Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In this case, Jesús Abdiel Feliciano-Candelario was indicted on five federal counts related to three separate armed robberies. Feliciano pled guilty to four counts under a plea agreement, which included a joint recommendation for a 130-month sentence, below the calculated Guidelines range of 157 to 181 months. The district court, however, sentenced him to 181 months. Feliciano appealed, challenging the sentence on several grounds.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico initially reviewed the case. Feliciano moved to sever the charges into three separate trials, which the court granted. During a status conference, the court discussed the possibility of sequential sentencing if Feliciano were convicted in separate trials. Eventually, Feliciano and the government reached a plea agreement, and Feliciano pled guilty to four counts, with the fifth count dismissed. The district court sentenced him to 181 months, applying a four-level enhancement for "otherwise using" a knife during a carjacking, among other considerations.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed with Feliciano that the district court improperly applied the four-level enhancement for "otherwise using" a knife instead of the three-level enhancement for "brandishing" it. The court vacated the sentence on the carjacking count and remanded for further proceedings regarding that enhancement. On other grounds, including the government's alleged breach of the plea agreement and the district court's consideration of community factors, the court affirmed the district court's decisions. The court found no plain error in the government's actions or the district court's consideration of community-based factors and rejected Feliciano's argument about the district court's supposed belief in a hypothetical, piecemeal sentencing process. View "United States v. Feliciano-Candelario" on Justia Law

Sine Phimmady, a Laotian refugee admitted to the U.S. in 1979, was convicted of multiple assault-related crimes in 1992 and 1993. He served five years in prison and was subsequently placed in removal proceedings by the Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS). An Immigration Judge (IJ) found him deportable based on his convictions, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed his appeal. After being released from INS custody in 2000, Phimmady rebuilt his life, maintaining steady employment and starting a family. In 2022, he successfully vacated his 1993 convictions due to a lack of proper immigration warnings during his plea hearings.Phimmady requested the BIA to reopen his removal proceedings sua sponte, citing the vacatur of his convictions. The BIA denied his motion, stating that he had not demonstrated an exceptional situation warranting reopening, particularly noting his delay in seeking post-conviction relief. Phimmady filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the BIA had a settled practice of granting reopening in cases where convictions were vacated due to defects in the criminal proceedings. The BIA denied the reconsideration, emphasizing the need to consider the specific facts and circumstances of each case, including Phimmady's delay and the nature of his convictions.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that the BIA does not have a settled practice of granting sua sponte reopening solely based on the vacatur of convictions. The court found that the BIA's decisions often consider the totality of circumstances, including the noncitizen's diligence in seeking post-conviction relief. Therefore, the court denied Phimmady's petition for review, upholding the BIA's decision. View "Phimmady v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Anlert Perez-Segura pled guilty to conspiring to import cocaine into the United States. In exchange for a specific term of imprisonment, he waived his right to appeal any aspect of his conviction and sentence. He was caught captaining a boat carrying cocaine off Puerto Rico's western coast. A grand jury indicted him on four counts, and he agreed to plead guilty to one count in exchange for the government dropping the remaining counts and advocating for a 120-month sentence, the mandatory minimum. The plea agreement included a supplement acknowledging that the court could impose a sentence below the mandatory minimum if he qualified for the "safety valve" under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f).The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico held a change-of-plea hearing and later a sentencing hearing. At the sentencing hearing, Perez-Segura's counsel indicated that he did not qualify for the safety valve because he was uncooperative. The court sentenced him to 120 months' imprisonment, and he appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. Perez-Segura argued that the district court erred by not inquiring further into his eligibility for the safety valve and that his counsel was ineffective for not advocating for it. The appellate court found that his waiver of the right to appeal was enforceable and that he did not demonstrate a miscarriage of justice. The court also noted that his ineffective assistance claim was better suited for a collateral proceeding due to the lack of a developed record on why his counsel acted as she did and whether her actions were prejudicial.The First Circuit dismissed the appeal, allowing Perez-Segura to raise his ineffective assistance claim in a collateral proceeding. View "United States v. Perez-Segura" on Justia Law

