Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around Agustin Vinas, who was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1958 for attempting to hire a hitman to murder a contractor and his business partner. Vinas, a subcontractor, claimed that the contractor owed him $8,500 for construction work and had threatened to harm him and his family when he tried to collect the debt. Vinas was arrested after a series of meetings with an undercover law enforcement officer posing as a hitman. He pleaded guilty to using facilities of interstate commerce in the commission of murder-for-hire, and the government agreed to dismiss the second count related to interstate travel in the commission of murder-for-hire.The District Court for the District of Rhode Island sentenced Vinas to time served, which amounted to nearly two years in pretrial detention. The government had recommended a sentence of ten years' imprisonment, arguing that a substantial sentence was necessary for specific and general deterrence. However, the defense argued for a sentence of time served, citing Vinas's attempts to peacefully collect the debt, the threats he received from the contractor, his mental health issues, and his efforts towards rehabilitation while in pretrial custody.The government appealed the sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, arguing that the sentence was substantively unreasonable given the seriousness of the crime. The government also contended that the District Court had categorically refused to consider general deterrence and had created a disparity with defendants in other cases who were given longer sentences for the same statutory violation. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's decision, finding that the sentence was within the expansive universe of reasonable sentences and that the District Court had adequately considered the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The Court of Appeals also found that the government had not preserved its arguments regarding general deterrence and sentencing disparity, and that these arguments did not meet the plain error standard. View "United States v. Vinas" on Justia Law

Ronald Tilley, the appellant, was convicted for robbing a credit union in Bangor, Maine, in 2019. His pre-sentence investigation report (PSI Report) revealed two prior convictions involving potential sexual misconduct, leading to a suggestion for special conditions of supervised release requiring Tilley to participate in sex-offender treatment. The first conviction in 2005 involved an incident where Tilley's then-wife accused him of choking and sexually assaulting her. The second conviction in 2008 was for violating a protective order and involved sexually explicit text messages allegedly exchanged between Tilley and his underage niece. Tilley objected to the sex-offender treatment conditions, leading to a compromise requiring him to undergo a Sexual Offense Assessment and Treatment Evaluation (SOATE).The SOATE, conducted by a licensed clinical social worker, placed Tilley in the "well below average risk" category for sexual recidivism due to the time elapsed since his last sexual misconduct. However, the assessment recommended caution due to a deceptive response in a sexual history polygraph. The SOATE also diagnosed Tilley with antisocial personality disorder and opioid use disorder, and recommended that he have no unsupervised contact with minors and participate in weekly group therapy for sexually problematic behavior.Based on the SOATE report, the government petitioned to add several special conditions to Tilley's supervised release terms, including participation in sex-offender treatment and restrictions on associating with minors. Tilley objected to these conditions, arguing that they were not supported by his previous convictions and that the relevance of these convictions was significantly mitigated by the time elapsed without any sexual misconduct incidents.The United States District Court for the District of Maine granted the government's petition, finding that the proposed modifications promoted the goals of supervised release. The court also found the conditions restricting Tilley's association with minors to be proportionate and reasonably related to the goals of supervised release and his history and characteristics.Tilley appealed, arguing that the district court relied on "clearly erroneous facts" in imposing the modified conditions. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case for abuse of discretion and found no clear error. The court upheld the district court's decision, concluding that the modified conditions were reasonable and supported by the record. View "US v. Tilley" on Justia Law

In 2019, Jason Candelario and three co-defendants conspired to rob a Maine resident of drugs and money. During the robbery, one of the co-defendants shot the victim, who survived. Two years later, a federal grand jury indicted the four defendants. In 2022, Candelario pleaded guilty to charges including conspiracy to commit a Hobbs Act robbery, interference with commerce by violence, and illegal possession of a firearm. His co-defendants also pleaded guilty to various charges.The district court calculated a guideline sentencing range of 140 to 175 months for Candelario. Despite Candelario's request for a 120-month sentence citing mitigating factors such as a difficult childhood and genuine remorse, the court imposed a 175-month sentence. The court found this sentence appropriate due to the seriousness of the crime, Candelario's criminal history, the risk of recidivism, and the need for deterrence.Candelario appealed his sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, arguing that it was substantively unreasonable and created an unwarranted disparity with the sentences imposed on his co-defendants. The appellate court affirmed the district court's decision, finding that Candelario's sentence was both reasonable and proportionate. The court noted that the co-defendants had lower guideline sentencing ranges, played different roles in the robbery, and cooperated with the government, which justified their lower sentences. The court also found that the district court had provided a plausible sentencing rationale and a defensible result. View "United States v. Candelario" on Justia Law

