Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After being released from prison on federal convictions including possession of a firearm by a prohibited person, the defendant was subject to supervised release. While on supervised release, he was arrested when police seized a rifle and ammunition from his residence and a pistol from a discarded bag. There was no direct evidence linking him to the rifle beyond its presence in his home, and the officers did not observe him handling it. The terms of his supervised release barred him from possessing firearms or ammunition.Following his arrest, a probation officer notified the court of alleged violations of supervised release. The defendant waived a preliminary hearing; a magistrate judge found probable cause and referred the matter for final revocation. Meanwhile, the government brought new criminal charges for firearm possession, including possession of a machine gun. At trial on the new charges, expert testimony addressed whether the seized rifle functioned as a machine gun. The court later dismissed these charges due to government discovery violations. The government then relied on selected excerpts from the trial and suppression hearing transcripts as evidence of a “Grade A” supervised release violation—possession of a machine gun—at the revocation hearing. The government expressly limited its evidence to these exhibits.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico found that the defendant knowingly possessed a machine gun, basing its conclusion on the visible features of the firearm and the defendant’s prior conviction. The court revoked supervised release and imposed the statutory maximum sentence. The defendant objected, arguing the government had not proven knowledge or mens rea. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the district court committed procedural error by relying on evidence outside the revocation record. The court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing limited to the existing record. View "US v. Fernandez-Santos" on Justia Law

The defendant, the former mayor of Guaynabo, Puerto Rico, was indicted on three federal charges: conspiracy to commit federal-program bribery, federal-program bribery and aiding and abetting, and extortion under color of official right. The indictment alleged that while serving as mayor, he used his authority over municipal contracting to steer contracts to a local construction company owned by another individual, in exchange for cash payments. Some of these payments were characterized by the government as bribes, while the defense argued they were campaign contributions intended to pay off campaign debt.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico denied the defendant’s pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment and later denied his motion for judgment of acquittal after the jury found him guilty on all counts. The district court found that the evidence supported the jury’s verdict, sentenced the defendant to concurrent terms of imprisonment and supervised release, and rejected his arguments regarding defects in the indictment, prejudicial variance, improper jury instructions, and jury bias.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence de novo, as well as other challenges. The First Circuit held that a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the payments in question were not campaign contributions, and thus the requirements of McCormick v. United States did not apply. The court further held that there was sufficient evidence of a quid pro quo and that the timing and nature of the payments did not convert them into mere gratuities. The court also concluded that there was no prejudicial variance, the jury instructions were not impermissibly biased, and the defendant’s right to an impartial jury was not violated. The First Circuit ultimately affirmed both the convictions and the sentences. View "US v. Perez-Otero" on Justia Law

Over a period of six years, the two defendants participated in a scheme involving the creation of multiple business entities and bank accounts, which were used to facilitate the transfer of large sums of money. One defendant directed friends and family members to register businesses and open accounts on his behalf, while the other registered a business and opened accounts at his request. The operation purported to involve purchasing goods domestically and exporting them overseas, but most of the funds came from a single victim who was deceived in an online romance scam. The defendants withdrew substantial amounts of cash from these accounts and used the funds for personal expenses, while maintaining little to no legitimate business records.After law enforcement began investigating, both defendants were questioned about their activities. They denied knowledge of any illegal source of funds and claimed to believe the business was legitimate. Nonetheless, evidence showed inconsistent statements, continued operation after warnings from banks and law enforcement, and a lack of documentation for the purported business transactions. A grand jury indicted both defendants for conspiracy to commit money laundering. At trial in the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire, both defendants testified that they were unaware of the illegal origins of the funds, but a jury found them guilty. One defendant also challenged the government’s arguments at trial and the sentencing calculation.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, both defendants argued that the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions, and that the district court erred in its jury instructions regarding willful blindness and good faith. The First Circuit held that the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions, and that the willful blindness and good faith instructions were proper. The court also found no error in the government’s arguments or in the sentencing calculation, and affirmed both the convictions and the sentence. View "US v. Sepetu" on Justia Law

