Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Karen Read was charged with second-degree murder, manslaughter while operating under the influence of alcohol, and leaving the scene of personal injury resulting in death. Her trial in Norfolk County Superior Court lasted thirty-seven days, after which the jury deliberated for approximately twenty-eight hours. The jury sent three notes to the trial judge indicating they were deadlocked. On July 1, 2024, after receiving the third note, the trial judge declared a mistrial. A retrial was scheduled for April 1, 2025.Read moved to dismiss Counts One and Three, arguing that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred retrial. The trial judge denied the motion, and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) affirmed the decision. Read then filed a habeas petition in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, seeking to prevent the state court from retrying her on those counts, claiming a retrial would violate her double jeopardy rights. The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts denied her habeas petition.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the trial judge exercised sound discretion in declaring a mistrial due to the jury's deadlock, which constituted "manifest necessity." The court also found that there was no acquittal on Counts One and Three, as the jury did not publicly affirm a not guilty verdict. The court affirmed the district court's decision and denied Read's motion to stay the state court proceedings pending appeal. View "Read v. Norfolk County Superior Court" on Justia Law

Walter Aceituno, a Guatemalan citizen, became a lawful permanent resident of the United States in 1989. In 2014, he pled guilty to drug-trafficking charges after being arrested in a sting operation involving the purchase of cocaine. His attorneys informed him that he would be deported as a result of his guilty plea, but did not explicitly state that he would be permanently barred from reentering the United States. Aceituno was deported in 2015 and later illegally reentered the U.S. in 2019, leading to further legal issues.The United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island granted Aceituno's petition for a writ of error coram nobis, allowing him to withdraw his 2014 guilty plea. The district court found that Aceituno's attorneys provided ineffective assistance by failing to inform him of the permanent reentry bar, and that Aceituno acted reasonably in not seeking earlier relief due to his ongoing efforts to reunite with his family through various legal means.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Aceituno's attorneys met the requirements set forth in Padilla v. Kentucky by informing him of the risk of deportation. The court found that the district court erred in concluding that the attorneys were required to inform Aceituno of the permanent reentry bar. Additionally, the appellate court determined that Aceituno's delay in seeking relief was unreasonable and that the equities did not justify the issuance of the writ. The court emphasized the importance of finality in legal proceedings and the lack of compelling circumstances to warrant coram nobis relief. The writ was quashed, and the petition was dismissed. View "Aceituno v. United States" on Justia Law

Michael Francis appealed the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized from his car, which included a firearm holster, a kilogram of cocaine, two cell phones, $10,000 in cash, and a black bandana. Francis had pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute cocaine but reserved his right to appeal the suppression ruling. The district court held that the search warrant was supported by probable cause and rejected Francis's claims that the supporting affidavit omitted critical information.The United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire held an evidentiary hearing and found that the affidavit by FBI Special Agent Ryan Burke did not recklessly or in bad faith omit information about the credibility of a cooperating witness. The court also determined that even if the omitted information had been included, it would not have negated probable cause. Francis's motion to suppress was denied, and he subsequently appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the affidavit established probable cause on its face, as it contained detailed and corroborated information from the cooperating witness. The court also found no clear error in the district court's credibility determinations regarding Agent Burke's testimony. The omissions in the affidavit were not deemed reckless or intentional, and their inclusion would not have undermined the probable cause finding. Therefore, the appellate court upheld the denial of the motion to suppress. View "United States v. Francis" on Justia Law

Three FBI agents arrived at Alan Parrot's house to execute a search warrant. Initially, the interaction was calm, but it escalated when Parrot tried to close a sliding glass door after becoming upset. Special Agent Angell attempted to prevent the door from closing, leading to a scuffle during which Parrot kicked her in the stomach. Parrot was aware that Angell was a federal officer but claimed he did not know about the search warrant. He was subsequently arrested and charged with forcibly assaulting a federal officer under 18 U.S.C. § 111.The United States District Court for the District of Maine heard the case. The jury found Parrot guilty of violating 18 U.S.C. § 111. Parrot appealed, arguing that the jury should have been instructed that his ignorance of the search warrant could affect his criminal intent and that the self-defense instruction given was improper.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that 18 U.S.C. § 111 is a general intent statute, requiring only an intent to assault, not an intent to assault a federal officer performing official duties. The court found that Parrot's proposed jury instruction, which would have required the government to prove he knew about the search warrant, was not substantively correct. Additionally, the court determined that the self-defense instruction given was not plain error, as Parrot did not raise the issue of excessive force in the lower court. Consequently, the First Circuit affirmed Parrot's conviction. View "United States v. Parrot" on Justia Law

