Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A group of medical students attended the University of Science, Arts and Technology (USAT), an international medical school based in Montserrat. USAT was licensed in Montserrat and, for years, was listed in the International Medical Education Directory, allowing its graduates to seek U.S. medical licensure. After a volcanic eruption in 2007, USAT began offering classes online and at alternative sites in the United States and Puerto Rico. In 2018, the Educational Commission for Foreign Medical Graduates (ECFMG) changed its policy, restricting certification to students educated in the country where the school was authorized. USAT students who took courses outside Montserrat after 2018 were no longer eligible for ECFMG certification, affecting their ability to obtain U.S. medical licenses. The students alleged that USAT misrepresented its accreditation and educational legitimacy, leading them to pay substantial tuition under false pretenses.The students filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, asserting federal RICO claims, as well as Puerto Rico law claims for fraudulent inducement, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, holding that the students failed to establish a “pattern of racketeering activity” as required under RICO, and dismissed the federal claims with prejudice. The court declined to exercise jurisdiction over the Puerto Rico law claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo. The court held that the students did not present sufficient evidence of closed- or open-ended continuity to establish a pattern of racketeering activity under RICO. As a result, the First Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the RICO claim and its decision not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims. View "Pena-Torres v. University of Science, Arts and Tech" on Justia Law

During the COVID-19 pandemic, federal relief programs such as the EIDL and PPP were implemented to assist small businesses. In Puerto Rico, a scheme led by Manfred Pentzke-Lemus fraudulently obtained such loans using fabricated documents and kickbacks. Jayson Pastrana-Román, owner of a food kiosk, became involved after Pentzke contacted him and assisted with loan applications. Pastrana allowed co-conspirators to alter his documents and apply for loans in his name, resulting in approved loans and kickbacks paid to Pentzke. Pastrana also recruited his brother and friends into the scheme, relaying instructions and collecting their kickback payments, though he did not retain these funds.A federal grand jury indicted Pastrana on ten counts, including wire fraud, money laundering, and conspiracy. He initially planned to go to trial but later pleaded guilty to all counts. At sentencing in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, the court determined Pastrana acted as a "manager" in the conspiracy, applying a three-level upward adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b). The court declined to grant a reduction for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, finding his acceptance was not timely and he had not admitted to his full role as recruiter and intermediary. The court imposed a 33-month concurrent sentence for all counts, below the calculated Guidelines range.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, Pastrana challenged the sentencing enhancements and denial of the acceptance reduction. The First Circuit held the district court did not err in applying the managerial role adjustment but did clearly err in denying the reduction for acceptance of responsibility, as Pastrana had admitted relevant conduct and timely notified the government of his intent to plead guilty. The court vacated Pastrana’s sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "US v. Pastrana-Roman" on Justia Law

A psychiatrist in Massachusetts operated his own private practice and, between 2015 and 2018, submitted fraudulent bills to a range of private and public health insurers, including Medicare and several major insurance companies. The fraudulent conduct included billing for over a thousand sessions at times when either he or the purported patient was out of the country. When insurers began to scrutinize his claims and requested additional billing records, he delayed responses and provided falsified records to support his claims. Eventually, at least one insurer halted payments pending his compliance, and another made payments contingent on preauthorization. Following federal investigation, the psychiatrist was indicted and, in October 2023, convicted by a jury on fourteen out of fifteen counts related to the fraud.In the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, the sentencing judge calculated his guidelines range based on a loss amount equating to the total billed—about $19 million—which resulted in a twenty-level sentencing enhancement. He was sentenced to ninety-nine months on the main counts, with additional concurrent sentences, and was ordered to pay approximately $6.5 million in restitution and a similar amount in criminal forfeiture. The defendant challenged both the intended loss calculation used for sentencing and the restitution amount.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the appeal. The court applied a burden-shifting framework, allowing the billed amount as prima facie evidence of intended loss, and found that the defendant did not provide sufficient evidence to show he intended to obtain less than he billed, even considering his status as an in-network provider. The appellate court also rejected his argument that restitution should be offset by claims for legitimate, unpaid services, holding that such offsets are not appropriate in the context of criminal restitution. The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s decisions in all respects. View "US v. Kinrys" on Justia Law

