Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

David Núñez Pérez was convicted in Puerto Rico in 2006 for carjacking and manslaughter. He sought habeas relief, arguing that his prosecution and convictions violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, based on the Supreme Court's 2016 decision in Puerto Rico v. Sánchez Valle, which held that Puerto Rico and the United States are not separate sovereigns for double jeopardy purposes.Núñez's petition was reviewed by the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico. The respondents argued that the petition was untimely under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), which imposes a one-year statute of limitations for state prisoners' federal habeas petitions. They contended that the limitations period began when Núñez's convictions became final in 2007, making his 2019 petition more than a decade late. The District Court, however, concluded that the limitations period began with the Sánchez Valle decision in 2016 and that Núñez was entitled to equitable tolling, making his petition timely.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The respondents argued on appeal that the petition was untimely even under the limitations period set by Sánchez Valle. However, the Court of Appeals found that the respondents had waived this argument by not raising it in their answer to Núñez's petition. The Court noted that the respondents had only argued that the petition was untimely under the limitations period starting from the finality of Núñez's convictions in 2007, and had not asserted that the petition was untimely under the limitations period starting from the Sánchez Valle decision.The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's judgment granting Núñez's habeas petition, concluding that the respondents had waived their argument regarding the petition's untimeliness under the Sánchez Valle limitations period. View "Nunez Perez v. Escobar Pabon" on Justia Law

In 2023, Jorge Luis Armenteros-Chervoni, an attorney in Puerto Rico, was convicted of five offenses in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico. The convictions stemmed from a visit to a correctional institution in the Commonwealth. Three convictions were for making materially false statements, and two were for attempting to provide prohibited objects to an inmate.The District Court denied Armenteros's pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment on multiplicity grounds, stating that such a dismissal was premature. At trial, the government presented testimony from an inmate about prior smuggling operations and the demand for contraband in the prison. The jury found Armenteros guilty on all counts, and he was sentenced to nine months of imprisonment for each count, to be served concurrently, along with supervised release and special assessments.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed with Armenteros that two of the three false statement convictions and one of the two prohibited object convictions were multiplicitous. The court vacated these convictions and their corresponding sentences. However, the court affirmed the remaining two convictions, finding no merit in Armenteros's claims of trial error. The court held that the evidence presented at trial was relevant and not unfairly prejudicial, and that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in limiting defense counsel's closing argument. View "United States v. Armenteros-Chervoni" on Justia Law

Pedro Martínez-Mercado, a former postmaster of the Sabana Grande Post Office in Puerto Rico, moved to New Jersey with a postal remittance bag containing over $11,000 in cash and money orders. He was convicted by a jury in the District of Puerto Rico for misappropriating postal funds and stealing or converting government property, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1711 and 641. The district court sentenced him to six months in prison.Martínez appealed, arguing that the district court should have allowed him to present evidence showing his intent to return the funds, that the court gave an erroneous supplemental jury instruction, that the prosecutor made improper remarks during rebuttal, and that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that Martínez waived his argument regarding the exclusion of evidence about his intent to repay by failing to object to the district court's in limine ruling and by not raising the issue under the plain error standard on appeal. The court also determined that Martínez waived his challenge to the supplemental jury instruction by explicitly agreeing to the revised instruction during trial.Regarding the prosecutor's remarks, the court acknowledged that the comment suggesting Martínez's defense was a common tactic used by defendants with no defense was improper. However, it concluded that the isolated remark did not affect the trial's fairness, given the strong evidence against Martínez and the district court's instructions to the jury.Finally, the court found that the evidence was sufficient to support Martínez's convictions. The evidence showed that Martínez knowingly and intentionally converted postal funds for his own use and deprived the United States of those funds, at least temporarily. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Martinez-Mercado" on Justia Law

Kenneth Pontz was convicted by a jury of violating a federal embezzlement statute, 18 U.S.C. § 641, by misrepresenting his financial situation to obtain public benefits over an eight-year period. The government presented evidence that Pontz had received Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits by falsely claiming he lived alone, while he actually lived with his wife, who received Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits. Pontz's misrepresentations allegedly began in 2004 and continued until 2020.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts denied Pontz's motion to dismiss the indictment, which argued that the statute of limitations barred charges for conduct occurring before June 16, 2017. The district court ruled that § 641 embezzlement was a "continuing offense," allowing the government to charge Pontz for conduct dating back to 2014. At trial, the court admitted testimony from an SSA employee, Luis Aguayo, as lay opinion under Federal Rule of Evidence 701, despite Pontz's objections that it was based on technical knowledge requiring expert testimony.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and held that § 641 embezzlement is not a continuing offense under the standard established in Toussie v. United States. The court found that the nature of embezzlement does not involve a renewed, daily threat of harm once the elements of the crime are complete. Consequently, the government could not charge Pontz for embezzlement occurring more than five years before his indictment. The court vacated the restitution and forfeiture orders and remanded to the district court to determine the appropriate remedy for the statute-of-limitations error. The court upheld the district court's evidentiary rulings regarding Aguayo's testimony. View "United States v. Pontz" on Justia Law