The case involves Irvin Abreu, who pleaded guilty to one count of sexual exploitation of a child. The district court sentenced him to 315 months in prison, applying an enhanced mandatory minimum sentence of 300 months due to his prior state-law conviction for enticement of a child under the age of sixteen. Abreu appealed, arguing that his prior state-law conviction should not trigger the twenty-five-year minimum for his federal crime.Previously, the district court had determined during pre-trial proceedings that Abreu's prior conviction did trigger the twenty-five-year mandatory minimum under § 2251(e). Abreu subsequently changed his plea to guilty, and at sentencing, the district court considered a U.S. Sentencing Guidelines range of 300 to 327 months due to the mandatory minimum sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court agreed with the district court's ruling that the enhancement does apply, concluding that the Massachusetts child-enticement statute is divisible and that Abreu's prior offense is related to the generic crimes listed in § 2251(e). The court also rejected Abreu's argument that § 2251(e) is unconstitutionally vague under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. View "US v. Abreu" on Justia Law

The case involves Jean Carlos Aponte-Colón ("Aponte") who was sentenced to a term of imprisonment longer than the range recommended by the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. Aponte had pleaded guilty to possessing with intent to distribute marijuana and possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. Under his plea agreement, Aponte committed to request an upwardly variant sentence on the firearm charge due to the "nature and quantity of evidence seized" during his arrest. Despite Aponte and the government requesting an aggregate imprisonment sentence of ninety-four months and 100 months respectively, the district court sentenced him to an upwardly variant sentence of 120 months.The district court's decision was appealed on the grounds that the government materially breached the plea agreement, the district court improperly based its sentence on Aponte's national origin, and the district court's sentence was procedurally unreasonable. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit concluded that the law and the record did not support Aponte's arguments and affirmed the district court's decision. The court found no breach of the plea agreement, no evidence that the district court based its sentence on Aponte's national origin, and no procedural unreasonableness in the district court's sentence. View "US v. Aponte-Colon" on Justia Law

The defendant, Yavier Mojica-Ramos, was on supervised release after serving a five-year sentence for possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking. In 2020, he was arrested for unlawfully possessing two modified machine guns, discovered when police officers were enforcing a COVID-19 mask mandate. Mojica entered into a plea agreement in 2021, promising to plead guilty to the unlawful possession charge. The agreement required both parties to request a sentence within the guidelines range, later calculated as thirty-seven to forty-six months.The government filed a sentencing memorandum requesting an upper-end guidelines sentence of forty-six months, attaching photos and a video from Mojica's cellphone as evidence of his involvement in other criminal behavior. Mojica filed a motion to compel specific performance of the plea agreement, alleging that the government breached the agreement by advocating for an upwardly variant sentence. The district court denied Mojica's motion.The district court imposed an upwardly variant seventy-two-month sentence for the unlawful possession charge, rejecting the parties' recommendations for a guidelines sentence. Immediately following this, the court held a supervised release revocation hearing and issued a sixty-month statutory maximum revocation sentence to run consecutively to Mojica's unlawful possession sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit found that the prosecutor's sentencing advocacy did not conform to the meticulous standards of performance required by Mojica's entrance into the plea agreement. The court vacated Mojica's sentences for unlawful possession and revocation, remanding the cases for resentencing before a different judge. View "United States v. Mojica-Ramos" on Justia Law

The defendant, Ronald Yoel Marte Carmona, was convicted on charges related to multiple fentanyl sales. He appealed, challenging the district court's denial of his motions to suppress the fruits of a Terry stop and arguing that the evidence supporting his six convictions was insufficient.Previously, the defendant had been indicted on one count of conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute 400 grams or more of fentanyl, and five counts of distribution and possession with intent to distribute forty grams or more of fentanyl. Each of the distribution counts corresponded with a particular controlled buy. The defendant moved to suppress the fruits of a traffic stop and the fruits of a search of an apartment, arguing that the stop was unconstitutional because it was not supported by probable cause or reasonable suspicion. The district court denied the motions, finding that the agents possessed reasonable suspicion to effectuate the stop.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the Terry stop was reasonable, grounded in articulable suspicion, and that the verdicts were supported by the record evidence. The court also found that the agents who stopped the defendant possessed a reasonable, articulable suspicion that he was involved in past criminal conduct, making the Terry stop permissible. The court further held that the evidence presented at trial established that a rational factfinder could conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was guilty of the charges. View "US v. Carmona" on Justia Law

