Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Criminal Law
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A medical device company that manufactures spinal devices was indicted, along with its CEO and CFO, for allegedly paying bribes to surgeons through a sham consulting program in violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute. The indictment claimed the surgeons did not provide bona fide consulting services, but were paid to use and order the company’s devices in surgeries covered by federal health care programs. The company’s CFO, who is not a shareholder but is one of only two officers, allegedly calculated these payments based on the volume and value of surgeries performed with the company’s devices. During the development of the consulting program, the company retained outside counsel to provide legal opinions on the agreements’ compliance with health care law, and those opinions were distributed to the surgeons.After the grand jury returned the indictment, the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts addressed whether the CFO’s plan to argue at trial that the involvement of outside counsel negated his criminal intent would effect an implied waiver of the company’s attorney-client privilege. The district court initially found that if the CFO or CEO invoked an “involvement-of-counsel” defense, it would waive the corporation’s privilege over communications with counsel. Following dismissal of charges against the company, the district court focused on whether the officers collectively could waive the privilege, concluded they could, and ruled that the CFO’s planned defense would constitute an implied waiver, allowing disclosure of certain privileged communications to the government. The district court stayed its order pending appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated the district court’s waiver order and remanded. The Court of Appeals held that (1) the record was insufficient to determine whether the CFO alone had authority to waive the company’s privilege, and (2) not every involvement-of-counsel defense necessitates a waiver. The appellate court directed the district court to reassess the issue in light of changed circumstances and to consider less intrusive remedies before finding an implied waiver. View "United States v. SpineFrontier, Inc." on Justia Law

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The defendant participated in two robberies of massage businesses in Massachusetts, roughly an hour apart, alongside two co-defendants. During both incidents, firearms were displayed and used to intimidate victims, and in the course of the robberies, the victims were physically restrained and money and phones were stolen. After the crimes, the defendant was apprehended, and the investigation linked him and his co-defendants to the robberies through various forms of evidence, including testimony from an accomplice and the victims.Following his arrest, the defendant pled guilty in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts to two counts of Hobbs Act robbery and aiding and abetting. At sentencing, the district court applied enhancements to his guideline offense level based on findings that firearms were possessed and otherwise used during the robberies, and that the use of firearms by the co-defendants was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant. The court relied on the presentence investigation report, testimony from a co-defendant’s trial over which the same judge presided, and other evidence. The defendant objected to the enhancements, arguing the government had not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that use of firearms was foreseeable and that the weapons were real firearms as defined by the guidelines.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the appeal, applying an abuse of discretion standard to procedural challenges and clear error to factual findings. The court held that the district court did not clearly err in finding it was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant that firearms would be possessed and otherwise used during the robberies, nor in concluding that real firearms were involved. The court found the evidence sufficient to support both enhancements and affirmed the defendant’s 78-month sentence. View "United States v. Tang" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Federal law enforcement agents, posing as a 14-year-old girl named "Rolianas," engaged in online communications with the defendant, who responded to an ad the agents posted on a casual encounters section of Craigslist. Over a series of emails, texts, and phone calls spanning several days, the defendant initiated and sustained contact, despite being told early in the exchange that "Rolianas" was 14. He sent sexually suggestive messages and photos and made plans to meet, including discussions of sexual activity and bringing condoms.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico conducted a jury trial, where the defendant was convicted of attempted transportation of a minor for criminal sexual activity under 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a) but acquitted of attempted sexual enticement of a minor under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). The defendant requested a jury instruction on the entrapment defense, arguing that the government induced him to commit the offense. The district judge denied that request, concluding that the defendant had not met the threshold of producing evidence of both government inducement and lack of predisposition.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed de novo whether the district court erred in refusing the entrapment instruction. The court found that the government’s conduct did not rise to the level of inducement, as the agents merely provided an opportunity for the defendant to commit the crime, and the defendant pursued the illegal activity after being informed of the purported minor’s age. The court held that the evidence did not support the defense of entrapment and affirmed the conviction, concluding that the district judge properly denied the entrapment instruction. View "United States v. Medina-Ortiz" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Craig Medoff, after a history of violating federal securities laws and failing to comply with prior court orders and penalties, was subject to a 2016 consent judgment in the District of Massachusetts that barred him and any entity he controlled from participating in the issuance, offer, or sale of any security for ten years. Despite this, Medoff continued to control Nova Capital International LLC and engaged in securities-related activities, using an alias and receiving substantial fees in violation of the judgment. The SEC initiated civil contempt proceedings, but the district court, concerned about the futility of further civil sanctions given Medoff’s history and financial situation, instead initiated criminal contempt proceedings under 18 U.S.C. § 401(3) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42(a).The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts appointed the U.S. Attorney to prosecute the criminal contempt case. Medoff’s counsel moved for the judge’s recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), arguing that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned due to his comments and conduct during the proceedings. The district court denied the recusal motion, finding no reasonable basis for doubting its impartiality, and proceeded with the criminal case. Medoff ultimately pleaded guilty to criminal contempt and was sentenced to twenty months in prison, a variance above the guideline range, and thirty-six months of supervised release, along with a fine.