Ángel Forteza-García appealed the denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(j), which criminalizes causing death through the use of a firearm during a crime of violence. Forteza based his petition on United States v. Davis, which held part of the definition of a "crime of violence" in § 924(c) unconstitutionally vague. He argued that his predicate conviction under § 2114(a) did not qualify as a "crime of violence" post-Davis, rendering his § 924(j) conviction unconstitutional.The District Court for the District of Puerto Rico denied Forteza's petition, ruling that his § 2114(a) offense did have the use of force as an element, thus qualifying as a "crime of violence" under § 924(c)(3)(A). The court also noted that any argument about Forteza being an accomplice rather than a principal was foreclosed by precedent. The court denied Forteza a certificate of appealability (COA) on his claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the District Court's decision, holding that Forteza's predicate § 2114(a) offense, which involved wounding the victim and placing his life in jeopardy by the use of a dangerous weapon, qualified as a "crime of violence" under § 924(c)(3)(A). The court rejected Forteza's argument that his conviction as an aider and abettor did not meet the force clause requirement, citing binding precedent. The court concluded that the aggravated form of the § 2114(a) offense, as charged, supported Forteza's § 924(j) conviction. View "Forteza-Garcia v. United States" on Justia Law

In this case, José M. Rojas-Tapia appealed the denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petitions for post-conviction relief, which he filed in the District of Puerto Rico. Rojas's convictions and sentences stem from his October 2000 guilty pleas to charges related to two separate post office robberies. The first indictment involved the Levittown Post Office, and the second involved the Sabana Seca Post Office. Both indictments included charges under 18 U.S.C. § 2114(a) for assaulting postal employees with intent to rob, and under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) for using a firearm during a crime of violence. Additionally, Rojas was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) for being a felon in possession of a firearm.Rojas did not challenge his convictions or sentences on direct appeal. However, in 2017, he filed two habeas petitions challenging his § 924(c) convictions and the application of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) to his § 922(g) convictions. He argued that his § 924(c) convictions could not stand under Johnson v. United States (2015) and United States v. Davis (2019), as his underlying offenses did not qualify as crimes of violence. He also contended that his ACCA-enhanced sentences were improper because his prior convictions did not qualify as violent felonies or serious drug offenses.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico denied both petitions. The court concluded that Rojas's federal mail robbery convictions under § 2114(a) qualified as crimes of violence under the force clause of § 924(c). Additionally, the court found that Rojas's prior convictions for attempted murder, second-degree murder, and armed carjacking under Puerto Rico law qualified as violent felonies under the ACCA.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Rojas's convictions for aggravated mail robbery under § 2114(a) qualified as crimes of violence under § 924(c)'s force clause. The court also rejected Rojas's argument that his aiding and abetting convictions did not qualify as crimes of violence, reaffirming that aiding and abetting liability under 18 U.S.C. § 2 does not alter the application of the categorical approach. The court did not address Rojas's ACCA-related arguments, as his request for a Certificate of Appealability on those claims had been denied. View "Rojas-Tapia v. United States" on Justia Law

The defendant, Guillermo Vasquez-Landaver, was sentenced in 2016 to 120 months of imprisonment followed by 60 months of supervised release for crimes committed as a member of the MS-13 gang. Conditions of his supervised release included abstaining from drugs and alcohol, not committing another crime, reporting to his probation officer, and remaining in the District of Maine unless permitted to travel. After his release in February 2020, he violated these conditions by leaving Maine without permission, using illegal drugs and alcohol, failing to report to his probation officer, and operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. Additionally, on October 20, 2021, he allegedly propositioned a woman and asked if she liked cocaine while in possession of the drug.The United States District Court for the District of Maine held a hearing on December 18, 2023, where the defendant admitted to all violations except the one from October 20, 2021. The government presented evidence from law enforcement officers who testified about the defendant's possession of cocaine packaged in a manner indicative of distribution. The district court found that the defendant possessed more than two grams of cocaine, which under Maine law, allowed an inference of intent to distribute. Consequently, the court revoked his supervised release and imposed a 60-month imprisonment term.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and upheld the district court's findings. The appellate court found no clear error in the district court's determination that the defendant possessed more than two grams of cocaine and intended to distribute it. The court affirmed the district court's decision to revoke the defendant's supervised release and impose a 60-month imprisonment term. View "United States v. Vasquez-Landaver" on Justia Law

