Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Two brothers residing in Massachusetts used fake passports to open numerous bank accounts between 2019 and 2020, including accounts in their own names, names of fabricated individuals, and a fictitious company. These accounts were used to deposit funds acquired from romance scams targeting vulnerable victims and unemployment scams involving stolen identities. The brothers exchanged account information with each other and with overseas collaborators, and withdrew funds using debit cards linked to the fraudulent accounts. The FBI investigated after being alerted by victims, ultimately searching the brothers’ residences and storage facilities, where they found fake identification documents and related materials.A grand jury indicted the brothers in 2021 on charges of bank fraud, conspiracy to commit bank fraud, and conspiracy to commit money laundering. After an eight-day jury trial in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, both were convicted on all counts. The district court sentenced Henry to seventy-eight months and Osaretin to seventy-two months of imprisonment, both with two years of supervised release. Restitution was deferred pending a hearing, after which the district court ordered both defendants to pay $615,805.65 in restitution, jointly and severally. The brothers appealed both their convictions and the restitution order.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the consolidated appeals, addressing challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, jury instructions, sentencing enhancements, and restitution orders. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions for bank fraud and conspiracy, that the jury instructions were not plainly erroneous or misleading, and that the sentencing enhancement for possession or use of authentication features was appropriate. The court also concluded that the district court had jurisdiction to issue the restitution order and did not err in making the defendants jointly and severally liable. Accordingly, the First Circuit affirmed the convictions and restitution orders. View "US v. Omoruyi" on Justia Law

A state prisoner challenged the denial of his federal habeas corpus petition after being convicted of several charges, including aggravated rape, in Massachusetts. The prosecution’s case was based on the victim’s testimony, physical evidence, and expert and witness accounts, while the defendant claimed the sexual encounter was consensual. During jury deliberations, seven not-guilty verdicts were returned on some charges, but deliberations continued on the remaining counts. After the weekend recess, a Facebook post by a former police officer urged community members to attend the next court session to support the victim, and a small demonstration took place at the courthouse with attendees wearing teal ribbons. The defense raised concerns about potential juror exposure to these influences, but the judge declined an individual juror inquiry, instead asking general questions about their ability to continue serving.Following conviction, the defense contacted jurors, and one juror reported seeing the Facebook post, being aware of the demonstration, and claimed that these factors led to greater weight being given to the victim’s testimony on the last day of deliberations. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing, found that some jurors were aware of the post and demonstration, but concluded that exposure was brief, not discussed during deliberations, and not prejudicial. The trial court specifically discredited the juror’s account of actual prejudice. The Massachusetts Appeals Court affirmed, and the Supreme Judicial Court declined review.In federal habeas proceedings, the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts denied relief, holding that the state court’s examination of extraneous influence claims met federal constitutional standards and that its factual findings were owed deference. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed, holding that the state court’s decision was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent, and that its factual determinations were reasonable. The denial of habeas relief was affirmed. View "Adames-Garcia v. Divris" on Justia Law

Federal agents in Puerto Rico were investigating the illegal exchange of child pornography in an online chatroom in 2021. Their investigation identified a phone number linked to Miguel González-Arocho and, through T-Mobile, they learned that this number was registered to a gray Apple iPhone 6s with a specific IMEI number. A Homeland Security Investigations agent applied for a search warrant based on probable cause, and a magistrate judge issued a warrant authorizing the search and seizure of the identified iPhone 6s. When executing the warrant, agents instead seized and searched an iPhone 13 belonging to González, which bore the same phone number but was a different device from the one specified in the warrant. The search uncovered over 100 files of child pornography on the iPhone 13.A grand jury indicted González for possession and receipt of child exploitation material. González moved to suppress the evidence found on the iPhone 13, arguing the warrant did not authorize a search of that device. The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico held an evidentiary hearing and found that the agents knowingly searched a device not covered by the warrant and that González had not validly consented to the search. The magistrate judge recommended denying the suppression motion under the good faith exception, but the district court disagreed, concluding the exception did not apply because the agents knew they were searching a different device and failed to obtain a new warrant.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to suppress the evidence. The court held that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply because the agents, aware they had seized a different device than specified in the warrant, failed to take reasonable steps to resolve the discrepancy or seek a new warrant before searching the iPhone 13. View "US v. Gonzalez-Arocho" on Justia Law