The defendant, Jean Carlos Polaco-Hance, was convicted of being a felon in unlawful possession of a machinegun. He was sentenced to seventy-two months in prison, a sentence that was forty percent higher than the upper end of the range recommended under the federal sentencing guidelines. Polaco appealed his sentence, arguing that it was both procedurally and substantively unreasonable.In the lower courts, Polaco had pled guilty to attempting to smuggle about $100,000 in cash from the United States to the Dominican Republic and making a false statement to a United States agency. He was sentenced to fifteen months of imprisonment for each offense, to be served concurrently, and three years of supervised release. He began his supervised release term on May 29, 2020. About three months later, Polaco was arrested for the offenses that form the basis of this appeal. A federal grand jury indicted Polaco on one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, and one count of unlawfully possessing a machinegun. The case proceeded to trial, after which a jury found Polaco guilty on both counts.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the district court had provided sufficient reasons to justify its higher sentence, including the large amount of ammunition in Polaco's possession. The court also found that the sentence was both procedurally and substantively reasonable. The court noted that the district court had considered Polaco's machinegun possession alongside other case-specific factors, including the large cache of ammunition and the high-capacity magazines Polaco had when he was arrested, as well as what the district court viewed as a heightened need for deterrence. View "US v. Polaco-Hance" on Justia Law

Nathan Reardon, who had been self-employed for 24 years, was convicted of bank fraud after submitting fraudulent applications for loans under the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP), a financial assistance program enacted by Congress in response to the economic fallout of the COVID-19 pandemic. Reardon used several of his businesses to submit the fraudulent applications and misused the funds from the approved loan. He was sentenced to twenty months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release. As part of his sentence, the district court imposed a special condition prohibiting Reardon from all forms of self-employment during his supervised release term.Reardon appealed this special condition, arguing that it was overly restrictive and unnecessary. The government suggested a "middle ground" where the condition could be modified to avoid a total prohibition against self-employment, but the district court overruled Reardon's objection and imposed the self-employment ban without explaining why it was the minimum restriction necessary to protect the public, as required by the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit found that while the district court was justified in imposing an occupational restriction, it did not provide sufficient explanation for why a total ban on self-employment was the minimum restriction necessary to protect the public. The court therefore vacated the self-employment ban and remanded the case for reconsideration of the scope of that restriction. View "United States v. Reardon" on Justia Law

Suzanne Brown, a federal prisoner, appealed the denial of her habeas corpus petition. Brown was convicted on twelve counts of making a materially false statement to a federal agency and was sentenced to twelve months of imprisonment and a two-year term of supervised release. She began her term of imprisonment in January 2022, with release scheduled for January 2023. However, in March 2022, the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) calculated that Brown had earned fifteen First Step Act (FSA) credits, which it applied to accelerate her release date to December 17, 2022. In August 2022, BOP transferred Brown to home confinement under the emergency measures of the CARES Act, still with a calculated release date of December 17, 2022.Brown filed a petition for habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maine, arguing that she had earned enough FSA credits to qualify for release on September 2, 2022, and that BOP's decision not to correct her FSA credit calculation and apply FSA credits to accelerate her release would result in her being held unlawfully in custody. A magistrate judge recommended that Brown's petition for habeas corpus be denied, and the district court adopted that recommendation and denied the petition. Brown timely appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the denial of the habeas petition de novo. Brown conceded that controlling precedent foreclosed some of the relief she sought earlier. She now asked only that the court hold her term of supervised release began on August 2, 2022, when she was transferred to home confinement. However, the court affirmed the denial of habeas relief, stating that the BOP's transfer of Brown to home confinement was a form of BOP custody, and her term of supervised release could not begin until the BOP released her from that custody. The court expressed no view as to whether Brown could receive relief under other procedural mechanisms, such as 18 U.S.C. § 3583. View "Brown v. Penders" on Justia Law