The defendant, a Maine resident with multiple prior felony convictions, was arrested after a state trooper observed him at a gas station and detained him based on an active felony warrant. During the arrest, Levasseur admitted to possessing a hunting rifle in his truck, which was loaded, and to having methamphetamine in the vehicle. He later stated he intended to hunt deer for food, although he lacked a hunting license, and disclosed a daily methamphetamine addiction. His criminal history included three illegal firearm possession convictions and other felonies, including drug possession and bail violations.A grand jury indicted Levasseur for possessing a firearm as a felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He moved to dismiss the indictment in the United States District Court for the District of Maine, arguing the statute was unconstitutional as applied to him under the Second Amendment, referencing New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen and later United States v. Rahimi. The district court denied both his initial and renewed motions, ruling that his felony conviction for methamphetamine possession rendered him sufficiently dangerous to be disarmed under the Second Amendment, based on historical analogues of disarming categories of dangerous individuals.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court’s legal rulings de novo. The First Circuit assumed, without deciding, that the Second Amendment could apply to individuals with felony convictions and entertained Levasseur’s as-applied challenge. The court held that Levasseur failed to demonstrate error in the district court’s determination that he could constitutionally be disarmed due to posing a special danger of misusing firearms. Accordingly, the First Circuit affirmed his conviction, holding that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to him. View "US v. Levasseur" on Justia Law

Malik Parsons was indicted for his role in a drug-trafficking operation, specifically for conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute significant quantities of fentanyl and cocaine. Law enforcement surveilled an apartment in Mansfield, Massachusetts, which was not leased to either Parsons or his codefendant, but which both accessed regularly and used to store, package, and distribute drugs. The investigation included video and physical surveillance, GPS data, and searches that yielded drugs, drug paraphernalia, cash, and firearms. Parsons was not present during the final search, but evidence tied him to the apartment and its operations.Following indictment, Parsons’s codefendant pled guilty to several counts, while Parsons proceeded to trial in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. At trial, the government presented extensive evidence, including testimony from a law enforcement officer who characterized the apartment as a "stash house" used by both defendants. The jury found Parsons guilty on the conspiracy and possession counts. The court sentenced him to eighty-four months in prison, applying sentencing enhancements for firearm possession and declining a reduction for being a zero-point offender.On appeal, Parsons challenged both his conviction and sentence before the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. He argued that the district court improperly admitted a law enforcement officer’s lay opinion regarding his culpability and erred in its sentencing calculations. The First Circuit held that, even if the officer's opinion testimony was improper, any error was harmless due to the overwhelming evidence of guilt. The court also found no error in the application of the firearm enhancement or the denial of the zero-point-offender reduction, concluding there was sufficient evidence that Parsons constructively possessed the firearms. The First Circuit affirmed both the convictions and the sentence. View "US v. Parsons" on Justia Law

Jose Miguel Pena de la Cruz, a citizen of the Dominican Republic, was indicted in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts on charges related to money laundering. After being released from criminal custody on conditions set by a magistrate judge, he was taken into Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) custody. The government then informed the district court that Pena de la Cruz would soon be deported. In response, the district court, treating the government’s notice as a motion to dismiss, ordered that the indictment be dismissed with prejudice upon his deportation.Before reaching the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, the district court had issued several orders regarding ICE custody and deportation of criminal defendants, including a standing order that generally barred ICE detention or removal until a criminal case concluded through dismissal with prejudice, acquittal, or judgment. The government opposed dismissal with prejudice, arguing that there was no bad faith or prosecutorial harassment, and that dismissal under Rule 48(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure should ordinarily be without prejudice. Defense counsel initially moved for dismissal with prejudice but withdrew the motion as unripe, and the district court ultimately dismissed the indictment with prejudice after ICE notified it of the impending removal.The First Circuit vacated the district court’s order dismissing the indictment with prejudice, holding that the circumstances did not meet the high bar required for such a dismissal. The court clarified that dismissal with prejudice under Rule 48(a) is appropriate only in cases of prosecutorial bad faith, harassment, or when dismissal without prejudice would create a patent threat of unfairness to the defendant—none of which were present here. The First Circuit also vacated the district court’s standing order and its modification, remanding with instructions to dismiss the indictment without prejudice. View "US v. Pena de la Cruz" on Justia Law

The appellant participated in a drug smuggling operation, originating from Venezuela and intending to transfer cocaine to another vessel at a prearranged location off the coast of Puerto Rico. When the rendezvous failed, the vessel, carrying three individuals and over 600 kilograms of cocaine, headed toward Puerto Rico, where it was intercepted by local and federal authorities. The appellant, who admitted to being the vessel's captain, was arrested along with the others.A federal grand jury in the District of Puerto Rico indicted the appellant on four drug trafficking counts. He pleaded guilty to all charges without a plea agreement. The United States Probation Office prepared a presentence report, applying a sentencing enhancement for his role as captain and recommending other adjustments. The government and the appellant filed sentencing memoranda, with the government supporting a sentence of 135 months and the appellant requesting 84 months and raising objections to the captain enhancement and the lack of a minor participant reduction. The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico imposed a 135-month sentence and five years of supervised release, accepting the government’s recommendations. The appellant appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the procedural and substantive reasonableness of the sentence. It upheld the application of the captain enhancement, finding no error in the district court’s interpretation of the relevant guidelines. However, the government conceded, and the court agreed, that the district court should reconsider the denial of a minor participant role adjustment in light of recent First Circuit decisions. The court also rejected the appellant’s claims regarding sentencing disparities and failure to consider mitigating factors. The First Circuit affirmed the sentence in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings on the minor participant issue. View "US v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

