Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In September 2022, police received a tip that the defendant was armed on the roof of a public housing building. When officers arrived and announced themselves, the defendant jumped off the roof and was found injured. He informed police that he had three firearms on the roof, where officers subsequently recovered two Glock pistols modified to fire automatically, a tactical rifle, a micro conversion kit, multiple magazines—including high-capacity ones—and 279 rounds of ammunition. At the time, the defendant was on supervised release for a prior firearm-possession conviction.The defendant pled guilty in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico to possessing machine guns and being a felon in possession of firearms and ammunition. The district court calculated an advisory guidelines range of sixty-three to seventy-eight months based on the total offense level and criminal history. The defendant requested a sentence at the bottom of the range, citing improved mental health and questioning the evidence, while the government requested a sentence at the top of the range due to the defendant’s criminal history and the quantity and type of weapons and ammunition possessed. The district court imposed a ninety-six-month sentence, an eighteen-month upward variance, citing the dangerousness of the weapons, the large cache of ammunition, the defendant’s prior conviction, his commission of the offense while on supervised release, and his active surveillance of the rooftop.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, the defendant argued his sentence was procedurally and substantively unreasonable and that the government breached the plea agreement by defending the upward variance. The First Circuit held that the district court adequately explained its reasons for the upward variance, properly considered aggravating factors not captured by the guidelines, and did not abuse its discretion. The court also found no breach of the plea agreement. The judgment was affirmed. View "United States v. Maldonado-Velazquez" on Justia Law

After serving time for a federal drug trafficking conviction, the defendant entered a residential re-entry program as ordered by the court. On November 2, 2023, while returning from an approved work pass, a drive-by shooting occurred near the facility. The defendant fled and later told staff he would return, but did not. Nearly two months later, U.S. Marshals arrested him at a residence where they found a Glock pistol modified to function as a machine gun, seven magazines (five high capacity), and 152 rounds of nine-millimeter ammunition. The defendant pled guilty to escaping from the re-entry program and to being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico calculated a guideline range of 33 to 41 months’ imprisonment. The defendant requested a sentence at the low end of the range, citing compliance prior to escape and his acceptance of responsibility. The government sought the high end, emphasizing the escape and the significant quantity and nature of the firearm and ammunition found. The court determined that the guideline range did not adequately reflect the seriousness of the offenses, or promote respect for the law and deterrence, and imposed two concurrent sentences of 60 months—an upward variance of 19 months above the guideline range.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the procedural and substantive reasonableness of the sentence. Applying plain error review to the procedural challenge, the court found that the district court adequately justified the upward variance based on the specific facts: the modified pistol and large amount of ammunition and magazines. For substantive reasonableness, reviewed for abuse of discretion, the appellate court held that these aggravating factors legitimately distinguished the case from typical guideline cases. The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and sentence. View "United States v. Del-Valle-Camacho" on Justia Law

Marcus Mello was charged with multiple offenses in connection with drug trafficking activities in Maine, including distributing pills purported to be oxycodone but containing fentanyl, possession with intent to distribute fentanyl, possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking, and later, failing to appear for his scheduled jury trial. The investigation linked Mello to a supplier named "Chop" and documented several large shipments of pills, some of which were sold to individuals, one of whom subsequently died from fentanyl toxicity. Law enforcement seized thousands of pills, a firearm, and cash during Mello’s arrest, and communications confirmed ongoing drug transactions over several months.Following his indictment in the United States District Court for the District of Maine, Mello pleaded guilty to all charges. At sentencing, the district court calculated a Guidelines range of 228-270 months, based on drug quantity, criminal history (including juvenile adjudications), and enhancements for obstruction of justice due to his failure to appear. The court denied Mello’s requests for downward departures related to age, mental health, and overrepresentation of criminal history, and also denied a reduction for acceptance of responsibility. After considering the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the court varied downward and sentenced Mello to a total of 181 months’ imprisonment.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, Mello challenged his sentence on both procedural and substantive grounds. The First Circuit reviewed the district court’s factual findings and legal conclusions for clear error and abuse of discretion, and procedural rulings de novo. The appellate court held that the district court had not erred in its drug quantity calculation, consideration of juvenile adjudications, application of enhancements and denials of reductions, or its refusal to depart further from the Guidelines. The First Circuit concluded that the sentence was both procedurally and substantively reasonable and affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Mello" on Justia Law