The defendant, a convicted felon, was living at a multi-unit residence with his girlfriend and her family in New Hampshire. After an altercation involving a damaged car mirror and escalating tensions with a family friend, the defendant brought a loaded pistol outside, intending to confront the friend. During a heated exchange, the defendant fired two shots, killing the family friend and seriously injuring his girlfriend’s uncle. He was arrested later that day and subsequently charged in federal court with possessing a firearm and ammunition as a convicted felon under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e).Prior to trial in the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire, the defendant sought to present affirmative justification defenses, including duress, necessity, and self-defense. He also moved to dismiss the indictment, claiming that the application of § 922(g)(1) violated his Second Amendment rights as applied to his circumstances. The district court held an evidentiary hearing and ultimately ruled that the defendant had failed to make a sufficient threshold showing to present a justification defense to the jury. It also denied his motion to dismiss. The defendant entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal these rulings and later challenged his above-Guidelines sentence as substantively unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court’s rulings and affirmed. The court held that the defendant failed to meet the threshold requirements for a justification defense under established circuit precedent and common law standards. The court further concluded that the defendant’s Second Amendment as-applied challenge lacked merit given the facts, and upheld the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss. Finally, the First Circuit found the above-Guidelines sentence was justified and not substantively unreasonable. The conviction and sentence were affirmed. View "US v. Fort" on Justia Law

During a four-day period in November 2015, Adrienne Rush, a heroin user, was manipulated and coerced into acts of commercial sex by Ricardo Middleton and his associates. Initially seeking drugs, Rush and her friend Julie Deschaine became entangled with Middleton, who, along with others, forced Rush to engage in sex acts with customers in exchange for money, subjected her to physical and sexual violence, and restricted her movements. Eventually, Rush managed to escape and seek help, but Middleton and his co-defendant, Sherry Jones, unsuccessfully attempted to locate her by threatening and assaulting Deschaine.Following these events, Middleton was arrested and indicted in the United States District Court for the District of Maine for sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1) and (b)(1). While in pretrial detention, Middleton made several phone calls attempting to influence the testimony of a co-defendant, leading to an additional charge for obstruction of a sex trafficking prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1591(d). After a trial, a jury found Middleton guilty on both counts, and the district court sentenced him to 360 months in prison, followed by ten years of supervised release.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, Middleton challenged the admission of expert testimony, the sufficiency of the evidence for obstruction, the reasonableness of his sentence, and the effectiveness of his counsel. The First Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentence, holding that the expert testimony was properly admitted, the evidence was sufficient to support the obstruction conviction, and the sentence was substantively reasonable. The ineffective assistance of counsel claim was dismissed as premature, without prejudice to raising it in a collateral proceeding. View "United States v. Middleton" on Justia Law

Federal authorities in Puerto Rico began investigating after a school social worker reported that a 12-year-old student received explicit requests via Instagram. Further investigation revealed that several minors were contacted through multiple Instagram accounts, soliciting initially innocuous photos that escalated to sexually explicit imagery. Authorities traced an IP address linked to these accounts to a San Juan residence, where they found the defendant and seized electronic devices. Forensic analysis of these devices produced evidence of sexually explicit images of multiple minors and communications linking the defendant to the Instagram accounts in question.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico charged the defendant with nine counts of production of child pornography, eight counts of coercion and enticement of a minor, and single counts each of receipt and possession of child pornography. After a six-day trial, a jury convicted the defendant on all nineteen counts. The court sentenced him to 360 months’ imprisonment, a downward variance from the Sentencing Guidelines’ recommendation of life, with concurrent 240-month terms for the possession and receipt charges.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, the defendant challenged various trial procedures, the Double Jeopardy implications of multiple convictions, and the substantive reasonableness of his sentence. The First Circuit held that: (1) the District Court did not plainly err in its jury selection process, handling of juror notes, or admission of witness testimony; (2) the evidence supported all convictions except that possession of child pornography is a lesser included offense of receipt, thus separate convictions for both on the same conduct violate the Double Jeopardy Clause; and (3) the 360-month sentence was substantively reasonable. The First Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentence in part, but remanded for the District Court to vacate either the possession or receipt conviction and the associated penalty. View "US v. Ortiz-Colon" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was convicted after a bench trial for his role in a 2010 armed robbery at a Puerto Rico police shooting range, where two officers were held hostage and 125 firearms were stolen. The government alleged that the defendant was the mastermind, coordinating with others who impersonated police officers to execute the plan. The defendant’s trial was delayed for several years due to changes in counsel, continuances, and the reassignment of the trial judge. Shortly before trial, the government filed a superseding indictment to comply with intervening Supreme Court precedent, United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. 445 (2019), which required a change to the predicate offense charged under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico denied the defendant’s motions to dismiss certain counts as time-barred, and also denied his last-minute motions for continuances and for additional funds for expert and investigatory services. The district court also excluded certain evidence and denied access to polygraph results, ultimately acquitting the defendant on one count but convicting him on the remaining counts, including conspiracy, robbery, firearms violations, and being a felon in possession of firearms.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court’s rulings. The First Circuit held that the superseding indictment did not materially broaden or amend the original charges and was therefore timely. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the denial of continuances or funds, as the defendant had not shown specific prejudice. The appellate court determined that there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions and that no evidentiary or discovery rulings warranted a new trial. Accordingly, the First Circuit affirmed the convictions. View "US v. Padilla-Galarza" on Justia Law

