Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In this case, the defendant completed a federal prison sentence for a prior firearm conviction and then began supervised release. During this supervised period, he was found in possession of a firearm and ammunition, which led to the initiation of revocation proceedings for violating the terms of his supervised release. Shortly thereafter, a search of his residence yielded additional ammunition. These events resulted in new criminal charges for possession of a firearm by a prohibited person under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The defendant pleaded guilty to the new charge pursuant to a plea agreement and also faced sentencing for the supervised release violations.Previously, the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico sentenced the defendant both for the new § 922(g)(1) offense and for the supervised release violations. The defendant appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit (in United States v. Rosa-Borges, 101 F.4th 66 (1st Cir. 2024)) vacated both sentences, finding that the district court had improperly relied on unreliable hearsay from the presentence report. On remand, the district court refused to strike the problematic information from the presentence report but stated it would not rely on it, then reimposed an upwardly variant sentence for the new firearm offense, in part based on the amount and nature of the ammunition. For the supervised release violation, the court imposed a consecutive sentence, finding a Grade A violation.Upon the second appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the revocation sentence, concluding that the defendant had waived his challenges to that sentence. However, the appellate court vacated the sentence for the § 922(g)(1) conviction, holding that the district court relied on a legally invalid rationale—namely, treating 31 rounds of ammunition as an aggravating factor and referencing unsupported facts about the ammunition’s nature. The case was remanded for resentencing before a different judge. View "United States v. Rosa-Borges" on Justia Law

In 2010, the petitioner was convicted in a Massachusetts Superior Court of several offenses, including burglary and mayhem, after being identified as the assailant in an attack involving hot cooking oil. The trial was conducted without a jury, and the court sentenced her to ten to eleven years in prison. Her conviction was affirmed by the Massachusetts Appeals Court, and the Supreme Judicial Court denied further review. While serving her sentence, federal immigration authorities revoked her permanent resident status and ordered her removal from the United States. After her release from state custody in December 2021, she was detained by federal authorities and deported to Trinidad and Tobago in January 2024.Following her deportation, the petitioner exhausted her state remedies, including a motion for a new trial based on alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, which was denied by the Superior Court and affirmed by the Massachusetts Appeals Court. In March 2024, she filed a habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, naming the Massachusetts Attorney General as the respondent. She claimed her convictions resulted from ineffective assistance of counsel and challenged the state court’s handling of new evidence. The district court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, reasoning that she was not in custody, as required by federal habeas law, at the time of filing.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The First Circuit held that because the petitioner was not in the custody of any Massachusetts official when she filed her habeas petition—and did not name as respondent any official with actual custody—the federal courts lacked jurisdiction to hear her petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The court did not reach other arguments and concluded that dismissal was required. View "St. John v. Campbell" on Justia Law

From December 2019 through May 2021, an individual incarcerated at the Buckingham Correctional Center in Virginia conspired with others, including two Massachusetts-based drug traffickers and a correctional officer, to distribute controlled substances—specifically MDMA and buprenorphine—inside the facility. The proceeds from these transactions were then collected and managed by the group. A federal grand jury in the District of Massachusetts indicted the defendant on charges of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute controlled substances, and conspiracy to commit money laundering. The defendant pled guilty to both charges.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts received a presentence investigation report that classified the defendant as a “career offender” under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, based on two prior Virginia felony convictions: use of a firearm in the commission of a robbery and attempted murder. The report also found that the instant conviction for conspiracy to distribute controlled substances qualified as a “controlled substance offense.” The defendant objected, arguing that the firearm conviction was not a “crime of violence” under the Guidelines and that conspiracy to distribute drugs was not a “controlled substance offense.” The district court rejected both arguments and imposed a 121-month sentence.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the classification of the prior Virginia firearm conviction and the instant drug conspiracy conviction. The court held that the Virginia conviction for use of a firearm in the commission of a robbery qualified as a “crime of violence” under both the enumerated offenses clause and the force clause of the Guidelines. It also held that conspiracy to distribute controlled substances is a “controlled substance offense” under binding First Circuit precedent, finding no basis to depart from this view despite arguments regarding inter-circuit disagreement and recent Supreme Court decisions. The First Circuit affirmed the sentence. View "US v. Mao" on Justia Law