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, Medoff challenged the denial of the recusal motion and the reasonableness of his sentence. The First Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying recusal, as the judge’s actions did not display deep-seated antagonism or favoritism. The court also found the sentence both procedurally and substantively reasonable, affirming the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Medoff" on Justia Law

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Gerardo Martinez was convicted of first-degree murder in Rhode Island for the 2005 killing of Lindsay Ann Burke, with evidence at trial showing a troubled relationship and a violent altercation that ended in Lindsay’s death by stabbing. Martinez’s defense attorney, Mark Smith, obtained a PTSD diagnosis from a forensic psychiatrist but chose not to present this expert testimony at trial. Instead, Smith argued that Martinez lacked premeditation and should be convicted of second-degree murder. The jury found Martinez guilty of first-degree murder, and he was sentenced to life without parole. On direct appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence.Martinez then sought post-conviction relief in the Rhode Island Superior Court, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel for Smith’s decision not to present the PTSD-based diminished capacity defense at trial. After a three-day evidentiary hearing, the Superior Court found that Smith’s choices were strategic and not constitutionally deficient, and therefore did not address the issue of prejudice. The Rhode Island Supreme Court denied Martinez’s petition for writ of certiorari. Martinez subsequently filed a federal habeas petition in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island, which was dismissed, but a certificate of appealability was granted.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed whether the Rhode Island court’s denial of post-conviction relief was an “unreasonable application” of Strickland v. Washington under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The First Circuit held that the state court’s decision was reasonable, emphasizing the strategic nature of Smith’s choices and the deference required under federal habeas review. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Martinez’s habeas petition, finding no constitutional deficiency in counsel’s performance. View "Martinez v. Salisbury" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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In this case, the defendant was involved in a Boston-based drug trafficking organization that distributed fentanyl from March 2020 to March 2021. He played a leadership role, coordinating large drug sales and organizing the movement of proceeds to Mexico, where he resided for much of the relevant period. The organization operated out of a specific apartment, used vehicles with hidden compartments to transport drugs and cash, and relied on encrypted communications. Law enforcement conducted extensive surveillance, culminating in searches and seizures of drugs, cash, and related paraphernalia. The defendant was arrested in the Dominican Republic and extradited to the United States.A federal grand jury in the District of Massachusetts indicted the defendant and several co-defendants for conspiracy to distribute fentanyl and conspiracy to commit money laundering. The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that his arrest abroad constituted outrageous government conduct, but the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts denied the motion. At trial, the defendant challenged various evidentiary rulings, alleged prosecutorial misconduct, and objected to aspects of the jury instructions and sentencing. The jury found him guilty on both counts, and he was sentenced to 25 years in prison. His co-defendant, who cooperated with the government, later received a significantly shorter sentence.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the defendant’s claims, including the denial of his motion to dismiss, evidentiary objections, allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, jury instruction issues, and sentencing challenges. The court held that the arrest did not constitute outrageous government conduct, the evidentiary rulings and jury instructions were not reversible error, and there was no plain error or prosecutorial misconduct warranting a new trial. The court also found the sentence procedurally and substantively reasonable. Accordingly, the First Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Castillo" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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A former U.S. Navy Reserve officer, after serving in Afghanistan, maintained contact with an Afghan businessman who had provided interpreters to U.S. forces. In 2018, the businessman asked the officer to write letters of recommendation for Afghan nationals seeking Special Immigrant Visas (SIVs) to the United States, offering payment in return. The officer agreed, negotiating a price and ultimately producing multiple letters that attested to his personal knowledge of the applicants’ character and service, despite not actually knowing or remembering them. The letters were used in SIV applications, and the officer received payment, which he attempted to disguise as consulting fees through a false invoice.A grand jury in the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire indicted the officer on four counts: conspiracy to commit bribery and false writing, bribery, false writing, and conspiracy to commit concealment money laundering. At trial, the officer moved for acquittal on the basis of insufficient evidence of falsity in the letters, but the district court denied the motion. The jury convicted him on all counts, and the district court later denied a renewed motion for acquittal, finding sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude the letters contained false statements and that the government was not required to prove falsity for all charges. The court sentenced the officer to thirty months’ imprisonment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence de novo and affirmed the convictions. The court held that there was sufficient evidence for a rational jury to find the letters contained false statements about the applicants’ character and the officer’s personal knowledge. The court also rejected challenges to the bribery and money laundering convictions, finding no clear or obvious error and no impermissible merger of offenses. The convictions and sentence were affirmed in full. View "United States v. Pittmann" on Justia Law

