Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The defendant, a convicted felon, was living at a multi-unit residence with his girlfriend and her family in New Hampshire. After an altercation involving a damaged car mirror and escalating tensions with a family friend, the defendant brought a loaded pistol outside, intending to confront the friend. During a heated exchange, the defendant fired two shots, killing the family friend and seriously injuring his girlfriend’s uncle. He was arrested later that day and subsequently charged in federal court with possessing a firearm and ammunition as a convicted felon under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e).Prior to trial in the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire, the defendant sought to present affirmative justification defenses, including duress, necessity, and self-defense. He also moved to dismiss the indictment, claiming that the application of § 922(g)(1) violated his Second Amendment rights as applied to his circumstances. The district court held an evidentiary hearing and ultimately ruled that the defendant had failed to make a sufficient threshold showing to present a justification defense to the jury. It also denied his motion to dismiss. The defendant entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal these rulings and later challenged his above-Guidelines sentence as substantively unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court’s rulings and affirmed. The court held that the defendant failed to meet the threshold requirements for a justification defense under established circuit precedent and common law standards. The court further concluded that the defendant’s Second Amendment as-applied challenge lacked merit given the facts, and upheld the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss. Finally, the First Circuit found the above-Guidelines sentence was justified and not substantively unreasonable. The conviction and sentence were affirmed. View "US v. Fort" on Justia Law

During a four-day period in November 2015, Adrienne Rush, a heroin user, was manipulated and coerced into acts of commercial sex by Ricardo Middleton and his associates. Initially seeking drugs, Rush and her friend Julie Deschaine became entangled with Middleton, who, along with others, forced Rush to engage in sex acts with customers in exchange for money, subjected her to physical and sexual violence, and restricted her movements. Eventually, Rush managed to escape and seek help, but Middleton and his co-defendant, Sherry Jones, unsuccessfully attempted to locate her by threatening and assaulting Deschaine.Following these events, Middleton was arrested and indicted in the United States District Court for the District of Maine for sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1) and (b)(1). While in pretrial detention, Middleton made several phone calls attempting to influence the testimony of a co-defendant, leading to an additional charge for obstruction of a sex trafficking prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1591(d). After a trial, a jury found Middleton guilty on both counts, and the district court sentenced him to 360 months in prison, followed by ten years of supervised release.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, Middleton challenged the admission of expert testimony, the sufficiency of the evidence for obstruction, the reasonableness of his sentence, and the effectiveness of his counsel. The First Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentence, holding that the expert testimony was properly admitted, the evidence was sufficient to support the obstruction conviction, and the sentence was substantively reasonable. The ineffective assistance of counsel claim was dismissed as premature, without prejudice to raising it in a collateral proceeding. View "United States v. Middleton" on Justia Law

Federal authorities in Puerto Rico began investigating after a school social worker reported that a 12-year-old student received explicit requests via Instagram. Further investigation revealed that several minors were contacted through multiple Instagram accounts, soliciting initially innocuous photos that escalated to sexually explicit imagery. Authorities traced an IP address linked to these accounts to a San Juan residence, where they found the defendant and seized electronic devices. Forensic analysis of these devices produced evidence of sexually explicit images of multiple minors and communications linking the defendant to the Instagram accounts in question.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico charged the defendant with nine counts of production of child pornography, eight counts of coercion and enticement of a minor, and single counts each of receipt and possession of child pornography. After a six-day trial, a jury convicted the defendant on all nineteen counts. The court sentenced him to 360 months’ imprisonment, a downward variance from the Sentencing Guidelines’ recommendation of life, with concurrent 240-month terms for the possession and receipt charges.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, the defendant challenged various trial procedures, the Double Jeopardy implications of multiple convictions, and the substantive reasonableness of his sentence. The First Circuit held that: (1) the District Court did not plainly err in its jury selection process, handling of juror notes, or admission of witness testimony; (2) the evidence supported all convictions except that possession of child pornography is a lesser included offense of receipt, thus separate convictions for both on the same conduct violate the Double Jeopardy Clause; and (3) the 360-month sentence was substantively reasonable. The First Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentence in part, but remanded for the District Court to vacate either the possession or receipt conviction and the associated penalty. View "US v. Ortiz-Colon" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was convicted after a bench trial for his role in a 2010 armed robbery at a Puerto Rico police shooting range, where two officers were held hostage and 125 firearms were stolen. The government alleged that the defendant was the mastermind, coordinating with others who impersonated police officers to execute the plan. The defendant’s trial was delayed for several years due to changes in counsel, continuances, and the reassignment of the trial judge. Shortly before trial, the government filed a superseding indictment to comply with intervening Supreme Court precedent, United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. 445 (2019), which required a change to the predicate offense charged under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico denied the defendant’s motions to dismiss certain counts as time-barred, and also denied his last-minute motions for continuances and for additional funds for expert and investigatory services. The district court also excluded certain evidence and denied access to polygraph results, ultimately acquitting the defendant on one count but convicting him on the remaining counts, including conspiracy, robbery, firearms violations, and being a felon in possession of firearms.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court’s rulings. The First Circuit held that the superseding indictment did not materially broaden or amend the original charges and was therefore timely. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the denial of continuances or funds, as the defendant had not shown specific prejudice. The appellate court determined that there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions and that no evidentiary or discovery rulings warranted a new trial. Accordingly, the First Circuit affirmed the convictions. View "US v. Padilla-Galarza" on Justia Law

