Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Edwin Otero operated a violent drug trafficking organization across Cape Cod, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island, distributing heroin and engaging in brutal acts to maintain control. In April 2019, suspecting a member of his group was cooperating with authorities, Otero orchestrated a kidnapping and assault in Pawtucket, Rhode Island, where the victim was beaten, stripped, and sexually exploited. Otero recorded the attack and boasted about it to others. A month later, he was involved in another violent incident, ordering a crew member to shoot a drug debtor. Otero was arrested in May 2019 after a DEA investigation uncovered his extensive criminal activities.Otero was charged in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts with multiple counts related to drug trafficking, kidnapping, firearms offenses, and obstruction of justice. He pleaded guilty to eight counts without a plea agreement. The presentence investigation report calculated a total offense level of 43, including a six-level enhancement for sexual exploitation during the kidnapping, resulting in a guideline range of life imprisonment. The district court sentenced Otero to 456 months’ imprisonment, with 336 months for most counts served concurrently and 120 months for a firearms count served consecutively. Otero objected to the sexual exploitation enhancement and the substantive reasonableness of his sentence, preserving these issues for appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed Otero’s procedural and substantive challenges for abuse of discretion. The court held that the district court did not err in applying the sexual exploitation enhancement, finding sufficient evidence that Otero’s conduct met the relevant statutory definitions. The appellate court also found the sentence substantively reasonable, noting it fell within the guidelines and was supported by a plausible rationale. The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Otero" on Justia Law

Over a period of 35 years, the defendant operated a dogfighting enterprise known as Stone City Kennel, where he bred, trained, and sold dogs for fighting, mentored others in the practice, and participated in over 150 dogfights across the Americas and the Caribbean. He was known as a prominent figure in the dogfighting world. After admitting incriminating information to an undercover agent, he was indicted in the District of Puerto Rico for conspiracy to violate the Animal Welfare Act (AWA) and for possession of dogs for use in animal fighting. A search of his property revealed four dogs in poor condition, leading to a superseding indictment with additional possession counts. He ultimately pleaded guilty to one conspiracy count and two possession counts.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico grouped the offenses and calculated a Sentencing Guidelines Range (GSR) of 12 to 18 months. However, the Presentence Investigation Report and the government argued for a much higher sentence, citing the exceptional scale and cruelty of the defendant’s conduct. At sentencing, the court heard expert testimony and considered the defendant’s extensive involvement, the cruelty involved, and the need for deterrence. The court imposed an 84-month sentence: 36 months for conspiracy and 24 months for each possession count, to be served consecutively, and described the sentence as an upward variance based on the statutory sentencing factors.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the defendant’s challenges, including claims of double jeopardy, inadequate explanation, and substantive unreasonableness. The court held that consecutive sentences for conspiracy and possession did not violate double jeopardy, that the statutory text allowed separate punishment for each dog possessed, and that the district court adequately explained and justified the upwardly variant sentence. The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Casillas-Montero" on Justia Law

The plaintiff was indicted by a Rhode Island grand jury, along with several co-defendants, on charges related to an alleged mortgage fraud conspiracy. He filed multiple motions to dismiss the charges in Rhode Island Superior Court, arguing that the indictment was tainted by prosecutorial misconduct and the presentation of misleading or missing evidence. After evidentiary hearings, a Magistrate denied his motions, and an Associate Justice of the Superior Court, on de novo review, adopted the Magistrate’s decision and added that the plaintiff had not shown sufficient prosecutorial misconduct to justify dismissal. The plaintiff did not appeal this ruling. Later, the charges against him were dismissed by the state as part of a plea agreement with a co-defendant.Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a malicious prosecution suit in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island against state law enforcement defendants. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that collateral estoppel barred the plaintiff from relitigating whether the indictment was procured by fraud or misconduct, since that issue had already been decided in state court. The plaintiff responded only that the issues were not identical, and did not contest the “final judgment” or “full and fair opportunity to litigate” elements of collateral estoppel.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the plaintiff had waived his arguments regarding the “final judgment” and “full and fair opportunity” elements by failing to raise them in the district court, and that no exceptional circumstances justified excusing this waiver. The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants, holding that collateral estoppel applied and barred the plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim. Costs were awarded to the defendants. View "Shabshelowitz v. Rhode Island Department of Public Safety" on Justia Law