Arthur Miles was sentenced to a total of 300 months’ imprisonment following two separate federal convictions. After his first sentencing in October 2022, Miles was housed at the Marion County Jail in Indiana for fifteen months—some of this time was before and some after his second federal sentencing. During his time at the county jail, Miles worked as an orderly. He later argued that under the First Step Act of 2018 (“FSA”), he was entitled to earn time credits for this work, which could reduce his sentence, because his federal sentence had commenced and the work was equivalent to an evidence-based recidivism reduction (“EBRR”) program.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts reviewed Miles’s habeas petition after a magistrate judge recommended denying the Bureau of Prisons’ (BOP) motion to dismiss. The magistrate judge found that BOP regulations preventing prisoners from earning FSA credits until they arrived at a federal facility conflicted with the FSA’s language. The district court, however, rejected this recommendation and dismissed Miles’s petition, holding that the BOP’s rules did not violate the FSA.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the BOP’s regulation, which delayed the accrual of FSA time credits until a prisoner’s arrival at a federal facility, was invalid because it conflicted with the statutory definition of when a sentence commences. The court further held that a risk and needs assessment is not a prerequisite for earning FSA credits, and that prisoners may earn credits for qualifying programming—such as work as an orderly—performed after sentencing even while housed in non-federal facilities. The court vacated the dismissal of Miles’s habeas petition and remanded for further proceedings to determine his entitlement to credits for his time at the county jail. View "Miles v. Bowers" on Justia Law

The case involves a Massachusetts psychiatrist who owned and operated a clinic providing treatment for addiction with imported drugs. The drugs included naltrexone and disulfiram in forms not approved by the FDA for use in the United States. The shipments were brought in from Hong Kong and falsely described on import documents as “plastic beads in plastic tubes,” with their value understated. The government charged the defendant with several crimes, including international money laundering, unlawful importation of merchandise, and receipt and delivery of misbranded drugs. The jury found the defendant guilty on some counts but acquitted him on others, including all counts against his wife.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts conducted the trial. After the jury’s verdict, the court sentenced the defendant to 36 months’ imprisonment on each count, to be served concurrently, and calculated the sentence using the fraud guideline in the United States Sentencing Guidelines. The defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in its evidentiary rulings, in admitting or excluding certain testimony, and in its application of the Sentencing Guidelines.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the defendant’s convictions, finding no reversible error in the district court’s evidentiary decisions or in its exclusion of expert testimony. The appellate court vacated the sentence for the misdemeanor misbranding conviction because it exceeded the statutory maximum. The court retained jurisdiction over the appeal and remanded to the district court for clarification regarding the application of the fraud guideline, specifically instructing the lower court to explain the basis for its use of that guideline and to address the impact of recent amendments related to acquitted conduct. View "US v. Shafa" on Justia Law

The defendant, who immigrated to the United States from Vietnam, operated a staffing agency that provided temporary laborers to various clients in Massachusetts. She managed most of the agency’s operations, including payroll, and worked closely with her daughter, who had accounting training. Between 2015 and 2019, the defendant withdrew over $3.7 million in cash from business accounts, frequently in increments just below the $10,000 federal reporting threshold, and used this cash to pay workers. Evidence at trial showed that the agency paid employees additional cash wages not reported to tax authorities, resulting in unpaid employment taxes and underreported payroll to the company’s workers’ compensation insurer, which led to lower insurance premiums.A federal grand jury in the District of Massachusetts indicted the defendant on four counts of failing to collect or pay employment taxes and one count of mail fraud. After a jury trial, she was convicted on all counts and sentenced to eighteen months’ imprisonment and two years of supervised release. She appealed, challenging the admission of evidence regarding the structuring of cash withdrawals, the district court’s refusal to give a jury instruction on implicit bias, the instructions related to tax obligations and good faith, and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the mail fraud conviction.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the convictions. The court held that evidence about the structuring of cash withdrawals was properly admitted as intrinsic to the charged offenses and relevant to intent. The refusal to instruct on implicit bias was not an error because the district court’s voir dire and instructions substantially covered the issue. The court found no reversible error in the jury instructions regarding tax law and good faith, and concluded that any error was harmless. Finally, the evidence of mail fraud was found sufficient, as it was reasonably foreseeable that the mail would be used in the insurance audit process. View "US v. Giang" on Justia Law

In this case, four police officers in Puerto Rico pursued two young men suspected of engaging in a drug deal. One officer shot 17-year-old Calep Carvajal in the back as he fled on a bicycle. Defendant José Cartagena apprehended and handcuffed Carvajal, and was accused of pistol-whipping him while he was on the ground. Additional assaults allegedly occurred during and after transport to the police station. Cartagena later filed a false report about the incident and lied to a juvenile prosecutor about Carvajal’s injuries. Federal charges were brought under various statutes, including civil rights violations and obstruction of justice.After a grand jury indictment, three officers pleaded guilty. Cartagena initially entered a plea but withdrew it and went to trial in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico. He was convicted by a jury on all counts and sentenced to concurrent prison terms. On appeal, he challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and asserted that his Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights were violated when the prosecution introduced a hearsay statement from the victim, who was not available for cross-examination.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. It found the evidence sufficient to support convictions on most counts but determined that the admission of the victim’s testimonial hearsay statement, offered through a government medical expert, violated Cartagena’s Confrontation Clause rights as to the count involving the alleged pistol-whipping during the arrest. The court vacated the conviction on that count, affirmed the convictions on the other counts, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "US v. Cartagena" on Justia Law