The appellant was indicted in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico for possessing a firearm while being an alien illegally or unlawfully in the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A). He moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that, as applied to him, the statute violated his Second Amendment rights. The District Court denied his motion, finding that, even assuming the Second Amendment protected him, the statute was consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The appellant then pleaded guilty, was sentenced, and timely appealed his conviction, preserving his constitutional challenge.The appeal was reviewed by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The government argued that the statute did not violate the Second Amendment, both because the appellant was not among “the people” whom the Amendment protects, and because, even if he was, the statute was consistent with historical tradition. The First Circuit, like the District Court, did not resolve whether the Second Amendment’s text covered the appellant, relying instead on the second step of the framework established in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen.Applying the Bruen framework, as clarified by United States v. Rahimi, the First Circuit held that § 922(g)(5)(A) is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The court found that historical analogues, including laws disarming those without allegiance to the sovereign, supported the regulation. The court concluded that the government met its burden to show that the statute is relevantly similar to such historical regulations. Therefore, the First Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment and rejected the appellant’s Second Amendment challenge. View "US v. Vizcaino-Peguero" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant completed a federal prison sentence for a prior firearm conviction and then began supervised release. During this supervised period, he was found in possession of a firearm and ammunition, which led to the initiation of revocation proceedings for violating the terms of his supervised release. Shortly thereafter, a search of his residence yielded additional ammunition. These events resulted in new criminal charges for possession of a firearm by a prohibited person under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The defendant pleaded guilty to the new charge pursuant to a plea agreement and also faced sentencing for the supervised release violations.Previously, the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico sentenced the defendant both for the new § 922(g)(1) offense and for the supervised release violations. The defendant appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit (in United States v. Rosa-Borges, 101 F.4th 66 (1st Cir. 2024)) vacated both sentences, finding that the district court had improperly relied on unreliable hearsay from the presentence report. On remand, the district court refused to strike the problematic information from the presentence report but stated it would not rely on it, then reimposed an upwardly variant sentence for the new firearm offense, in part based on the amount and nature of the ammunition. For the supervised release violation, the court imposed a consecutive sentence, finding a Grade A violation.Upon the second appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the revocation sentence, concluding that the defendant had waived his challenges to that sentence. However, the appellate court vacated the sentence for the § 922(g)(1) conviction, holding that the district court relied on a legally invalid rationale—namely, treating 31 rounds of ammunition as an aggravating factor and referencing unsupported facts about the ammunition’s nature. The case was remanded for resentencing before a different judge. View "United States v. Rosa-Borges" on Justia Law

In 2010, the petitioner was convicted in a Massachusetts Superior Court of several offenses, including burglary and mayhem, after being identified as the assailant in an attack involving hot cooking oil. The trial was conducted without a jury, and the court sentenced her to ten to eleven years in prison. Her conviction was affirmed by the Massachusetts Appeals Court, and the Supreme Judicial Court denied further review. While serving her sentence, federal immigration authorities revoked her permanent resident status and ordered her removal from the United States. After her release from state custody in December 2021, she was detained by federal authorities and deported to Trinidad and Tobago in January 2024.Following her deportation, the petitioner exhausted her state remedies, including a motion for a new trial based on alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, which was denied by the Superior Court and affirmed by the Massachusetts Appeals Court. In March 2024, she filed a habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, naming the Massachusetts Attorney General as the respondent. She claimed her convictions resulted from ineffective assistance of counsel and challenged the state court’s handling of new evidence. The district court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, reasoning that she was not in custody, as required by federal habeas law, at the time of filing.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The First Circuit held that because the petitioner was not in the custody of any Massachusetts official when she filed her habeas petition—and did not name as respondent any official with actual custody—the federal courts lacked jurisdiction to hear her petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The court did not reach other arguments and concluded that dismissal was required. View "St. John v. Campbell" on Justia Law

