Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Three defendants were charged following a federal investigation into La Asociación Ñeta, an organization originally founded to advocate for prisoners’ rights in Puerto Rico, but later alleged to have evolved into a criminal enterprise engaged in drug trafficking and violence. The defendants were accused of conspiring to violate the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, and of conspiring to possess with intent to distribute heroin, cocaine, and marijuana. The indictment described La Ñeta as an enterprise whose members facilitated drug transactions and other criminal conduct. The defendants were tried jointly before a jury and convicted on both counts.After conviction in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, the defendants appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. Their appeals were consolidated with those of several codefendants. In an earlier opinion, the First Circuit rejected most challenges but found that it could not resolve whether certain hearsay statements used at trial were admissible under United States v. Petrozziello because the District Court had not made the required findings. The First Circuit remanded for the District Court to make explicit findings about whether the statements were made by coconspirators during and in furtherance of the conspiracy, and retained jurisdiction over the appeals.After the District Court made its findings, the First Circuit reviewed the record and supplemental briefs. The court held that the challenged statements were properly admitted under Petrozziello or, where any error occurred, it was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of guilt. The court also rejected a cumulative error argument, finding no basis to overturn the convictions. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the convictions of all three defendants. View "United States v. Rosario-Orangel" on Justia Law

In 1974, a fatal shooting occurred in a Boston park, resulting in the death of a fourteen-year-old victim. The suspect, who was twenty years old at the time, was identified by witnesses and a murder complaint was issued against him. Shortly after the incident, the suspect was arrested in Indiana under an alias for an unrelated crime. After being acquitted of that charge, he was mistakenly released, and his whereabouts were unknown to Massachusetts authorities for nearly two decades. During this period, he lived under his own name in Indiana, worked, attended university, and occasionally used aliases when interacting with law enforcement.Following a renewed discovery of his location in 1994, Massachusetts authorities interviewed and indicted him for murder in 1997. He was tried and convicted in 2004. Prior to trial, the defendant filed multiple motions to dismiss the indictment on speedy-trial grounds, all unsuccessful. The Massachusetts Superior Court and then the Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) rejected his arguments, finding that the delay was largely attributable to his own conduct, including the use of aliases. The SJC also denied his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims on direct appeal.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts denied his habeas petition, which alleged violations of his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial and ineffective assistance by counsel. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that, under binding federal precedent, the speedy-trial right only attached upon indictment, not at the issuance of the complaint, and since the relevant delay was seven years, not thirty, his federal speedy-trial claim failed. The court also found his ineffective-assistance claims unavailing, as the record showed no deficient performance or prejudice. Therefore, the First Circuit affirmed the denial of habeas relief. View "Carr v. Lizotte" on Justia Law

Jacob Parlin was arrested after law enforcement, investigating a narcotics operation, intercepted communications implicating him in drug transactions. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) began wiretapping a suspected dealer’s phone, capturing conversations among Parlin, the dealer, and a third party, which discussed drug sales and pricing strategies. Following these intercepts, officers stopped Parlin's vehicle and discovered nearly two pounds of pure methamphetamine, along with drug paraphernalia and a small quantity of drugs indicative of personal use.A federal grand jury indicted Parlin on conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of methamphetamine, as well as substantive distribution and possession charges. At trial in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, Parlin objected to a police officer's testimony about the typical amount of methamphetamine held by users versus distributors, arguing the officer was giving undisclosed expert testimony. The court allowed the testimony, finding it was based on the officer’s personal observations. Parlin was convicted by a jury on both counts. He then moved for acquittal or a mistrial, asserting the testimony was improper; the district court denied these motions, determining the testimony was appropriately limited and other evidence supported the verdict.Parlin appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, contending the district court erred by admitting the officer’s opinion testimony and that, without it, the evidence was insufficient to prove intent to distribute. The First Circuit held that, even if admitting the testimony was error, it was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of Parlin's intent to distribute, including recorded phone calls and the large quantity of drugs. The court affirmed Parlin’s conviction on both counts. View "United States v. Parlin" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant who was recruited in Puerto Rico to act as a courier, transporting two suitcases containing approximately eleven kilograms of cocaine on a flight to Newark, New Jersey. Airport authorities in San Juan discovered the drugs before the defendant boarded the flight. After her arrest, she admitted to knowingly transporting the suitcases for a promised payment of $1,500, a sum far less than the drugs’ street value.Following her guilty plea to conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute cocaine, the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico sentenced her to forty-eight months in prison and forty-eight months of supervised release. The Probation Office recommended a three-level reduction in her Sentencing Guidelines offense level based on her minor or minimal role, highlighting other individuals who recruited her, organized the transport, and prepared the luggage. The government objected, arguing she was indispensable to the offense. The district court agreed with the government and denied the mitigating-role reduction, focusing primarily on her own conduct and the fact she was the one transporting the drugs.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed whether the district court properly conducted the required comparative culpability analysis under the Sentencing Guidelines. The appellate court held that the district court erred by failing to consider the roles of all participants in the criminal activity and by not applying the multi-step analysis clarified in United States v. Guía-Sendeme. The First Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing so the district court could properly assess the defendant’s eligibility for a mitigating-role reduction, consistent with current precedent and the proper legal framework. View "United States v. Robles-Lopez" on Justia Law