Mario Rafael Castillo was charged with one count of aggravated sexual abuse of a child under twelve and one count of abusive sexual contact of a child under twelve. He pleaded guilty to the second count, which involved his younger granddaughter, while the government dismissed the first count. The plea agreement allowed Castillo to seek a 78-month sentence, and the government could argue for up to 180 months. Castillo was initially sentenced to 235 months by the district court, which applied a sentencing guidelines cross-reference that increased the advisory guideline range.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated the initial sentence due to a procedural error in applying the cross-reference. On remand, the district court acknowledged the lower guideline range but reimposed the 235-month sentence. Castillo appealed again, arguing that the prosecutor breached the plea agreement by not genuinely recommending the 180-month sentence and instead undermining it.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and agreed with Castillo. The court found that the prosecutor's statements, although technically recommending 180 months, effectively undermined the plea agreement by emphasizing the district court's authority to impose a harsher sentence and suggesting that Castillo was a danger to society. The court held that the prosecutor's actions constituted a breach of the plea agreement.The First Circuit vacated Castillo's sentence and remanded the case for resentencing before a different judge, emphasizing the importance of prosecutors upholding their end of plea agreements to maintain the integrity of the judicial process. View "United States v. Castillo" on Justia Law

Two state forensic chemists in Massachusetts tampered with drug evidence and falsified test results, affecting tens of thousands of drug cases. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) vacated over 30,000 criminal cases due to this misconduct. The SJC ruled that under the Fourteenth Amendment, affected individuals were entitled to the repayment of most funds collected due to their vacated convictions but not the automatic return of forfeited property. Instead, individuals had to file motions for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b) of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure.The plaintiffs, whose criminal convictions were vacated, sought a federal court order for the automatic return of their forfeited property and related relief. The Commonwealth defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the claims were barred by the Eleventh Amendment, which prohibits suits in federal court against a state by its own citizens. The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissed the complaint in part, ruling that it could not order the automatic return of forfeited property but allowed other claims to proceed under the Ex parte Young exception to the Eleventh Amendment.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that the Eleventh Amendment bars all the relief sought by the plaintiffs. The court held that the plaintiffs' claims focused on a past wrong, and the Ex parte Young exception applies only to prospective relief against ongoing violations of federal law. Additionally, the state officials sued lacked the authority to enforce or change the state court procedures. The court reversed the district court's partial denial of the motion to dismiss and remanded with instructions to dismiss the case in full. View "Cotto v. Campbell" on Justia Law

Humana, a health insurance company and Medicare Part C and Part D sponsor, filed a lawsuit against Biogen, a drug manufacturer, and Advanced Care Scripts, Inc. (ACS), a specialty pharmacy, in the District of Massachusetts. Humana alleged that Biogen and ACS engaged in fraudulent schemes involving three multiple sclerosis drugs, violating the civil RICO statute. Humana claimed that Biogen "seeded" the market with these drugs, funneled patients into Medicare, and indirectly funded patient copays through third-party patient-assistance programs (PAPs). Humana also alleged that ACS aided Biogen's scheme by steering patients and acting as an intermediary between Biogen and the PAPs, causing the submission of false certifications to Humana.The district court dismissed the case, ruling that Humana lacked standing to bring RICO claims because it was an indirect purchaser and failed to plead the RICO claims with particularity as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). The court found that Humana did not specify the time, place, and content of the alleged fraudulent communications and failed to detail the false certifications' language, timing, and context. Humana's motion for leave to amend the complaint was also denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal, agreeing that Humana failed to meet the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b) for its RICO claim. The court held that Humana did not provide specific details about the fraudulent certifications or the use of mail or wire communications in furtherance of the scheme. The court also upheld the denial of leave to amend, citing undue delay and the inefficiency of seeking amendment after dismissal. View "Humana Inc. v. Biogen, Inc." on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant, a local attorney, was contracted by Theory Wellness, a marijuana dispensary operator, to assist in obtaining a host community agreement from the City of Medford, Massachusetts. Instead of legitimate lobbying, the defendant attempted to bribe Medford's chief of police through the chief's brother. This led to the defendant's convictions on two counts of honest-services wire fraud and one count of federal programs bribery.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts presided over the trial, where a jury convicted the defendant on all counts. The defendant was sentenced to concurrent twenty-four-month terms of imprisonment. The defendant appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the admission of certain testimony, and the jury instructions.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court vacated the honest-services wire fraud convictions, finding that the district court erroneously admitted the only evidence establishing the jurisdictional element of those counts. However, the court affirmed the federal programs bribery conviction, concluding that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding that the defendant intended to bribe the chief of police.The court held that the defendant's actions constituted a bribery scheme under 18 U.S.C. § 666, even if the defendant did not believe the chief had accepted the bribe. The court also found that the district court's failure to instruct the jury on the requirement of an "official act" was harmless, as the evidence overwhelmingly supported the conclusion that the defendant sought official acts from the chief. The court rejected the defendant's entrapment defense, finding no improper inducement by the government and that the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime. View "United States v. O'Donovan" on Justia Law

