Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Guzman, a supervisor at Kmart, provided his co-conspirators with information about a Kmart store, including the store's layout and the identity of the security guard. Guzman's co-conspirators robbed the store, using a firearm and physically restraining and injuring the security guard. Guzman subsequently provided details about another Kmart store and prepared a hiding spot for his co-defendant, who hid in that spot until the store closed. When Guzman and other employees encountered the robber the next morning, Guzman pretended to be a victim. The second robbery involved a firearm, restraint of employees, and injury to the security guard. The value of the property taken during the two robberies exceeded $50,000. Guzman pled guilty to conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robberies, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a). His plea agreement and PSR recommended a range of 97 to 121 months, based on a total offense level of 30 and a criminal history category of I. The offense level included enhancements because a firearm was brandished, victims sustained bodily injury, victims were physically restrained, the loss exceeded $50,000, and Guzman abused a position of trust. The court imposed a 135-month term, explaining its consideration of the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). The First Circuit affirmed; the factors relied on by the court established a plausible rationale for the modest variance. View "United States v. Guzman-Fernandez" on Justia Law

A U.S. Postal Service worker was delivering mail in Mayagüez, Puerto Rico in her USPS vehicle when Soto approached. With a gun in hand, Soto demanded that the victim give him the packages in her vehicle. Soto took two or three of the packages and fled the scene on foot. Montes would later acknowledge having "taken [Soto] earlier the day to the place where the robbery occurred for the purpose of committing that robbery." After the robbery, a witness at the housing project where both men lived overheard them discussing the crime. Montes and Soto were arrested. Montes pled guilty to aiding and abetting the robbery of a USPS employee, 18 U.S.C. 2114(a) and 2, and Soto to aiding and abetting the carrying, using, and brandishing of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) and 2. The district court applied a five-level weapon enhancement and rejected the parties' joint recommendation for a two-level minor role reduction. Based on a total offense level of 24 and a criminal history of I, Montes had a Guidelines range of 51 to 63 months and was sentenced to 51 months' imprisonment. The First Circuit affirmed the sentence. View "United States v. Montes-Fosse" on Justia Law

Operation Guard Shack began in 2008, focusing on Puerto Rico police officers who were suspected of accepting money from drug dealers in exchange for providing security during drug transactions. In 2010, as part of that operation, the FBI conducted the sting operation that led to Amaro's arrest. Amaro was not an officer and claimed to have been under duress during the sting transaction. He was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine in excess of five kilograms, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 846, aiding and abetting the attempted possession with intent to distribute cocaine in excess of five kilograms, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. 2, and possession of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense, 18 U.S.C. 924(c). The jury found that the amount of fake cocaine involved was 11 kilograms, Amaro was sentenced to 15 years in prison. The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction; that the district court erred in delivering to the jury an "Allen charge," a supplemental instruction that a judge may give to a jury when it is deadlocked in its deliberations; and that the prosecutor made two inappropriate statements during closing argument. View "United States v. Amaro-Santiago" on Justia Law

Jenkins was convicted in Massachusetts state court in 2005 of the first-degree murder of his cousin and was sentenced to life in prison. He did not testify. The state trial court denied Jenkins's motion for a new trial, and the Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) affirmed. The federal district court denied his habeas petition and granted a certificate of appealability only on the issue of Jenkins's waiver of his right to testify in his own defense. Jenkins argued that his attorney unilaterally decided that he would not testify. The First Circuit affirmed the denial, engaging in deferential review under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. 2254(d) because the SJC adjudicated Jenkins's claim on the merits . Because there is no Supreme Court precedent clearly establishing the proper standard and burdens for assessing whether a criminal defendant has validly waived his right to testify on facts like these, Jenkins is not entitled to habeas relief. His claim depends on too broad a characterization of waiver of federal constitutional rights, not drawn from cases of like circumstances. View "Jenkins v. Bergeron" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two weapons possession counts and witness tampering. Appealing from a federal district court, Defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and alleged several procedural errors. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) a reasonable jury could have convicted Defendant of both weapons possession offenses and the witness tampering charge; (2) the trial court did not impair Defendant’s right to cross-examination by denying Defendant’s request to introduce alleged impeachment evidence; and (3) there was no reversible error in the district court’s instructions to the jury. View "United States v. Berrios-Bonilla" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. The district court sentenced Defendant to a term of imprisonment of sixty months. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the firearm and ammunition and erred in classifying his prior convictions and convictions of a crime of violence for purposes of calculating his base offense level under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress but vacated the remanded for resentencing proceedings, holding (1) there was no unlawful seizure at the time that Defendant contended one occurred, and therefore, the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress; and (2) the district court’s application of the sentencing enhancement set forth in U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(a)(2) was erroneous. View "United States v. Fields" on Justia Law

Michael McLaughlin, James Fitzpatrick, and Bernard Morosco, all of whom worked for a public agency responsible for providing low-income housing, were indicted for knowingly and unlawfully conspiring to defraud the United States and its agency, the Department of Housing and Urban Development. McLaughlin pleaded guilty. After a jury trial, Fitzpatrick and Morosco were found guilty as charged. Fitzpatrick and Morosco appealed, raising a number of arguments. The First Circuit affirmed Fitzpatrick’s conviction and sentence, denied as moot Fitzpatrick’s earlier-filed motion asking the Court to stay his sentence pending appeal, and affirmed Morosco’s conviction, holding that Defendants were not entitled to relief on any of their arguments. View "United States v. Morosco" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pled guilty to possession of ammunition by a felon. The district court sentenced Defendant to a 216-month incarcerative term followed by five years of supervised release. Defendant was sentenced as an armed career criminal under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) based on his criminal history. The First Circuit vacated Defendant’s guidelines sentence, holding (1) Defendant’s convictions for possession with intent to distribute and assault with a dangerous weapon qualify as predicates under the ACCA; but (2) the district court failed to calculate correctly Defendant’s guidelines sentencing range. Remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Hudson" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to murder in the second degree in exchange for the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. Defendant subsequently filed a motion to revise or revoke under Mass. R. Crim. P. 29, to no avail. After unsuccessfully seeking relief in state courts, Defendant filed a federal habeas petition alleging that his trial counsel was deficient for allegedly inducing him to plead guilty on the assurance that he would be able to reduce his sentence through the Rule 29 process. The district court dismissed the petition as untimely under the one-year statute of limitations imposed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). The First Circuit upheld the determination that Defendant’s petition was untimely but remanded for consider as to whether the running of the limitations period should should be tolled on equitable grounds. On remand, the district court found equitable tolling unwarranted and denied habeas relief. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Defendant failed to satisfied the two necessary conditions for equitable tolling. View "Holmes v. Spencer" on Justia Law

When he was arrested, Defendant confessed to allegations that he engaged in conduct sufficient to support convictions for the coercion and enticement of a minor and the sexual exploitation of a child. During a change-of-plea hearing before the district court at which Defendant pled guilty to the charges against him, he again confessed to the allegations against him. Defendant later filed two motions to withdraw his guilty plea. The district court denied both motions. The district court subsequently sentenced Defendant to twenty-one years in prison. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motions to withdraw his plea; and (2) Defendant’s sentence was neither procedurally nor substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. Dunfee" on Justia Law