Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The First Circuit upheld the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment against him and convicting Defendant of interstate violation of a protection order under 18 U.S.C. 2262(a)(1), holding that no-contact and stay-away provisions in a conditional release order may constitute a "protection order" as defined by the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA), 108 Stat. 1796, 1902.Defendant was charged with the felony assault of T.N. A state-court judge issued a conditional release order following a bail hearing that included a no-contact provision with T.N. The assault charge was later dismissed due to T.N.'s death. Three years later, a federal grand jury returned an indictment charging Defendant with two counts of interstate violation of a protection order. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the conditional release order was not a "protection order" as defined under 18 U.S.C. 2266(5). The district court denied the motion to dismiss. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the no-contact and stay-away provisions in a conditional release order may, under certain circumstances, satisfy the VAWA's definition of a "protection order" as defined in section 2266(5). View "United States v. Dion" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Appellant's petition for habeas corpus, in which he alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, holding that Appellant failed to establish that his counsel's performance was deficient under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).After a retrial, Appellant was convicted of two counts of attempting to kill a federal witness with intent to prevent testimony and communication with law enforcement. The First Circuit affirmed. Appellant later filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. 2255 to vacate his conviction based on ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court denied relief. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Appellant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were unavailing. View "Watson v. United States" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied a writ of habeas corpus sought by Petitioner under 28 U.S.C. 2254 to vacate her conviction for murder in the first degree, holding that there was no error.Petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder based on deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty and was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Petitioner later filed a habeas petition claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court denied the petition. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that there was no prejudice on any of the alleged errors claimed by Petitioner. View "Field v. Hallett" on Justia Law

Watkins was convicted of first-degree murder in Massachusetts state court in 2005 for a fatal 2003 shooting. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed his conviction. His federal habeas petition was denied.The First Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. The state courts made an error of fact in their decisions, rejecting a “Brady” claim that a withheld a police report could have been used for the impeachment of a witness (Rudolph), finding that the report did not show the investigating officers were aware that Rudolph was a witness against Watkins. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act's deferential standard of review or applying de novo review, Watkins has not shown prejudice arising from the error or with respect to any of his other claims. There was an extensive examination of bias, and the failure to add onto any such evidence hardly would be prejudicial. Rudolph's motivation for reaching out to the police and the agreement that Rudolph later reached with the Commonwealth were discussed at trial and clearly informed Watkins and the jury that Rudolph sought an incentive in return for his cooperation and testimony. View "Watkins v. Medeiros" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals of the First Circuit affirmed Defendant's conviction of two counts of committing a hate crime and one count of conspiring to commit a hate crime under the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd Jr, Hate Crimes Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C. 249(a)(1), 371, holding that there was no error or abuse of discretion.Specifically, the First Circuit held (1) section 259(a)(1) does not implicate federalism concerns; (2) certifications made under 249(b) are exempt from judicial review, and therefore, Defendant's challenge to the certification of his prosecution failed; and (3) Defendant's remaining assignment of error was waived. View "United States v. Diggins" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's convictions for receipt and possession of child pornography, holding that the district court did not err in denying Defendant's pre-trial motion to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant and did not abuse its discretion in excluding certain text-message evidence as inadmissible hearsay.On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the affidavit filed in support of the search warrant failed sufficiently to describe ether pornographic images to be found and that the court erred in excluding from his trial the text message evidence at issue. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) there was no error in the district court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress; and (2) the district court did not err in barring the text messages from Defendant's trial. View "United States v. Chiu" on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed the decision of the district court that the prosecutor in the underlying Rhode Island case transgressed the Batson rule in the course of jury selection but that Petitioner was not entitled to habeas corpus relief, holding that the decision of the Rhode Island Supreme Court could not withstand habeas review.Petitioner, a Rhode Island state prisoner and an African-American man who was convicted of murder and other crimes, claimed in his petition for writ of habeas corpus that the prosecutor violated Batson during jury selection. The federal district court concluded that Petitioner's rights under Batson were violated but that the Rhode Island Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion in finding sufficient race-neutral reasons for a peremptory challenge against the juror in question. The First Circuit reversed, holding (1) the prosecutor's explanation for his peremptory strike was not race-neutral on its face and thus violated Batson; and (2) the Rhode Island Supreme Court's decision rested on either an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, an unreasonable determination of the facts, or both. View "Porter v. Coyne-Fague" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court revoking Defendant's supervised release and adding to the terms of his supervised release a monitoring condition as to Defendant's computer activities to provide him with incentives to comply with the law, holding that the condition was not unwarranted.Defendant pleaded guilty to a twenty-four-count indictment charging him with money laundering, mail and wire fraud, and tax evasion and was sentenced to fifteen-years in prison. After he was released, Defendant stipulated to violating the terms of his supervised release. The district court revoked Defendant's supervised release and imposed several new conditions of supervision, including the condition at issue on appeal. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the imposition of the computer monitoring condition was not an abuse of discretion. View "United States v. Windle" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court sentencing Defendant to a 150-month term of immurement in connection with his plea of guilty to conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute controlled substances, holding that there was no breach of the plea agreement in this case.On appeal, Defendant argued that the government breached the parties' agreement to recommend a sentence at the low end of the applicable guideline range and that the alleged breach defeated a waiver-of-appeal provision in the plea agreement. The First Circuit affirmed the judgment below, holding that, under the plain error standard, Defendant failed to show that the prosecutor's overall conduct was other than "reasonably consistent with making [the promised] recommendation." View "United States v. Lessard" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court concluding that Defendant violated the conditions of his supervised release term and the length of his revocation sentence, holding that any error was harmless.Defendant pleaded guilty to participation in a conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine and was sentenced to a 120-month term of imprisonment to be followed by a sixty-month term of supervised release. The district court subsequently found that Defendant committed a violation of his supervised release, revoked the supervised release, and sentenced Defendant to a sixty-month term of imprisonment to be followed by a thirty-six month term of supervised release. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) even if the admission of certain testimony was error, the error was harmless; and (2) the district court did not clearly or obviously err in imposing the revocation sentence that it did. View "United States v. Cintron-Ortiz" on Justia Law