In the 1990s, Anthony M. Shea was involved in a series of bank and armored-car robberies in New Hampshire. In 1997, following a federal jury trial in the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire, Shea was convicted on fourteen counts, including two counts of using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), and was sentenced to life imprisonment. The § 924(c) convictions were based on underlying predicate offenses, including substantive Hobbs Act robbery, conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, and bank robbery with a dangerous weapon. The jury returned a general verdict, finding Shea guilty of all counts.After his convictions were affirmed on direct appeal by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, Shea filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 seeking to vacate his § 924(c) convictions and to be resentenced, arguing that subsequent Supreme Court decisions, particularly United States v. Davis and Johnson v. United States, rendered his predicate conspiracy offenses invalid for purposes of § 924(c). The District Court denied relief as to the § 924(c) convictions, finding any error in the jury instructions harmless, but granted resentencing because Shea’s "career offender" designation was no longer applicable.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed both the partial denial of Shea’s § 2255 motion and the amended judgment after resentencing. The First Circuit held that the District Court did not err in its harmless error analysis, finding that even though the jury was instructed on both valid and invalid predicate offenses, the valid predicates were so interrelated and coextensive with the invalid ones that the instructional error did not have a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict. The First Circuit affirmed both the denial of relief as to the § 924(c) convictions and the amended judgment. View "Shea v. United States" on Justia Law

A witness was subpoenaed to testify in a federal criminal trial in the United States District Court for the District of Maine. After answering a few questions, she invoked her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, refusing to answer further questions from the government. The government then sought and obtained an order from the District Court granting her statutory immunity under 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002-6003, which precluded the use of her compelled testimony or information derived from it against her in any criminal case, except for prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or failing to comply with the order. Despite this grant of immunity and a direct order from the court, the witness continued to refuse to testify.Following her refusal, the District Court found her in criminal contempt and issued an order accordingly. Her attorney argued that the statutory immunity provided was not as broad as her Fifth Amendment privilege, specifically asserting that the immunity did not protect her from potential prosecution for perjury based on her compelled testimony. The District Court rejected this argument, clarifying that the immunity was coextensive with the Fifth Amendment privilege as it protected against self-incrimination for prior acts but did not extend to potential perjury in the immunized testimony itself.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the District Court’s criminal contempt order for abuse of discretion, reviewing factual findings for clear error and legal questions de novo. The First Circuit held that the statutory immunity granted under 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002-6003 was indeed coextensive with the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, except for future perjury or false statements given under immunity. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s order of criminal contempt. View "United States v. McBreairty" on Justia Law

Chang Goo Yoon, a licensed physical therapist operating clinics in Massachusetts, engaged in a scheme over four years to submit more than one million dollars in fraudulent claims to private health insurers, including Blue Cross Blue Shield and Aetna, for services he did not actually provide. He fabricated treatment notes, sometimes under another provider's name, and submitted false personal injury claims to his own car insurer, MAPFRE. Yoon manipulated patient addresses to ensure reimbursement checks were sent directly to him, avoiding detection by patients. His fraudulent conduct was eventually uncovered, and a jury convicted him on two counts of health care fraud, with Count One involving Blue Cross and Aetna, and Count Two concerning MAPFRE.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts presided over the trial. Before trial, Yoon moved to exclude evidence related to insurance company investigations into his billing, including a 2015 Blue Cross investigation and a 2007 Colorado licensing investigation. The district court limited the evidence to Yoon’s knowledge of the investigations, excluding their outcomes. The court also redacted key documents and provided limiting instructions to the jury. At trial, witnesses testified about insurance procedures and Yoon’s billing practices. Yoon challenged the admissibility of this evidence, as well as testimony from insurance investigators, arguing it was unduly prejudicial and improperly admitted.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed Yoon’s appeal. The court affirmed the district court’s evidentiary rulings, holding that evidence of Yoon’s knowledge of prior investigations was highly probative of his specific intent and not unduly prejudicial given the safeguards imposed. The court also affirmed the application of two sentencing enhancements: one for intended loss based on the total amount billed, and another for abuse of a position of trust, finding both were supported by the record and correctly applied. Yoon’s conviction and sentence were affirmed. View "United States v. Yoon" on Justia Law