The case involves the United States government alleging that Regeneron Pharmaceuticals violated the Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS) by covering copayments for patients prescribed Eylea, a drug used to treat wet age-related macular degeneration. The government contends that this action induced doctors to prescribe Eylea, leading to Medicare claims that were "false or fraudulent" under the False Claims Act (FCA) because they "resulted from" the AKS violation.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts reviewed the case and agreed with Regeneron's interpretation that the phrase "resulting from" in the 2010 amendment to the AKS requires a but-for causation standard. This means that the government must prove that the AKS violation was the actual cause of the Medicare claims. The district court noted the conflict in case law and sought interlocutory review, which was granted.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling. The court held that the phrase "resulting from" in the 2010 amendment to the AKS imposes a but-for causation requirement. The court reasoned that the ordinary meaning of "resulting from" requires actual causality, typically in the form of but-for causation, unless there are textual or contextual indications to the contrary. The court found no such indications in the 2010 amendment or its legislative history. Therefore, to establish falsity under the FCA based on an AKS violation, the government must prove that the kickback was a but-for cause of the submitted claim. View "United States v. Regeneron Pharmaceuticals, Inc." on Justia Law

In this case, Jesús Abdiel Feliciano-Candelario was indicted on five federal counts related to three separate armed robberies. Feliciano pled guilty to four counts under a plea agreement, which included a joint recommendation for a 130-month sentence, below the calculated Guidelines range of 157 to 181 months. The district court, however, sentenced him to 181 months. Feliciano appealed, challenging the sentence on several grounds.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico initially reviewed the case. Feliciano moved to sever the charges into three separate trials, which the court granted. During a status conference, the court discussed the possibility of sequential sentencing if Feliciano were convicted in separate trials. Eventually, Feliciano and the government reached a plea agreement, and Feliciano pled guilty to four counts, with the fifth count dismissed. The district court sentenced him to 181 months, applying a four-level enhancement for "otherwise using" a knife during a carjacking, among other considerations.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed with Feliciano that the district court improperly applied the four-level enhancement for "otherwise using" a knife instead of the three-level enhancement for "brandishing" it. The court vacated the sentence on the carjacking count and remanded for further proceedings regarding that enhancement. On other grounds, including the government's alleged breach of the plea agreement and the district court's consideration of community factors, the court affirmed the district court's decisions. The court found no plain error in the government's actions or the district court's consideration of community-based factors and rejected Feliciano's argument about the district court's supposed belief in a hypothetical, piecemeal sentencing process. View "United States v. Feliciano-Candelario" on Justia Law

Sine Phimmady, a Laotian refugee admitted to the U.S. in 1979, was convicted of multiple assault-related crimes in 1992 and 1993. He served five years in prison and was subsequently placed in removal proceedings by the Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS). An Immigration Judge (IJ) found him deportable based on his convictions, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed his appeal. After being released from INS custody in 2000, Phimmady rebuilt his life, maintaining steady employment and starting a family. In 2022, he successfully vacated his 1993 convictions due to a lack of proper immigration warnings during his plea hearings.Phimmady requested the BIA to reopen his removal proceedings sua sponte, citing the vacatur of his convictions. The BIA denied his motion, stating that he had not demonstrated an exceptional situation warranting reopening, particularly noting his delay in seeking post-conviction relief. Phimmady filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the BIA had a settled practice of granting reopening in cases where convictions were vacated due to defects in the criminal proceedings. The BIA denied the reconsideration, emphasizing the need to consider the specific facts and circumstances of each case, including Phimmady's delay and the nature of his convictions.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that the BIA does not have a settled practice of granting sua sponte reopening solely based on the vacatur of convictions. The court found that the BIA's decisions often consider the totality of circumstances, including the noncitizen's diligence in seeking post-conviction relief. Therefore, the court denied Phimmady's petition for review, upholding the BIA's decision. View "Phimmady v. Bondi" on Justia Law