On June 1, 2021, two masked men, later identified as Hall and Medina, abducted a U.S. postal worker at gunpoint to interrogate him about a package with missing contents, which was found to contain illicit drugs. During an undercover operation, law enforcement arrested Hall, Garay, and Medina while they attempted to collect other drug-laden packages. Officers seized five telephones from the defendants and obtained search warrants for the phones' contents and historical cell site location information (CSLI) for two defendants. A federal grand jury indicted the defendants on charges including kidnapping, conspiracy, and drug possession.The U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island found the warrants lacked probable cause due to missing referenced exhibits in the applications and suppressed the evidence. The court also rejected the government's argument that the good faith exception from United States v. Leon should apply, leading to the current appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that the officer executing the warrants acted in good faith. The court noted that the officer, Inspector Atwood, had no reason to believe the affidavits were not attached and relied reasonably on the USAO to file the applications correctly. The court distinguished this case from United States v. Sheehan, emphasizing that the incorporation language was explicit and the error was not systemic but isolated. Consequently, the First Circuit vacated the suppression order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "United States v. Medina" on Justia Law

Dario Giambro was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) for being a felon in possession of a firearm. The conviction stemmed from evidence found by police officers who forcibly entered his home in Hebron, Maine, without a warrant. The officers entered the home based on information from Giambro's son, Antonio, who reported that his mother, Arline, had died and was not in the house. Giambro argued that the warrantless entry violated his Fourth Amendment rights and that the evidence should be suppressed. He also challenged the charge on Second Amendment grounds.The United States District Court for the District of Maine denied Giambro's motion to suppress, ruling that the entry fell within the emergency aid exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. The court found that the officers had an objectively reasonable basis to believe that Arline might be in need of immediate aid, despite Antonio's report that she had died and was not in the house. The court also denied Giambro's motion to dismiss the charge on Second Amendment grounds.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and disagreed with the district court's application of the emergency aid exception. The appellate court held that the officers did not have an objectively reasonable basis to believe that Arline was alive and in need of immediate aid, given that Antonio had been in the house that morning and reported that she was not there. The court emphasized that the officers should have spoken to Antonio and Giambro, who were available for questioning, before forcibly entering the home. Consequently, the First Circuit reversed the district court's denial of the motion to suppress, vacated Giambro's conviction and sentence, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court did not address the Second Amendment claim due to its ruling on the Fourth Amendment issue. View "United States v. Giambro" on Justia Law

In September 2021, Jonathan Fargas-Reyes pled guilty to unlawfully possessing a modified Glock pistol. He was sentenced to 33 months in prison and 3 years of supervised release, starting in November 2021. In January 2022, Puerto Rico police observed Fargas with firearms outside his home. After a brief chase, Fargas and his girlfriend, Mary Herrera-Cruz, were arrested. They were found with multiple firearms and ammunition. Fargas pled guilty to illegally possessing firearms and ammunition as a convicted felon, while Herrera pled guilty to aiding and abetting.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico sentenced Fargas to 120 months in prison for the new crime, above the recommended range of 57 to 71 months, and an additional 24 months for violating his supervised release, to be served consecutively. Herrera received a 37-month sentence, within the guidelines range.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. Fargas argued that the government breached the plea agreement by effectively advocating for a higher sentence and that his sentences were procedurally and substantively unreasonable. The court found no plain error in the government's conduct, noting that the prosecutor adhered to the plea agreement's terms. The court also held that the district judge adequately explained the reasons for the upward variance, emphasizing the seriousness of Fargas's conduct and the need for deterrence and public protection. The court rejected Fargas's argument about sentencing disparity with Herrera, noting significant differences in their criminal histories and circumstances.The First Circuit affirmed Fargas's sentences but allowed him the right to seek resentencing under a retroactive guideline amendment that could eliminate the status points added to his criminal history score. View "United States v. Fargas-Reyes" on Justia Law