The appellant was indicted in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico for possessing a firearm while being an alien illegally or unlawfully in the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A). He moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that, as applied to him, the statute violated his Second Amendment rights. The District Court denied his motion, finding that, even assuming the Second Amendment protected him, the statute was consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The appellant then pleaded guilty, was sentenced, and timely appealed his conviction, preserving his constitutional challenge.The appeal was reviewed by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The government argued that the statute did not violate the Second Amendment, both because the appellant was not among “the people” whom the Amendment protects, and because, even if he was, the statute was consistent with historical tradition. The First Circuit, like the District Court, did not resolve whether the Second Amendment’s text covered the appellant, relying instead on the second step of the framework established in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen.Applying the Bruen framework, as clarified by United States v. Rahimi, the First Circuit held that § 922(g)(5)(A) is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The court found that historical analogues, including laws disarming those without allegiance to the sovereign, supported the regulation. The court concluded that the government met its burden to show that the statute is relevantly similar to such historical regulations. Therefore, the First Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment and rejected the appellant’s Second Amendment challenge. View "US v. Vizcaino-Peguero" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant completed a federal prison sentence for a prior firearm conviction and then began supervised release. During this supervised period, he was found in possession of a firearm and ammunition, which led to the initiation of revocation proceedings for violating the terms of his supervised release. Shortly thereafter, a search of his residence yielded additional ammunition. These events resulted in new criminal charges for possession of a firearm by a prohibited person under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The defendant pleaded guilty to the new charge pursuant to a plea agreement and also faced sentencing for the supervised release violations.Previously, the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico sentenced the defendant both for the new § 922(g)(1) offense and for the supervised release violations. The defendant appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit (in United States v. Rosa-Borges, 101 F.4th 66 (1st Cir. 2024)) vacated both sentences, finding that the district court had improperly relied on unreliable hearsay from the presentence report. On remand, the district court refused to strike the problematic information from the presentence report but stated it would not rely on it, then reimposed an upwardly variant sentence for the new firearm offense, in part based on the amount and nature of the ammunition. For the supervised release violation, the court imposed a consecutive sentence, finding a Grade A violation.Upon the second appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the revocation sentence, concluding that the defendant had waived his challenges to that sentence. However, the appellate court vacated the sentence for the § 922(g)(1) conviction, holding that the district court relied on a legally invalid rationale—namely, treating 31 rounds of ammunition as an aggravating factor and referencing unsupported facts about the ammunition’s nature. The case was remanded for resentencing before a different judge. View "United States v. Rosa-Borges" on Justia Law

In 2010, the petitioner was convicted in a Massachusetts Superior Court of several offenses, including burglary and mayhem, after being identified as the assailant in an attack involving hot cooking oil. The trial was conducted without a jury, and the court sentenced her to ten to eleven years in prison. Her conviction was affirmed by the Massachusetts Appeals Court, and the Supreme Judicial Court denied further review. While serving her sentence, federal immigration authorities revoked her permanent resident status and ordered her removal from the United States. After her release from state custody in December 2021, she was detained by federal authorities and deported to Trinidad and Tobago in January 2024.Following her deportation, the petitioner exhausted her state remedies, including a motion for a new trial based on alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, which was denied by the Superior Court and affirmed by the Massachusetts Appeals Court. In March 2024, she filed a habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, naming the Massachusetts Attorney General as the respondent. She claimed her convictions resulted from ineffective assistance of counsel and challenged the state court’s handling of new evidence. The district court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, reasoning that she was not in custody, as required by federal habeas law, at the time of filing.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The First Circuit held that because the petitioner was not in the custody of any Massachusetts official when she filed her habeas petition—and did not name as respondent any official with actual custody—the federal courts lacked jurisdiction to hear her petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The court did not reach other arguments and concluded that dismissal was required. View "St. John v. Campbell" on Justia Law