The defendant was investigated after law enforcement used a specialized tool called Freenet Roundup, which is a modified version of a peer-to-peer software called Freenet. Freenet allows users to share files anonymously, but its Opennet mode warns users that their identity could be discovered and their IP address is visible to strangers. Freenet Roundup, available only to law enforcement, logs requests for known child sexual abuse material (CSAM) and uses a formula to help identify whether a request came from an original source or was simply relayed. After Freenet Roundup flagged requests associated with the defendant’s IP address for CSAM, the FBI obtained a search warrant for his residence, finding devices containing child pornography.The defendant was charged in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts with possession of child pornography. Before trial, he moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that law enforcement’s use of Freenet Roundup constituted an unlawful Fourth Amendment search, as he claimed a reasonable expectation of privacy in his Freenet transmissions. The district court denied the motion, reasoning that because the defendant voluntarily used Freenet’s Opennet mode, which warns of identity risks and connections with strangers, he lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the relevant activity. The court distinguished this case from Carpenter v. United States, finding that law enforcement’s actions did not amount to wholesale surveillance or use of technology not in general public use. The defendant then entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to appeal the suppression ruling.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court’s findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. The First Circuit held that a defendant lacks a reasonable expectation of privacy in activity voluntarily shared on publicly-available peer-to-peer networks like Freenet’s Opennet mode. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of the suppression motion. View "US v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The defendant was indicted by a federal grand jury in Massachusetts on three counts: being a prohibited person in possession of a firearm and ammunition, and two counts of possession with intent to distribute controlled substances. The first drug count was based on drugs found during his arrest, and the second on drugs found at his residence during a search. He moved to suppress evidence seized from his home, arguing the search violated the Fourth Amendment, but the district court denied the motion, finding the search was conducted under a valid warrant and in good faith. He also sought dismissal of the firearm charge, claiming the statute was unconstitutional under the Second Amendment, but that motion was denied. He then pleaded guilty to all counts.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts grouped the convictions for sentencing under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. The presentence report applied several enhancements, including one for being a career offender based on prior convictions. The defendant objected, arguing he had only one qualifying conviction and that a 2008 Massachusetts conviction for possession with intent to distribute cocaine should not count, because the definition of “controlled substance” had changed under federal law. The district court rejected his objections, but stated it would have imposed the same sentence even if it had accepted his arguments. The court ultimately imposed a below-Guidelines sentence of 96 months.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the district court erred in applying the career offender enhancement because the relevant Massachusetts conviction did not qualify as a “controlled substance offense” under the Guidelines at the time of federal sentencing, since the substance at issue was no longer federally controlled. Nevertheless, the error was harmless because the district court made clear it would have imposed the same sentence regardless. The court affirmed the convictions and sentences. View "US v. Fulcar" on Justia Law

Police officers in Worcester, Massachusetts, observed Joan Rosado Maldonado raise his arm before hearing a gunshot. Approaching the scene, they found Maldonado outside an apartment building and, upon searching him, discovered a loaded firearm in his satchel. Maldonado was indicted for being a prohibited person in possession of a firearm and ammunition under federal law. He pleaded guilty in March 2024. At sentencing, his prior convictions for trafficking in cocaine (2010) and possession with intent to distribute a Class B substance (2019), both under Massachusetts law, were considered in calculating his sentence.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts adopted the United States Probation Office's recommendation, assigning Maldonado a base offense level of twenty-four under the United States Sentencing Guidelines § 2K2.1(a)(2). This was based on the determination that his two prior convictions qualified as “controlled substance offenses.” The resulting guideline range was seventy to eighty-seven months’ imprisonment, and Maldonado was sentenced to sixty months in prison with three years of supervised release. The court also imposed various supervised release conditions, some of which Maldonado objected to, including restrictions on associating with persons possessing firearms. He timely appealed his sentence, arguing that his prior Massachusetts convictions did not categorically qualify as controlled substance offenses under federal law.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the term “controlled substance” in the relevant sentencing guideline refers only to substances regulated by the federal Controlled Substances Act, not by state law. Because Massachusetts included ioflupane as “cocaine” in its controlled substances list while federal law did not, Maldonado’s convictions were not a categorical match. The First Circuit vacated Maldonado’s sentence and remanded the case for resentencing. View "US v. Rosado Maldonado" on Justia Law

The case concerns a man who was found sleeping in a stolen vehicle by Puerto Rican police. Upon investigation, officers discovered that he possessed three firearms, two of which had been modified to function as machineguns, as well as a large quantity of ammunition, high-capacity magazines, ski masks, gloves, and other items often associated with criminal activity. He was charged with one count of possession of a machinegun under federal law and pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement. The plea agreement anticipated a lower offense level and allowed the defendant to argue for an eighteen-month sentence, while the government agreed not to recommend more than twenty-four months.However, the United States Probation Office prepared a presentence report calculating a higher offense level, resulting in a Guidelines sentencing range of thirty to thirty-seven months. The defendant did not object to this calculation. At sentencing in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, both parties presented arguments, and the defendant personally expressed remorse. The district court, after reviewing the facts, the presentence report, and the parties' arguments, imposed a forty-eight-month sentence, representing an eleven-month upward variance from the Guidelines range. The court cited the quantity and type of firearms and ammunition, the presence of items commonly used in violent crime, and the high rate of violent crime in Puerto Rico as justifications for the variance.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not commit procedural or substantive error. It found that the upward variance was adequately explained and justified, particularly by the significant quantity of ammunition and high-capacity magazines, and was consistent with precedent. The First Circuit affirmed the forty-eight-month sentence. View "US v. Colon-Vazquez" on Justia Law