A man was convicted of sex trafficking a minor after police located the missing child in an apartment where he was staying. The police had responded to a missing persons report filed by the minor’s father, who believed the child was endangered. Investigators traced the minor’s Snapchat activity to an IP address at the apartment and, after gaining access from a tenant in the building, entered the unlocked apartment briefly to ask about the missing child. During this encounter, the defendant emerged from a bedroom. Subsequent evidence, including text messages from a phone recovered from the minor, supported the prosecution’s case.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts denied the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence related to the police entry and admitted several text messages and emails as evidence. During jury selection, the court temporarily sealed the courtroom while questioning potential jurors about sensitive matters, with defense counsel expressly stating there was no objection. At the close of trial, the court mistakenly allowed alternate jurors into the deliberation room but promptly removed them and instructed the jury to disregard any statements by the alternates and restart deliberations if needed. The defendant was convicted by a jury and sentenced to 180 months’ imprisonment plus supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the police entry was justified under the emergency-aid exception, the temporary courtroom sealing did not violate the public trial right due to waiver, and the evidentiary rulings were not an abuse of discretion. The court also found no reversible error in the alternate juror incident, as there was no showing of prejudice. The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Rowell" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who, after losing his law license, became involved in schemes such as romance scams and business email compromises, which defrauded victims of millions of dollars. He opened bank accounts for shell companies, received funds from victims deceived by his co-conspirators, and transferred or withdrew the money for personal or further illicit purposes. Even after being confronted by bank investigators, he continued these activities.Previously, the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts convicted him on charges including wire fraud and money-laundering conspiracy, but the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed only some of those convictions, vacated others, and remanded for resentencing. On remand, the district court imposed a new sentence of 87 months’ imprisonment—below the advisory guidelines range of 108 to 135 months—and reimposed more than $2 million in restitution. The defendant appealed again, challenging both the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his sentence and the amount and scope of restitution ordered.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed and rejected all of the defendant’s claims. The court held that the district judge correctly applied the sentencing guidelines, including the base offense level, loss amount calculation, and enhancements for money laundering and sophisticated means. The court also found that the district judge properly denied a reduction for zero-point offenders, reasonably found the sentence substantively appropriate given the facts, and correctly ordered restitution, including for losses suffered by a foreign victim through a domestic bank account. The First Circuit affirmed the new sentence and restitution order in full. View "United States v. Abbas" on Justia Law

The case concerns an individual who was convicted under federal law for possessing a firearm after having previously been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. The predicate offense was a 2010 conviction under Maine law for simple assault against his then-wife, to which he pleaded no contest after the original charge of "Domestic Violence Assault" was reduced. Several years later, he was charged federally after he admitted to police that he owned a firearm. At his federal trial, he stipulated to many elements of the offense but sought to introduce evidence that he believed, based on his plea arrangement and representations by the prosecution and his attorney in state court, that he was legally allowed to possess a firearm.Initially, the United States District Court for the District of Maine convicted him, but the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated that conviction after the Supreme Court decided Rehaif v. United States, which clarified the knowledge requirement for firearms offenses. On remand, he was retried and again convicted, but a First Circuit panel vacated the conviction due to errors in jury instructions. Sitting en banc, the First Circuit clarified the applicable knowledge standard, vacated the conviction, and remanded for another trial. On further remand, the District Court denied his Second Amendment challenge to the statute, excluded his proffered evidence regarding his belief about firearm possession, and again convicted him after a jury trial.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), which prohibits firearm possession by those convicted of misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence, does not violate the Second Amendment, either facially or as applied, in light of the Supreme Court’s guidance in United States v. Rahimi. The court also held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of the defendant’s belief about the lawfulness of his conduct, as the statute does not require knowledge that firearm possession is unlawful, only knowledge of the facts that make one ineligible. The conviction and denial of the motion to dismiss were affirmed. View "US v. Minor" on Justia Law