Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting United States Liability Insurance Group's (USLI) motion to dismiss this lawsuit brought by Nahant Preservation Trust, Inc. to secure insurance coverage in connection with defense costs and indemnification arising from a state court action brought by Northeastern University, holding that there was no error.Northeastern sued Nahant in state court seeking a declaratory judgment regarding its rights concerning certain land. Nahant, which carried liability insurance through USLI, did not notify USLI of the suit until it wrote to USLI seeking coverage for defense costs. USLI refused to provide coverage on the grounds that Nahant had provided untimely notice of the claim. Thereafter Nahant sued USLI seeking, among other things, a declaratory judgment regarding USLI's duty to defend and indemnify. The First circuit granted USLI's motion to dismiss, concluding that the "exclusion agreement" signed by the parties excluded coverage. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court properly accepted USLI's plausible reading of the exclusion amendment. View "Nahant Preservation Trust, Inc. v. Mount Vernon Fire Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the order of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Insurer in this insurance dispute, holding that the failure to give notice according to the terms and conditions of an excess insurance policy forfeits any right to coverage.The President and Fellows of Harvard College purchased a one-year liability insurance policy from a member company of the American International Group, Inc. (AIG) requiring prompt notice of any claim filed against Harvard. Harvard purchased a secondary excess policy from Zurich American Insurance Co. providing that a policyholder give notice of any claims arising under the policy "in the same manner required by the terms and conditions of the [AIG] Policy." In 2014, a student organization sued Harvard for violating Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Harvard timely notified AIG of the pending suit but neglected to notify Zurich until after the policy's notification window. Therefore, Zurich denied coverage. Harvard brought this action seeking declaratory relief and damages for breach of contract. The district court granted summary judgment for Zurich. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that there was no basis for overturning the district court's entry of summary judgment. View "President & Fellows of Harvard College v. Zurich American Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the rulings of the district court requiring Timothy Day to pay NuVasive, Inc., his former employer, more than $1.7 million in damages and attorney's fees for breach of contract and spoliation of evidence, holding that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion.NuVasive brought suit against Day making claims arising from Day's business interactions with NuVasive's customers on behalf of Alphatec Spine, Inc., Day's new employer, in violation of non-competition and non-solicitation obligations in Day's contract with NuVasive. After the district court entered its final judgment Day appealed, arguing that the court erred in finding the requisite causal nexus between Day's improper solicitations and the decisions of certain NuVasive customers to switch to Alphatec as their primary supplier of spine-related surgical products. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that there was no error in the damages award or the sanctions-based award of attorney's fees and costs. View "NuVasive, Inc. v. Day" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court in favor of the Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority (PRHTA) and its executive directors (collectively, Appellees) and dismissing this complaint brought by sixty-nine current and former employees of the PRHTA (collectively, Appellants), holding that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion.Appellants brought this action challenging the PRHTA's decision no longer to give effect to a regulation providing Appellants with additional compensation. Specifically, Appellants claimed that the decision was contrary to P.R. Act No. 66-2014, giving rise to violations of the Contracts Clause and Due Process Clause. The district court granted summary judgment for the PRHTA on the federal constitutional claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Appellants' claims under Puerto Rico law. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err in concluding that Appellants could not establish their federal constitutional claims; and (2) did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise jurisdiction over Appellants' remaining Puerto Rico law claims. View "Vazquez-Velazquez v. P.R. Highway & Transportation Authority" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court dismissing this putative action asserting various state law claims in relation to a data breach that allegedly exposed Plaintiffs' personally identifiable information (PII) and that of more than 75,000 other patients of Injured Workers Pharmacy, LLC (IWP), holding that remand was required.Plaintiffs brought a class action complaint against IWP, a home-delivery pharmacy service registered and headquartered in Massachusetts, asserting state law claims for negligence, breach of implied contract, unjust enrichment, invasion of privacy, and breach of fiduciary duty. Plaintiffs sought to certify a class of United States residents whose PII was compromised in the data breach at issue. The district court granted IWP's motion to dismiss for lack of Article III standing. The First Circuit reversed in part, holding (1) the complaint plausibly demonstrated Plaintiffs' standing to seek damages; and (2) Plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue injunctive relief because their desired injunctions would not likely redress their alleged injuries. View "Webb v. Injured Workers Pharmacy, LLC" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Triple-S Management Corporation and Triple-S Vida, Inc. (collectively, Triple-S) and dismissing this case brought by Dora Bonner, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Bonner's discovery-related motions and did not err in considering the evidence at the summary judgment stage.Bonner brought several claims alleging that Triple-S denied her millions of dollars of proceeds from certain certificates and devised a scheme to defraud her. After denying Bonner's motion to compel discovery and extend the discovery deadline, the district court concluded that Triple-S had established as a matter of law that the persons behind the fraudulent scheme were not related to Triple-S. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to compel and motion for consideration; and (2) properly granted summary judgment for Triple-S. View "Bonner v. Triple-S Vida, Inc." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting a motion to compel arbitration in this insurance dispute, holding that the district court correctly granted the motion to compel arbitration brought by the underwriters of Green Enterprises, LLC's insurance policy, all syndicates at Lloyd's of London (Underwriters).After a fire destroyed one of its plants, Green, a Puerto Rican recycling company, filed an insurance claim. Underwriters denied the claim, after which Green brought this lawsuit. Underwriters filed a motion to compel arbitration under an arbitration clause in the parties' contract. The district court granted the motion and dismissed Green's claims without prejudice. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court properly granted the motion to compel. View "Green Enterprises, LLC v. Hiscox Syndicates Limited at Lloyd's of London" on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court dismissing Plaintiff's breach of contract claim against Defendant, a digital health company, and affirmed the district court's dismissal of all other claims against Defendant and three of its board members, holding that Plaintiff plausibly stated a claim for entitlement to severance benefits.Plaintiff worked for Defendant as its CEO for one year. Thereafter, Defendant decided that it no longer wished to continue its relationship with Plaintiff, as defined in her one-year, automatically renewable employment agreement, and, after she left, refused to pay severance benefits under the agreement. In response to Plaintiff's ensuing lawsuit, Defendant argued that it did not terminate Plaintiff's employment because it merely exercised its right not to renew the agreement. The district court agreed and granted Defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The First Circuit (1) reversed the dismissal of Plaintiff's breach of contract claim, holding that the complaint adequately alleged that Defendant obligated itself to pay severance benefits by ending her employment under the agreement without cause before the end of the one-year term; and (2) affirmed the dismissal of all other claims against Defendant and its three board members, holding that the district court did not otherwise err. View "Sullivan v. etectRx, Inc." on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court ruling that Insured's claim of unfair claim settlement practices in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 176D and 93A was barred by the choice-of-law provision of the marine insurance policy he purchased from Great Lakes Insurance SE (GLI), holding that the district court erred.Insurer, the insurer of Insured's forty-seven-foot catamaran sailing vessel, brought a declaratory judgment action to determine whether the "constructive total loss" of Insured's vessel was covered under the relevant policy. Insured brought a counterclaim alleging violations of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 176D, 3(9) and ch. 93A, 9(3A). The district court ruled that pursuant to the policy's choice-of-law provision, New York law barred Insured's Massachusetts counterclaim because New York law does not provide for a chapters 176D and 93A claim. The First Circuit reversed, holding (1) Insured's statutorily-based counterclaim was extra-contractual; (2) the plain language of the choice-of-law provision was not broad enough to unambiguously encompass an extra-contractual claim; and (3) any ambiguity in the policy must be construed in favor of Insured. View "Great Lakes Insurance SE v. Andersson" on Justia Law

In 2013, New Balance entered into a Distribution Agreement with PSG to distribute its products in Peru. The Agreement contained an arbitration clause, which New Balance invoked in 2018. Also joined as respondents in this arbitration were Ribadeneira, PSG’s controlling owner, and Superdeporte, another business entity owned by Ribadeneira in Peru. The arbitrator issued two awards, which imposed liability on PSG and Superdeporte for breach of the Distribution Agreement, and on PSG, Superdeporte, and Ribadeneira for tortious interference. The arbitrator rejected three counterclaims brought against New Balance. Finding that the arbitrator had improperly exercised jurisdiction over nonsignatories Ribadeneira and Superdeporte, the district court vacated the awards.The First Circuit reversed. Theories of assumption and equitable estoppel apply to support arbitral jurisdiction over Ribadeneira and Superdeporte. Superdeporte was PSG's successor-in-interest and assumed PSG's obligation to arbitrate under the Distribution Agreement. Ribadeneira is estopped from denying that the Agreement's arbitration clause is enforceable, just as he is estopped from asserting his nonsignatory status to avoid the obligation to arbitrate under that clause. The tortious interference claims were "related to or arising out of" the Agreement. View "Ribadeneira v. New Balance Athletics, Inc." on Justia Law