A Brazilian pilot, facing financial difficulties at his flight school, was recruited to transport mining equipment from Venezuela. Upon arrival, he discovered the job actually involved smuggling cocaine. Initially reluctant, he was persuaded by the recruiter’s promise of payment and the assertion that completing the flight was necessary to return home. The pilot and another individual stayed at a jungle encampment monitored by armed FARC soldiers, eventually agreeing to fly cocaine to Puerto Rico. After landing, law enforcement, who had coordinated a months-long sting operation, arrested both men and seized the drugs and a large military-style hunting knife from the plane.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico indicted both individuals on six counts related to drug trafficking and importation. The pilot entered a straight guilty plea and was sentenced to 135 months in prison, after the court applied a sentencing enhancement for possession of a dangerous weapon, denied a reduction for a mitigating role, and declined a downward departure for duress. The co-defendant pled to a lesser charge and received a lighter sentence.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed three sentencing issues: the dangerous weapon enhancement, the denial of the mitigating role adjustment, and the denial of a duress departure. The court affirmed the application of the dangerous weapon enhancement and the denial of the duress departure, finding no clear error. However, it determined that the district court erred in its analysis of the mitigating role by failing to consider the broader universe of participants in the drug conspiracy, as required under recent precedent. The First Circuit vacated the pilot’s sentence and remanded for resentencing consistent with its opinion. View "US v. da Conceicao-Level" on Justia Law

Over the course of three weeks in late 2018, the defendant, along with accomplices, committed a series of violent crimes in Puerto Rico, including eleven Hobbs Act robberies (one attempted) and six carjackings (one attempted). The group’s crime spree ended after a failed gas station robbery in San Juan, during which an accomplice was shot by a security guard. The police investigation connected the defendant to the broader pattern of robberies and carjackings. He was indicted on multiple charges, including firearm offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Pursuant to a plea agreement, he pleaded guilty to the robbery and carjacking counts, and one firearm count, in exchange for the government dismissing the remaining firearm charges and recommending a total sentence of 207 months.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico initially sentenced the defendant to 207 months, consistent with the plea agreement. Following the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Taylor, which held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a “crime of violence” under § 924(c), the defendant’s firearm conviction was vacated on collateral review. At resentencing, the district court again imposed a 207-month sentence for the remaining counts, despite a lower advisory Sentencing Guidelines range. The defendant appealed, challenging the substantive and procedural reasonableness of the sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the sentence. The court held that the district court did not commit procedural error, adequately explained its reasons for the upward variance, and properly considered both aggravating and mitigating factors. The appellate court further concluded that the sentence was substantively reasonable, given the seriousness and scope of the defendant’s conduct, and was not an abuse of discretion. View "US v. Acevedo-Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Federal authorities investigated an individual in Massachusetts after monitoring his activity on Freenet, an internet-based peer-to-peer network known for anonymous file sharing. Law enforcement noted that a user at his IP address requested child pornography files. They obtained a search warrant and, upon execution, seized several electronic devices from the individual’s home. One device contained substantial evidence of child pornography, including images and videos of an identified minor in various states of undress, as well as internet activity linking the device to the individual.Following investigation, the United States filed criminal charges for possession, receipt, and production of child pornography. A grand jury returned indictments on all three counts. The individual moved to suppress evidence from the search, arguing the warrant lacked probable cause. The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts denied this motion. At trial, a jury convicted the defendant on all charges. The district court then imposed sentencing enhancements for, among other things, a pattern of activity, use of a computer, vulnerable victim status, and obstruction of justice, resulting in a total sentence of 20 years for the production count and 14 years each for the receipt and possession counts, to be served concurrently.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, the defendant challenged the denial of his suppression motion, the sufficiency and constitutionality of the production charge, certain evidentiary rulings, and the sentencing enhancements. The First Circuit reviewed each claim and rejected them, finding the search warrant was supported by probable cause, the evidence sufficient for conviction, § 2251(a) constitutional as applied, and no reversible error in evidentiary or sentencing rulings. The First Circuit affirmed both the conviction and sentence. View "US v. Baxter" on Justia Law