Marilyn Besosa-Noceda moved from Puerto Rico to Texas with her daughter, whose biological father, Emmanuel Santiago-Melendez, objected to the relocation and subsequently filed criminal charges against Besosa, alleging she deprived him of access to his child. Santiago’s complaint led to Besosa’s arrest in Texas and extradition to Puerto Rico. Ultimately, the criminal charges were dismissed after Besosa demonstrated a lack of probable cause.After the dismissal, Besosa filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico against the police officer who received Santiago’s complaint, the prosecutor who authorized the criminal charges, and the prosecutor’s supervisor. She alleged malicious prosecution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Commonwealth law, claiming her constitutional rights were violated by the initiation of legal process unsupported by probable cause. The defendants moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted. The court found the arrest warrant was issued by a judge based on probable cause and was not obtained through false statements or omissions. The district court also rejected Besosa’s claim that her absence from the probable cause hearings violated her rights, finding no entitlement under Commonwealth law to be present at such hearings.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed Besosa’s arguments, including a challenge to an unresolved discovery dispute and the merits of the summary judgment ruling. The First Circuit held that Besosa failed to invoke the proper procedural mechanism to delay summary judgment pending discovery and that she did not present evidence showing the defendants knowingly provided false information or recklessly disregarded the truth when seeking the arrest warrant. The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the defendants. View "Besosa-Noceda v. Capo-Rivera" on Justia Law

In this case, the petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder and robbery for an offense committed at age 17, resulting in a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without parole under Massachusetts law. Decades later, following developments in constitutional law, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that life-without-parole sentences for juveniles were unconstitutional and ordered that such sentences be modified to life with the possibility of parole. As a result, the petitioner’s sentence was changed; he became parole eligible, was granted parole, and was released.After this modification, the petitioner sought to file a second habeas corpus petition in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts ruled that this petition was “second or successive” under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) and thus subject to its “gatekeeping” requirements, concluding that the addition of parole eligibility did not constitute a new judgment for purposes of federal habeas law.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed de novo whether the sentence modification constituted a new judgment. The court held that the change from life without parole to life with parole eligibility was a material change, making the sentence a new judgment under federal law. The court reasoned that, because the petitioner’s current custody was authorized by this new judgment, his second-in-time habeas petition did not trigger the restrictions of § 2244(b).Therefore, the First Circuit reversed the district court’s decision, holding that the petitioner need not obtain pre-authorization to file his habeas petition, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Donovan v. Massachusetts Parole Board" on Justia Law

A political news producer in Puerto Rico contacted a senior government official, warning that the son of the Treasury Secretary possessed damaging chat messages about the administration and might release them unless political attacks on his father ceased. The producer and the official met twice; the producer described a binder of messages and relayed demands for $300,000, renewal of two government contracts, and payments to media personalities in exchange for withholding the chats and favorable coverage. After the chats were leaked, resulting in political turmoil and resignations, the official became a confidential FBI source, recorded a second meeting, and collaborated with agents. The producer later deleted relevant messaging records from the official's phone during an FBI interview.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico held a jury trial. The jury convicted the producer on three counts: attempted extortion under the Hobbs Act (18 U.S.C. § 1951), transmitting a threatening communication with intent to extort (18 U.S.C. § 875(d)), and destruction of records in a federal investigation (18 U.S.C. § 1519). The defendant moved for acquittal and a new trial, arguing insufficient evidence, prosecutorial misconduct, and errors in jury instructions. The district court denied these motions and sentenced him to fifty-one months in prison.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed sufficiency of the evidence and the alleged procedural errors. It held that the evidence was sufficient for all counts, including proof of wrongful threats and intent to extort, and that the government did not commit prosecutorial misconduct or Brady violations. The court found no reversible error in the jury instructions or limitations on cross-examination and affirmed the convictions in full. View "United States v. Diaz-Colon" on Justia Law

Two Massachusetts State Police officers, Lieutenant Daniel Griffin and Sergeant William Robertson, were implicated in a years-long scheme involving fraudulent overtime billing between 2015 and 2017. Both routinely claimed pay for hours they did not work, either by arriving late, leaving early, or “double-dipping” by billing overtime for tasks performed during regular hours. They also encouraged subordinates to engage in the same practices. The overtime funds in question were supplied through federal grants meant to support highway safety initiatives. In addition to the overtime fraud, Griffin separately engaged in wire fraud relating to private school financial aid and tax fraud connected to a private security business.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts presided over a jury trial, which resulted in convictions for both defendants on all counts related to wire fraud, theft of federal funds, and conspiracy. Griffin pled guilty to additional charges of wire fraud and tax falsification before trial. Sentences were imposed: Griffin received 60 months’ imprisonment, three years’ supervised release, substantial restitution, and forfeiture; Robertson received 36 months’ imprisonment, three years’ supervised release, joint and several liability for restitution, and forfeiture.Upon appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, the court reviewed a broad array of challenges. The First Circuit largely affirmed the convictions, sentences, and restitution orders. It found no reversible error in the district court’s handling of the constitutional challenge, sufficiency of the evidence, guidelines calculations, sentencing disparities, and restitution. However, the Circuit Court vacated and remanded the forfeiture order against Griffin, holding that the government failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the full amount of financial aid received was “traceable to” fraud, as required by statute. All other aspects of the district court’s judgment were affirmed. View "United States v. Robertson" on Justia Law