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In late 2020 and early 2021, Massachusetts law enforcement investigated a suspected drug trafficking organization operating in the South Shore area. The investigation focused on two apartments believed to be used for storing and distributing drugs, and a blue Jeep Grand Cherokee linked to the organization. On January 11, 2021, officers executed state search warrants at both apartments, recovering large quantities of narcotics, cash, firearms, and drug-trafficking equipment. Earlier that day, officers conducted a warrantless stop of the Jeep, driven by Aderito Patrick Amado, and found additional drugs and cash. Amado was charged with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute fentanyl, fentanyl analogue, and cocaine; three counts of possession with intent to distribute those substances; two counts of being a felon in possession of firearms; and one count of possessing firearms in furtherance of drug trafficking.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts denied Amado’s motion to suppress evidence from the Jeep, finding that officers had reasonable suspicion for the stop. After a nine-day trial, a jury convicted Amado on all counts except one firearm-in-furtherance charge. The district court sentenced him to a total of 384 months’ imprisonment, within the advisory Guidelines range, and ten years of supervised release. Amado appealed, challenging the denial of his suppression motion, the application of an obstruction-of-justice enhancement, his designation as a career offender, and the substantive reasonableness of his sentence compared to a co-defendant’s shorter term.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. The court held that reasonable suspicion supported the stop of the Jeep, the obstruction-of-justice enhancement was warranted due to Amado’s perjury at trial, and the career-offender designation was proper and did not affect the advisory range. The court also found no substantive sentencing error, noting material differences between Amado and his co-defendant. The convictions and sentence were affirmed. View "United States v. Amado" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Víctor Miguel Duluc-Méndez was convicted for his role in a 2013 carjacking in Puerto Rico that resulted in the death of the vehicle’s driver. Duluc and a juvenile accomplice forcibly took a car, detained the driver, withdrew money from his account, and later, the juvenile fatally shot the driver. Duluc was apprehended shortly after and admitted to the carjacking, though he denied knowledge of the juvenile’s intent to kill. He pleaded guilty to the carjacking charge, and the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico sentenced him to 240 months in prison.After serving about ten years, Duluc moved for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), citing his mother’s deteriorating health and his siblings’ inability to care for her, supported by letters from his family. He also emphasized his substantial post-conviction rehabilitation, including completion of over a thousand hours of programming, leadership roles, and strong recommendations from prison staff and fellow inmates. The government opposed the motion, arguing that Duluc had not shown he was the only available caregiver and that rehabilitation alone was insufficient for compassionate release. The district court denied the motion in a brief order, finding Duluc’s family circumstances unconvincing and citing his criminal record, without addressing his rehabilitation arguments.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the denial. The court held that the district court abused its discretion by failing to consider Duluc’s argument that his rehabilitation, combined with his family circumstances, could constitute “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for release. The appellate court vacated the district court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the lower court to consider Duluc’s rehabilitation in its analysis. View "United States v. Duluc-Mendez" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Edwin Otero operated a violent drug trafficking organization across Cape Cod, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island, distributing heroin and engaging in brutal acts to maintain control. In April 2019, suspecting a member of his group was cooperating with authorities, Otero orchestrated a kidnapping and assault in Pawtucket, Rhode Island, where the victim was beaten, stripped, and sexually exploited. Otero recorded the attack and boasted about it to others. A month later, he was involved in another violent incident, ordering a crew member to shoot a drug debtor. Otero was arrested in May 2019 after a DEA investigation uncovered his extensive criminal activities.Otero was charged in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts with multiple counts related to drug trafficking, kidnapping, firearms offenses, and obstruction of justice. He pleaded guilty to eight counts without a plea agreement. The presentence investigation report calculated a total offense level of 43, including a six-level enhancement for sexual exploitation during the kidnapping, resulting in a guideline range of life imprisonment. The district court sentenced Otero to 456 months’ imprisonment, with 336 months for most counts served concurrently and 120 months for a firearms count served consecutively. Otero objected to the sexual exploitation enhancement and the substantive reasonableness of his sentence, preserving these issues for appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed Otero’s procedural and substantive challenges for abuse of discretion. The court held that the district court did not err in applying the sexual exploitation enhancement, finding sufficient evidence that Otero’s conduct met the relevant statutory definitions. The appellate court also found the sentence substantively reasonable, noting it fell within the guidelines and was supported by a plausible rationale. The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Otero" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law