From December 2019 through May 2021, an individual incarcerated at the Buckingham Correctional Center in Virginia conspired with others, including two Massachusetts-based drug traffickers and a correctional officer, to distribute controlled substances—specifically MDMA and buprenorphine—inside the facility. The proceeds from these transactions were then collected and managed by the group. A federal grand jury in the District of Massachusetts indicted the defendant on charges of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute controlled substances, and conspiracy to commit money laundering. The defendant pled guilty to both charges.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts received a presentence investigation report that classified the defendant as a “career offender” under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, based on two prior Virginia felony convictions: use of a firearm in the commission of a robbery and attempted murder. The report also found that the instant conviction for conspiracy to distribute controlled substances qualified as a “controlled substance offense.” The defendant objected, arguing that the firearm conviction was not a “crime of violence” under the Guidelines and that conspiracy to distribute drugs was not a “controlled substance offense.” The district court rejected both arguments and imposed a 121-month sentence.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the classification of the prior Virginia firearm conviction and the instant drug conspiracy conviction. The court held that the Virginia conviction for use of a firearm in the commission of a robbery qualified as a “crime of violence” under both the enumerated offenses clause and the force clause of the Guidelines. It also held that conspiracy to distribute controlled substances is a “controlled substance offense” under binding First Circuit precedent, finding no basis to depart from this view despite arguments regarding inter-circuit disagreement and recent Supreme Court decisions. The First Circuit affirmed the sentence. View "US v. Mao" on Justia Law

Arthur Miles was sentenced to a total of 300 months’ imprisonment following two separate federal convictions. After his first sentencing in October 2022, Miles was housed at the Marion County Jail in Indiana for fifteen months—some of this time was before and some after his second federal sentencing. During his time at the county jail, Miles worked as an orderly. He later argued that under the First Step Act of 2018 (“FSA”), he was entitled to earn time credits for this work, which could reduce his sentence, because his federal sentence had commenced and the work was equivalent to an evidence-based recidivism reduction (“EBRR”) program.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts reviewed Miles’s habeas petition after a magistrate judge recommended denying the Bureau of Prisons’ (BOP) motion to dismiss. The magistrate judge found that BOP regulations preventing prisoners from earning FSA credits until they arrived at a federal facility conflicted with the FSA’s language. The district court, however, rejected this recommendation and dismissed Miles’s petition, holding that the BOP’s rules did not violate the FSA.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the BOP’s regulation, which delayed the accrual of FSA time credits until a prisoner’s arrival at a federal facility, was invalid because it conflicted with the statutory definition of when a sentence commences. The court further held that a risk and needs assessment is not a prerequisite for earning FSA credits, and that prisoners may earn credits for qualifying programming—such as work as an orderly—performed after sentencing even while housed in non-federal facilities. The court vacated the dismissal of Miles’s habeas petition and remanded for further proceedings to determine his entitlement to credits for his time at the county jail. View "Miles v. Bowers" on Justia Law

The case involves a Massachusetts psychiatrist who owned and operated a clinic providing treatment for addiction with imported drugs. The drugs included naltrexone and disulfiram in forms not approved by the FDA for use in the United States. The shipments were brought in from Hong Kong and falsely described on import documents as “plastic beads in plastic tubes,” with their value understated. The government charged the defendant with several crimes, including international money laundering, unlawful importation of merchandise, and receipt and delivery of misbranded drugs. The jury found the defendant guilty on some counts but acquitted him on others, including all counts against his wife.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts conducted the trial. After the jury’s verdict, the court sentenced the defendant to 36 months’ imprisonment on each count, to be served concurrently, and calculated the sentence using the fraud guideline in the United States Sentencing Guidelines. The defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in its evidentiary rulings, in admitting or excluding certain testimony, and in its application of the Sentencing Guidelines.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the defendant’s convictions, finding no reversible error in the district court’s evidentiary decisions or in its exclusion of expert testimony. The appellate court vacated the sentence for the misdemeanor misbranding conviction because it exceeded the statutory maximum. The court retained jurisdiction over the appeal and remanded to the district court for clarification regarding the application of the fraud guideline, specifically instructing the lower court to explain the basis for its use of that guideline and to address the impact of recent amendments related to acquitted conduct. View "US v. Shafa" on Justia Law