After police executed a search warrant at an apartment in San Juan, Puerto Rico, where Heclouis Joel Nieves-Díaz was residing, they found drugs, ammunition, and a machine gun conversion device. Nieves, who was on supervised release for a previous federal drug conviction, pleaded guilty to federal charges including being a felon in possession of ammunition, illegal possession of a machine gun conversion device, and possession with intent to distribute cocaine.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico initially sentenced Nieves to eighty-four months' imprisonment, applying a four-level enhancement for using or possessing ammunition in connection with another felony. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated that sentence, finding the enhancement inapplicable. On remand, the district court recalculated the guidelines range and resentenced Nieves to sixty-six months—twenty-five months above the top of the new Guidelines range—based on an upward variance. The court justified the variance by citing Nieves’s criminal history, the quantity of ammunition, and the prevalence of gun violence in Puerto Rico.Nieves appealed again, arguing that the district court failed to adequately explain the upward variance, particularly regarding the significance of the ammunition in the absence of a firearm. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the district court’s explanation for the variance was insufficient, especially in not addressing Nieves’s argument about the lack of a firearm. The court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing, clarifying that while the district court could consider Nieves’s criminal history and community factors, it must provide a more specific explanation if it imposes an upward variance based on the quantity of ammunition. The appellate court declined to limit the sentence on remand or order reassignment to a different judge. View "US v. Nieves-Diaz" on Justia Law

A man sought to contest the forfeiture of a boat, claiming he was its rightful owner. The boat had been seized and made subject to forfeiture following his brother’s guilty plea to a federal drug conspiracy that began in May 2019. The man submitted a pro se petition in federal district court, asserting under penalty of perjury that he was the sole and rightful owner of the boat at the time it was seized. He attached several documents, all in Spanish, which he described as evidence of ownership and title. Later, with counsel, he provided additional documents purporting to show that he acquired the boat in 2017.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico had issued a preliminary order of forfeiture following the brother’s plea. After the man’s petition, the government moved to dismiss, arguing that the petition failed to allege when and how the man acquired his interest in the boat, as required by statute. The district court granted the government’s motion to dismiss without a hearing and entered a final order of forfeiture. The man appealed, arguing that his submissions sufficed or, alternatively, that he should have been allowed to amend his petition.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It held that the man’s petition did not satisfy the statutory requirement to state the time and circumstances of his acquisition of the boat, and that untranslated documents could not be considered. However, the appellate court found that the district court did not address the alternative request for leave to amend, and the reasons for denial were not apparent from the record. The First Circuit vacated the denial of the petition and remanded for further proceedings, directing the district court to consider the request to amend in light of the liberal construction required by statute. View "US v. Calderin-Pascual" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who, after previously being convicted of possessing child pornography and serving a prison sentence followed by supervised release, was found during his supervision with additional devices containing child sexual abuse material (CSAM). The defendant, Kevin Lee Ross, was subject to conditions including restrictions on his internet use, device monitoring, and random searches. During his term of supervised release, a tip from his brother led probation officers to search his residence and vehicle, where they discovered a cell phone, laptop, and external hard drive, all containing a large quantity of CSAM. Ross denied knowledge of the devices and their contents.A grand jury in the United States District Court for the District of Maine indicted Ross for possessing child pornography across three devices. At trial, Ross stipulated that certain exhibits contained child pornography as legally defined. Despite this, the government introduced and published nine representative exhibits to the jury and had a special agent describe their contents. Ross objected, arguing that, due to the stipulation, displaying the images and providing descriptions was unfairly prejudicial under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. The district court overruled his objections, relying on precedent that allows the government to present its evidence even where a defendant is willing to stipulate to certain elements. The jury convicted Ross.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, Ross argued that the district court abused its discretion by allowing the publication and description of the CSAM exhibits in light of the stipulation. The First Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion, finding that the evidence remained probative to issues of possession and knowledge, especially since Ross denied knowing the contents of the devices. The court affirmed Ross’s conviction. View "US v. Ross" on Justia Law