David Núñez Pérez was convicted in Puerto Rico in 2006 for carjacking and manslaughter. He sought habeas relief, arguing that his prosecution and convictions violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, based on the Supreme Court's 2016 decision in Puerto Rico v. Sánchez Valle, which held that Puerto Rico and the United States are not separate sovereigns for double jeopardy purposes.Núñez's petition was reviewed by the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico. The respondents argued that the petition was untimely under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), which imposes a one-year statute of limitations for state prisoners' federal habeas petitions. They contended that the limitations period began when Núñez's convictions became final in 2007, making his 2019 petition more than a decade late. The District Court, however, concluded that the limitations period began with the Sánchez Valle decision in 2016 and that Núñez was entitled to equitable tolling, making his petition timely.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The respondents argued on appeal that the petition was untimely even under the limitations period set by Sánchez Valle. However, the Court of Appeals found that the respondents had waived this argument by not raising it in their answer to Núñez's petition. The Court noted that the respondents had only argued that the petition was untimely under the limitations period starting from the finality of Núñez's convictions in 2007, and had not asserted that the petition was untimely under the limitations period starting from the Sánchez Valle decision.The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's judgment granting Núñez's habeas petition, concluding that the respondents had waived their argument regarding the petition's untimeliness under the Sánchez Valle limitations period. View "Nunez Perez v. Escobar Pabon" on Justia Law

In 2023, Jorge Luis Armenteros-Chervoni, an attorney in Puerto Rico, was convicted of five offenses in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico. The convictions stemmed from a visit to a correctional institution in the Commonwealth. Three convictions were for making materially false statements, and two were for attempting to provide prohibited objects to an inmate.The District Court denied Armenteros's pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment on multiplicity grounds, stating that such a dismissal was premature. At trial, the government presented testimony from an inmate about prior smuggling operations and the demand for contraband in the prison. The jury found Armenteros guilty on all counts, and he was sentenced to nine months of imprisonment for each count, to be served concurrently, along with supervised release and special assessments.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed with Armenteros that two of the three false statement convictions and one of the two prohibited object convictions were multiplicitous. The court vacated these convictions and their corresponding sentences. However, the court affirmed the remaining two convictions, finding no merit in Armenteros's claims of trial error. The court held that the evidence presented at trial was relevant and not unfairly prejudicial, and that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in limiting defense counsel's closing argument. View "United States v. Armenteros-Chervoni" on Justia Law

Pedro Martínez-Mercado, a former postmaster of the Sabana Grande Post Office in Puerto Rico, moved to New Jersey with a postal remittance bag containing over $11,000 in cash and money orders. He was convicted by a jury in the District of Puerto Rico for misappropriating postal funds and stealing or converting government property, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1711 and 641. The district court sentenced him to six months in prison.Martínez appealed, arguing that the district court should have allowed him to present evidence showing his intent to return the funds, that the court gave an erroneous supplemental jury instruction, that the prosecutor made improper remarks during rebuttal, and that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that Martínez waived his argument regarding the exclusion of evidence about his intent to repay by failing to object to the district court's in limine ruling and by not raising the issue under the plain error standard on appeal. The court also determined that Martínez waived his challenge to the supplemental jury instruction by explicitly agreeing to the revised instruction during trial.Regarding the prosecutor's remarks, the court acknowledged that the comment suggesting Martínez's defense was a common tactic used by defendants with no defense was improper. However, it concluded that the isolated remark did not affect the trial's fairness, given the strong evidence against Martínez and the district court's instructions to the jury.Finally, the court found that the evidence was sufficient to support Martínez's convictions. The evidence showed that Martínez knowingly and intentionally converted postal funds for his own use and deprived the United States of those funds, at least temporarily. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Martinez-Mercado" on Justia Law