A native Spanish speaker with limited English proficiency responded to an online advertisement for commercial sex in November 2022. After exchanging text messages with the poster, who was actually an undercover federal agent, he arranged to meet at a hotel, bringing $200, his phone, and condoms. The agent’s messages indicated that the sex would be with minors, specifically describing two girls as ages 14 and 12. The defendant arrived at the hotel, met the agent, received a room key, and was arrested. During booking, when told he was charged with paying for sex with a minor, he expressed surprise and denied speaking to any minor. In a subsequent interview conducted in Spanish about thirty minutes later, he stated he believed he was arranging sex with an adult.A grand jury indicted him on attempted sex trafficking of a child and attempted coercion and enticement of a child to engage in prostitution. His first trial ended in a hung jury, but the second resulted in convictions on both counts. The defense argued he did not intend to have sex with a minor and misunderstood the agent’s messages due to his limited English. The district court admitted his immediate booking statement as an excited utterance but excluded his later interview statements. The court also gave jury instructions distinguishing motive from intent and explaining the interstate commerce element, using examples that paralleled the government’s evidence.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court’s evidentiary and instructional rulings. The appellate court held that the exclusion of the post-arrest interview statements was not an abuse of discretion, as the statements were made after a significant time lapse and under circumstances suggesting reflection. The court also found no error in the jury instructions regarding interstate commerce or the distinction between motive and intent. The convictions were affirmed. View "US v. Medina" on Justia Law

The defendant pleaded guilty in 2013 to possessing child pornography, after sharing videos of minors being sexually abused and attempting to arrange sex with a minor. He was sentenced to ten years in prison and 25 years of supervised release, with conditions restricting his access to internet-capable devices. After completing his prison term, he began supervised release in December 2019. His release was revoked three times for violations, including unauthorized internet access and failure to comply with monitoring requirements. The conditions at issue required him to use only devices with court-approved monitoring software and to contribute to the cost of monitoring based on his ability to pay.Following the first revocation, the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico imposed new, stricter internet monitoring conditions. After further violations, including possessing unauthorized devices and failing to report employment changes, the court again revoked his supervised release (the “Second Revocation”), sentencing him to time served and a renewed term of supervised release with the same conditions. The defendant objected, arguing that the court improperly relied on ex parte communications from his probation officer and that the internet monitoring conditions were unconstitutional and unlawfully delegated judicial authority to the Probation Office.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the appeal. The court held that, although the district court erred by relying on new, significant facts from ex parte communications regarding the defendant’s employment, the error was harmless because other uncontested violations supported the revocation and sentence. The court also held that the challenged internet monitoring conditions were not facially unconstitutional or an unlawful delegation of judicial authority. The court found the defendant’s as-applied constitutional challenges unripe, as they depended on future enforcement. The judgment and sentence from the Second Revocation were affirmed. View "United States v. Negron-Cruz" on Justia Law

In August 2021, the defendant, along with his brother and another accomplice, committed a series of crimes in Puerto Rico, including two carjackings and an armed robbery. During the first carjacking, a firearm was brandished at the victim, and the group later attempted a second carjacking, which was unsuccessful. That same night, the defendant and another individual robbed a bar, during which the defendant fired a gun both outside and inside the establishment. The defendant was arrested the following day, confessed to the attempted carjacking, and admitted to other criminal conduct that night.A grand jury indicted the defendant on two counts of carjacking and two counts of possession and brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence. He entered into a plea agreement, pleading guilty to both carjacking counts and one count of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence. The plea agreement contained errors regarding the total offense level for the carjacking counts and the maximum supervised release term for the firearm count. The presentence report corrected these errors, and neither party objected. At sentencing, the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico imposed sentences above those recommended by the parties, including an upward variance on the firearm count, citing the seriousness of the offenses and the defendant’s conduct.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that, although the defendant was misinformed about the supervised release term for the firearm count at the plea hearing, he was later correctly informed and failed to show a reasonable probability that this error affected his decision to plead guilty. The court also found no Rule 11 error regarding the sentencing range for the carjacking counts and concluded that the upwardly variant sentence for the firearm count was procedurally reasonable. The First Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Morales-Ortiz" on Justia Law

A former college track and field coach used his position to obtain nude and semi-nude photographs from female student-athletes. While coaching at a university, he would ask athletes for their phones under the pretense of filming their form, then search for and secretly send intimate images to himself. After leaving the university, he created anonymous social media accounts to contact former athletes, falsely claiming he found their photos online and offering to help remove them, while actually using the images he had previously stolen. He also created fake online personas to solicit additional images under the guise of a body development study and conspired with others to hack into women’s Snapchat accounts, obtaining more private images. In total, he obtained images from fifty-one women and attempted to obtain them from at least seventy-two others.A grand jury indicted him on multiple counts, including wire fraud, cyberstalking, and computer fraud. He was released pending trial with conditions, but violated them by again soliciting images online. The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts calculated a guideline sentencing range of twenty-seven to thirty-three months, but imposed an upwardly variant sentence of sixty months, citing the number of victims, the nature of the offenses, the abuse of trust, and his conduct while on release. The court rejected the government’s request for an even higher sentence.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the procedural and substantive reasonableness of the sentence. The court held that the district court did not commit procedural error, adequately considered the relevant sentencing factors, and provided a plausible and defensible rationale for the upward variance. The First Circuit affirmed the sixty-month sentence, finding it reasonable in light of the seriousness of the offenses, the impact on the victims, and the risk of recidivism. View "United States v. Waithe" on Justia Law

