Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant’s motion to suppress drug evidence found on his person during a traffic stop.A law enforcement officer stopped a vehicle in which Defendant was a passenger for a traffic violation. On appeal from the denial of his motion to suppress, Defendant argued that the officer violated Defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights by unreasonably extending the duration of the traffic stop and that the district court erred in ruling that the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule applied to the drug evidence found during the resulting patdown search, which the government conceded was unlawful. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the officer did not unlawfully prolong the traffic stop; and (2) the proper scope of a patdown search was exceeded in this case, but the district court properly applied the inevitable discovery rule. View "United States v. Clark" on Justia Law

Police officers were searching a mall for a motorcyclist who had violated traffic laws when they were spotted by Rivera-Cruz, who ran, yelling "police!" into a walkie-talkie. The officers recovered a loaded revolver with an obliterated serial number from a fanny pack that Rivera-Cruz had tossed onto the ground during his flight. On the eve of trial, Rivera-Cruz pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The Sentencing Guidelines calculations in his plea agreement included a three-level reduction in offense level for acceptance of responsibility. The plea agreement permitted Rivera-Cruz to argue for a sentence of 96 months, and the government to argue for a statutory-maximum sentence of 120 months. The Guidelines calculations in the presentence investigation report also contained a three-level reduction for acceptance for responsibility. Unlike the plea agreement, the PSR contained a four-level enhancement because the gun had an obliterated serial number. The resulting Guidelines sentencing range in the PSR was 110-137 months. The district court adopted the PSR's calculations, and sentenced Rivera-Cruz to 120 months in prison. The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting Rivera-Cruz’s argument that the plea agreement was invalid because it lacked consideration. As such, he argues that he should be entitled to withdraw his plea. View "United States v. Rivera-Cruz" on Justia Law

Alejandro-Rosado was convicted of receiving a firearm as a person under indictment and was sentenced to 36 months' imprisonment plus three years of supervised release. While he was serving supervised release, the Probation Office notified the district court of nine separate violations of Alejandro-Rosado's supervised release terms: he failed his first drug test and subsequently failed three more drug tests; Alejandro-Rosado was observed handling a firearm and changing the magazine; he was witnessed selling cocaine. Alejandro-Rosado was arrested for being in possession of synthetic marijuana and prescription pain pills and admitted to being the owner. A search of his apartment revealed more drugs and an incriminating notebook. Though Alejandro-Rosado admitted to committing violations, he sought a sentence of four-10 months under the sentencing guidelines, citing his poor physical health, psychological well-being, misunderstanding of release terms, and full acceptance of responsibility. The court imposed the maximum 24-month sentence to reflect the seriousness of the violations, promote respect for law, provide just punishment, afford adequate deterrence, and protect the public from future crimes. The First Circuit affirmed. The district court exercised reasonable sentencing procedure and arrived at a substantively reasonable result. View "United States v. Alejandro-Rosado" on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment ruling that Defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment in the motel room where he was at the time of a police search of the premises, holding that Defendant, a guest of a guest in the motel room, did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the motel room.Defendant was charged with possession with intent to distribute a mixture or substance containing cocaine based and aiding and abetting such conduct. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized as a result of the search of the motel room where he had been staying. The district court ruled that the search violated the Fourth Amendment and suppressed the evidence. The First Circuit reversed and remanded, holding (1) the district court properly found that Defendant was the guest of a guest; but (2) Defendant failed to demonstrate an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the motel room. View "United States v. Aiken" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant’s convictions for two counts of aiding and abetting bank robbery and two counts of conspiracy to commit bank robbery.Defendant’s convictions stemmed from two separate robberies, the second of which was of a TD Bank in Lewiston, Maine. On appeal, Defendant only challenged the district court’s rulings that pertained to his convictions for the offenses relating to the TD Bank robbery. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in admitting a redacted version of a video taken by law enforcement showing Defendant driving away from the scene of the crime; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that two statements Defendant made to the police following his arrest for the TD Bank robbery could be introduced into evidence only if the government could introduce other statements that Defendant made to the police at that time. View "United States v. West" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant’s conviction, rendered after a jury trial, for knowingly possessing with intent to distribute heroin and crack cocaine and of aiding and abetting the same. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in allowing parts of a witness’s testimony about intercepted cellphone calls and erred in instructing the jury on willful blindness. In affirming, the First Circuit held (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing lay opinion testimony about the meaning and purport of intercepted conversations in which he had participated; and (2) the willful blindness instruction was justified in this case. View "United States v. Valbrun" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the reduced sentence Defendant received after a limited remand for resentencing and remanded with instructions for the district court to address Defendant’s pending 18 U.S.C. 2255 motion to vacate his sentence as soon as practicable.Defendant pled guilty to interference with commerce by threats or violence an carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence. The First Circuit vacated Defendant’s sentence and remanded the case back to the district court. After a resentencing hearing was ordered, Defendant filed a pro se motion under section 2255 to vacate count two of his sentence, arguing that this count should have been dismissed in light of Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). A few weeks later, Defendant’s counsel filed a motion to dismiss count two on the same grounds. The district judge refused to consider the Johnson issue because the matter was not ripe. The district court then resentenced Defendant. At the time of this appeal, Defendant’s section 2255 motion had been stayed. The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s resentencing order, holding that the district court did not err in declining to address Defendant’s motion to dismiss because the issue of whether Johnson applied fell far outside the scope of remand. View "United States v. Santiago-Reyes" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the order of the district court denying Appellant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea for conspiracy to distribute 3,4-Methyleneioxypyrovalerone (MDPV) - known commonly as “bath salts” - and for maintaining a drug-involved residence, holding that Appellant’s arguments on appeal were unavailing.After Appellant entered his plea but before he was sentenced, the Supreme Court issued its decision in McFadden v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2298 (2015). Based on McFadden, Appellant argued that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary because the district court did not sufficiently apprise him of the necessary scienter for a conviction under the Controlled Substance Analogue Enforcement Act of 1986. Specifically, Appellant claimed he did not know MDPV was a controlled substance analogue before October 21, 2011. The First Circuit held (1) Appellant’s plea was knowing and voluntary, and Appellant raised no colorable claim of innocence as to his post-October 21, 2011 conduct, and therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea; and (2) there was no clear error in the district court’s selection of a comparator listed in the sentencing guidelines most analogous to MDPV. View "United States v. Ketchen" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed Appellant’s federal convictions and resulting sentence for five counts of bank robbery. The court held that, contrary to the arguments raised by Appellant on appeal, the district court did not err in denying Appellant’s motions for (1) a hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), based on Appellant’s failure to make the requisite preliminary showing, regarding warrants that were issued to install Global Positions System (GPS) tracking devices; (2) the suppression of evidence obtained from the GPS tracking devices installed pursuant to those warrants where the supporting affidavit provided probable cause for the warrants and for the installation of the GPS tracking devices; and (3) the suppression of evidence obtained as the result of Appellant’s arrest where the probable cause standard was met. View "United States v. Patterson" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court accepting Defendant’s plea of guilty to wire fraud charges and sentencing Defendant to forty-one months’ imprisonment. This sentence meant that Defendant would serve six additional months of prison time beyond the amount to which he and the government had conditionally agreed in a plea agreement. Defendant was also ordered to pay $265,535 in restitution to various victims identified in the presentence report (PSR). The plea agreement called for $49,000 in restitution. The First Circuit held (1) the district court did not err in rejecting the plea agreement Defendant negotiated with the government; (2) any error on the part of the district court in not allowing Defendant to negotiate and submit a new agreement was harmless; and (3) any error on the part of the district court in sentencing Defendant before he reviewed the PSR was harmless. View "United States v. Scott" on Justia Law