up, and without proof of coercion, he could not be guilty of extortion. The First Circuit disagreed, holding (1) where the government presents evidence that the government official received a payment under color of official right, it need not prove that the official induced the payment through fear; and (2) the government was not required to show that Defendant originated the idea for the payment rather than simply capitalizing on an idea suggested by one of those individuals. View "United States v. Buffis" on Justia Law