A man was indicted for unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition by a felon after Boston police discovered a loaded pistol under the front passenger seat of a car in which he was seated. The discovery occurred shortly after a drive-by shooting in the area, though later evidence showed the car was not involved in the shooting. Video evidence and police testimony established that the man exclusively occupied the front passenger seat from the time the car arrived at a market until the stop, wore a latex glove on his right hand, and repeatedly bent toward the floor mat area where the pistol was found. No fingerprints were found on the firearm, magazine, or ammunition.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts denied the defendant’s motions for judgment of acquittal and for a new trial. The motions argued the evidence was insufficient to prove possession and that the government’s references to the nearby shooting were prejudicial. The court found that, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, the circumstantial evidence—including the glove, the exclusive control over the seat, and his actions toward the floor—was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find constructive possession beyond a reasonable doubt.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the evidence supported the jury’s verdict of constructive possession under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The appellate court affirmed that the district court correctly denied both the judgment of acquittal and the new trial motion, finding no miscarriage of justice or erroneous result. The court also affirmed the revocation of the defendant’s supervised release, as the evidence met the preponderance standard. The convictions and the revocation of supervised release were affirmed. View "United States v. Abercrombie" on Justia Law

In March 1997, James Garrey was involved in a fatal altercation at a bar in Franklin, Massachusetts, where he stabbed and killed Corey Skog following a dispute. Garrey, who is white, was later convicted of first-degree murder by a Massachusetts jury and sentenced to life imprisonment. During jury selection, the prosecution exercised a peremptory strike to remove a minority-race juror, Juror 6-7. Garrey objected, arguing the strike was improper and motivated by race, referencing Batson v. Kentucky and Powers v. Ohio. The trial judge allowed the strike after the prosecutor cited the juror’s occupation as a guidance counselor as the reason, not her race.Garrey appealed his conviction to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC), asserting that the trial judge erred by accepting the prosecutor’s justification and by referencing the lack of minority participants in the trial. The SJC affirmed the conviction, finding the prosecutor’s explanation sufficient and not pretextual, and that the trial judge did not improperly rely on racial considerations. Garrey’s subsequent motions for a new trial in state court were denied.He then petitioned the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, alleging Batson and Powers errors and unreasonable factual findings by the SJC. The District Court denied relief, concluding the SJC’s application of federal law and findings were not unreasonable.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the District Court. The First Circuit held that the SJC did not unreasonably determine the facts or misapply clearly established federal law under Batson or Powers, and found the prosecutor’s rationale and the trial court’s process constitutionally sufficient. The judgment denying habeas relief was affirmed. View "Garrey v. Kelly" on Justia Law

The case concerns an engineer who worked for a microchip design company. While employed, he downloaded proprietary design files, including a file for a microchip known as the HMC1022A, and retained them after leaving his employer. Shortly after his departure, he started a competing business that marketed and sold microchips bearing strong similarities to his former employer’s products, using some of the appropriated design files in the manufacturing process. He concealed the origins of these files by renaming them and sought to keep his new business secret from his former employer.A federal grand jury indicted him on a range of charges, including possession of stolen trade secrets, wire fraud, export violations, visa fraud, and unlawful procurement of citizenship. The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts presided over the jury trial. The defendant was convicted on only one count: unlawful possession of a trade secret, specifically the design layout and GDS file for the HMC1022A microchip. He was acquitted of all other charges, and the court dismissed related charges against his business partner and spouse. Post-trial, the defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing selective enforcement and prosecution on the basis of his Chinese ethnicity, but the district court denied these motions.Upon review, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the conviction. The court held that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the file in question was both a trade secret and that the defendant knew it to be so. The court also affirmed the district court’s rejection of the selective prosecution and enforcement claims, determining that the defendant had not shown similarly situated individuals of a different race were treated differently, nor that the investigation or prosecution was motivated by discriminatory purpose. The conviction and sentence were therefore upheld. View "United States v. Yu" on Justia Law