A police officer in Puerto Rico was convicted after accepting a bribe from a woman he had arrested for marijuana possession. The officer promised to help the woman avoid a criminal conviction in exchange for sex. The woman, a young assistant nurse studying to become a full-time nurse, feared that a conviction would jeopardize her career. After her arrest, she met with the officer, who suggested that he could get her case dismissed if she provided sexual favors. She agreed, and they had sex, but the officer did not deliver on his promise. The woman subsequently faced multiple court appearances, hired a private attorney, and ultimately pleaded guilty, incurring various costs and emotional distress.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico presided over the trial, during which the jury convicted the officer of violating 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B), which prohibits government officials from accepting bribes in connection with business or transactions involving $5,000 or more. The defendant moved for acquittal, arguing that the government failed to prove the value of the "business" or "transaction" exceeded $5,000. The district court denied the motion. On appeal, the defendant challenged both the sufficiency of the evidence regarding the $5,000 threshold and an alleged violation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination due to statements by the prosecution during closing argument.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the conviction. The court held that the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that the value of avoiding a criminal conviction—considering the woman’s career prospects, legal expenses, fines, and her own testimony—exceeded $5,000. The court also found no clear or obvious error in the prosecution’s closing argument regarding the defendant’s decision not to testify. The conviction was affirmed. View "US v. Velez-Ramirez" on Justia Law

The appellant was convicted in the 1990s for bank and armored car robberies committed with a group that included Anthony Shea. These crimes involved frequent use of firearms, and in one particularly violent incident, two armored car guards were killed execution-style. The convictions included armed bank robbery, carjacking, Hobbs Act robbery and conspiracy, gun possession by a felon or drug user, and aiding and abetting the use of a firearm during a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The trial judge instructed the jury that several offenses were “crimes of violence” for the gun-use charge, but the verdict form did not specify which predicate offense the jury relied upon.Following his conviction, the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire sentenced him to life imprisonment, applying enhancements under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) based on prior convictions. After the Supreme Court in Johnson v. United States struck down ACCA’s residual clause, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit allowed the appellant to file a successive habeas petition. The district court subsequently vacated the ACCA-enhanced sentence and imposed a lower term, but declined to grant a full resentencing or to vacate the § 924(c) conviction, reasoning that the jury instruction error was harmless because valid predicate offenses remained.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the denial of § 2255 relief de novo and for harmless error. It held that the district court's reliance on the harmless-error standard was correct and that the error in instructing on an invalid predicate offense did not have a substantial and injurious effect on the jury’s verdict, given the interrelated and coextensive nature of the valid and invalid predicates. The court further held that the appellant was not entitled to a certificate of appealability or to a full resentencing, as no substantial constitutional claim was raised regarding the district court’s choice of remedy. The judgment was affirmed and the request for a certificate of appealability denied. View "McDonald v. US" on Justia Law

A correctional officer participated in a "forced cell move" at a federal medical facility, where a mentally ill and physically frail inmate, KT, was handcuffed behind his back. During the incident, the officer, equipped with a shield, entered the cell at high speed and struck KT in the chin and face, causing him to fall backward and suffer serious head and facial injuries. The event was captured on video. Prior to this, KT had spat on staff, including the officer, but was not threatening or aggressive at the time the force was used.The officer was indicted in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts on two counts of deprivation of rights under color of law. At the first jury trial, he was acquitted on one count, while the jury hung on the count concerning the shield strike, leading to a retrial. In the second trial, the district court excluded a training video the defense sought to introduce, finding it irrelevant and more prejudicial than probative, particularly since the circumstances in the video were materially different from those at issue. The jury convicted the officer on the remaining count. The district court denied post-trial motions and imposed a sentence of imprisonment and supervised release.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, the officer challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, jury instructions, exclusion of the training video, and certain testimonial evidence, also alleging cumulative error. The First Circuit held that sufficient evidence supported the jury's finding that the officer acted maliciously and sadistically, violating the inmate's Eighth Amendment rights and meeting the willfulness standard under 18 U.S.C. § 242. The court found no error in the exclusion of the video, the jury instructions, or the evidentiary rulings, and determined that no cumulative error occurred. The conviction was affirmed. View "US v. Bourget" on Justia Law