Dinelson Hernandez-Rodriguez was stopped by a Connecticut state trooper while driving a vehicle that was under surveillance by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) as part of a lengthy investigation into a Boston-based drug trafficking operation. The DEA had linked the vehicle and its occupants to the transport of cocaine from New York to Boston and the return of drug proceeds to New York. On the day of the stop, DEA agents observed Hernandez-Rodriguez interacting with suspected co-conspirators and driving the vehicle away from a location associated with drug activity. After the stop, a search of the vehicle uncovered $240,240 in a hidden compartment.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts denied Hernandez-Rodriguez’s motion to suppress the cash, finding that the warrantless search was justified under the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment because there was probable cause to believe the vehicle contained evidence of a crime. The court found that the DEA’s extensive investigation, surveillance, and intercepted communications provided sufficient grounds for probable cause. Following a jury trial, Hernandez-Rodriguez was convicted of conspiracy to distribute cocaine and sentenced to sixty-eight months in prison.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. The appellate court held that the collective knowledge of the DEA agents, imputed to the state trooper who conducted the stop, established probable cause to search the vehicle under the automobile exception. The court rejected the argument that the search was based on a mere “hunch,” finding that the facts supported a fair probability that evidence of a crime would be found. The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress. View "United States v. Hernandez-Rodriguez" on Justia Law

In February 2023, police officers arrested Charlie Vick for domestic assault and battery involving a firearm. After his arrest, officers discovered that the car he had been driving was uninsured, unregistered, and had invalid license plates. They waited until Vick's uncle attempted to drive the car away and then stopped him shortly after he exited the parking lot. The officers impounded the car and conducted an inventory search, which revealed a gun. Vick was subsequently charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts ruled that the officers had staged the impounding and that their sole motive for the search was investigatory. Consequently, the court ordered the suppression of the evidence found during the search. The government appealed, arguing that the district court should not have considered the officers' subjective motives and that the court's finding of a sole investigatory motive was clearly erroneous.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed with the government that the district court's finding of a sole investigatory motive was clearly erroneous. The appellate court noted that the officers had an objectively reasonable basis for impounding the car, as it was unregistered, uninsured, and had invalid plates, making it a safety hazard. The court also found that the officers' decision to impound the car was lawful under the community caretaking exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant and probable cause requirements. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the district court's grant of the motion to suppress and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "US v. Vick" on Justia Law

Two cousins, Jairo Huertas-Mercado and Erick Pizarro-Mercado, were involved in a series of violent crimes in Puerto Rico, including six carjackings and two kidnappings, one of which resulted in death. The crimes occurred between May and June 2018, and involved the use of firearms and threats of violence. The victims included a security guard, a family on a road trip, a surfer, a couple, a churchgoer, and a well-known local singer, Bryant Myers, who was kidnapped along with his mother.The case was first brought to the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, where Huertas was initially indicted in July 2018. Over time, the indictment was superseded three times, adding more charges and defendants, including Pizarro. The pretrial process was prolonged due to ongoing investigations, plea negotiations, and the COVID-19 pandemic. The death penalty review process also contributed to the delay. Ultimately, the trial began in September 2022, more than four years after the initial indictment.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. Huertas argued that his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated due to the 51-month delay between his indictment and trial. The court applied the Barker v. Wingo balancing test and found that while the delay was lengthy, it was justified by valid reasons, including the complexity of the case, the need for thorough investigation, and the impact of the pandemic. Huertas' failure to assert his right to a speedy trial and the lack of demonstrated prejudice to his defense also weighed against him.Both defendants challenged the sufficiency of the evidence for their convictions, particularly the carjacking charges. The court found that the evidence, including witness testimonies and admissions by Huertas, was sufficient to support the jury's verdict. The court also rejected Huertas' double jeopardy claim, noting that the lesser included offense was dismissed before sentencing.Finally, Pizarro's argument that his life sentence was unreasonable was reviewed. The court found that the sentence was within the guideline range and justified by the severity of the crimes, affirming the district court's decision. The appeals court ultimately affirmed the convictions and sentences of both defendants. View "US v. Huertas-Mercado" on Justia Law