Kenneth Pontz was convicted by a jury of violating a federal embezzlement statute, 18 U.S.C. § 641, by misrepresenting his financial situation to obtain public benefits over an eight-year period. The government presented evidence that Pontz had received Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits by falsely claiming he lived alone, while he actually lived with his wife, who received Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits. Pontz's misrepresentations allegedly began in 2004 and continued until 2020.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts denied Pontz's motion to dismiss the indictment, which argued that the statute of limitations barred charges for conduct occurring before June 16, 2017. The district court ruled that § 641 embezzlement was a "continuing offense," allowing the government to charge Pontz for conduct dating back to 2014. At trial, the court admitted testimony from an SSA employee, Luis Aguayo, as lay opinion under Federal Rule of Evidence 701, despite Pontz's objections that it was based on technical knowledge requiring expert testimony.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and held that § 641 embezzlement is not a continuing offense under the standard established in Toussie v. United States. The court found that the nature of embezzlement does not involve a renewed, daily threat of harm once the elements of the crime are complete. Consequently, the government could not charge Pontz for embezzlement occurring more than five years before his indictment. The court vacated the restitution and forfeiture orders and remanded to the district court to determine the appropriate remedy for the statute-of-limitations error. The court upheld the district court's evidentiary rulings regarding Aguayo's testimony. View "United States v. Pontz" on Justia Law

Ángel Forteza-García appealed the denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(j), which criminalizes causing death through the use of a firearm during a crime of violence. Forteza based his petition on United States v. Davis, which held part of the definition of a "crime of violence" in § 924(c) unconstitutionally vague. He argued that his predicate conviction under § 2114(a) did not qualify as a "crime of violence" post-Davis, rendering his § 924(j) conviction unconstitutional.The District Court for the District of Puerto Rico denied Forteza's petition, ruling that his § 2114(a) offense did have the use of force as an element, thus qualifying as a "crime of violence" under § 924(c)(3)(A). The court also noted that any argument about Forteza being an accomplice rather than a principal was foreclosed by precedent. The court denied Forteza a certificate of appealability (COA) on his claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the District Court's decision, holding that Forteza's predicate § 2114(a) offense, which involved wounding the victim and placing his life in jeopardy by the use of a dangerous weapon, qualified as a "crime of violence" under § 924(c)(3)(A). The court rejected Forteza's argument that his conviction as an aider and abettor did not meet the force clause requirement, citing binding precedent. The court concluded that the aggravated form of the § 2114(a) offense, as charged, supported Forteza's § 924(j) conviction. View "Forteza-Garcia v. United States" on Justia Law

In this case, José M. Rojas-Tapia appealed the denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petitions for post-conviction relief, which he filed in the District of Puerto Rico. Rojas's convictions and sentences stem from his October 2000 guilty pleas to charges related to two separate post office robberies. The first indictment involved the Levittown Post Office, and the second involved the Sabana Seca Post Office. Both indictments included charges under 18 U.S.C. § 2114(a) for assaulting postal employees with intent to rob, and under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) for using a firearm during a crime of violence. Additionally, Rojas was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) for being a felon in possession of a firearm.Rojas did not challenge his convictions or sentences on direct appeal. However, in 2017, he filed two habeas petitions challenging his § 924(c) convictions and the application of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) to his § 922(g) convictions. He argued that his § 924(c) convictions could not stand under Johnson v. United States (2015) and United States v. Davis (2019), as his underlying offenses did not qualify as crimes of violence. He also contended that his ACCA-enhanced sentences were improper because his prior convictions did not qualify as violent felonies or serious drug offenses.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico denied both petitions. The court concluded that Rojas's federal mail robbery convictions under § 2114(a) qualified as crimes of violence under the force clause of § 924(c). Additionally, the court found that Rojas's prior convictions for attempted murder, second-degree murder, and armed carjacking under Puerto Rico law qualified as violent felonies under the ACCA.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Rojas's convictions for aggravated mail robbery under § 2114(a) qualified as crimes of violence under § 924(c)'s force clause. The court also rejected Rojas's argument that his aiding and abetting convictions did not qualify as crimes of violence, reaffirming that aiding and abetting liability under 18 U.S.C. § 2 does not alter the application of the categorical approach. The court did not address Rojas's ACCA-related arguments, as his request for a Certificate of Appealability on those claims had been denied. View "Rojas-Tapia v. United States" on Justia Law