Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

ALC filed suit against Lamex in commonwealth court under Puerto Rico's Dealers' Contract Act (Law 75), which prohibits a principal from terminating a business relationship with a dealer without just cause. Before service of process, Lamex filed suit in federal court. The federal district court denied Lamex's requests to pierce the corporate veil and for preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, but granted Lamex's request for a declaratory judgment absolving it from liability under Law 75, ordered ALC to pay, and ordered the Superior Court of San Juan to release the money ALC consigned. The First Circuit affirmed the imposition of sanctions against ALC and the monetary judgment in favor of Lamex, but vacated the judgment with respect to Lamex's claims for a declaratory judgment and to pierce ALC's corporate veil. The district court erred in failing to provide indisputably clear notice of its intent to consolidate the preliminary injunction hearing with a trial on the merits under Rule 65(a)(2) and, in so doing, abrogated ALC's right to a jury trial.

Plaintiff financed an ice cream hardening system. The lender held title and leased the equipment to plaintiff, but refused to set an end-of-lease purchase price. The final agreement did not refer to an estimate in a side letter or conversations concerning the lease price. Two years after the equipment was installed, plaintiff suggested an early buy-out. When the parties were unable to agree to a price, plaintiff filed suit alleging breach of contract and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, violation of the Utah Unfair Practices Act, promissory estoppel and fraud. The district court rejected other claims, but held that the lender had fraudulently professed, in a side letter, to have estimated 12 percent as the price when, in fact, it had no estimate. The court ordered the lender to convey the equipment and refund to plaintiff part of the payments made under the agreement. The First Circuit affirmed the award of title, but remanded for recalculation of the refund. The transfer of title was an expected outcome of the contract and the evidence supported a finding of fraud.

Defendant is a valet parking business and executed a letter of intent to buy a competing company for $16 millions. An outline of a financing agreement under negotiation with a private equity group contained exclusivity and confidentiality provisions. While that agreement was in effect, the defendant's founder negotiated financing from a company that owned 24.9 % of defendant company. The private equity company sued. The district court entered judgment in favor of defendant. The First Circuit affirmed. The district court properly declined to instruct the jury on the lost opportunity theory of causation and damages; at most, the equity group was deprived of a contractually guaranteed right to prevent defendant from negotiating financing with others. The court properly instructed the jury that the exclusivity provision reference to discussing financing with "any person or entity" was ambiguous.

The company filed civil claims under Massachusetts state laws and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961 after discovering a scheme under which its employees and outsiders duped it into paying fraudulent invoices. Other defendants settled. After a trial, a former employee and an outsider, who advanced funds for the scheme, were found liable to the company. The First Circuit affirmed. There was sufficient evidence that the outsider knowingly and willfully participated in the scheme to support a verdict under RICO. That the jury did not find her liable for conspiracy to violate RICO is irrelevant. The evidence also supported a verdict of common law fraud; any error in a "willful blindness" jury instruction was harmless. Inclusion of anticipated attorney fees in an appeal bond was appropriate.

The company purchased a disability benefits plan, regulated by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act. A part-owner and employee of the company received benefits for about four years before the insurer terminated benefits because her non-salary income was higher than her salary income had been. The plan defines "pre-disability earnings" as: "your monthly rate of earnings from the employer in effect just prior to the date disability begins" and "basic annual earnings" as the amount reported by the policyholder on a W-2, excluding commissions. The company argued that a provision allowing termination of benefits when "current earnings" reach a percentage of pre-disability earnings referred to earnings from all sources. The district court held that the employee was not entitled to benefits but denied the insurer reimbursement. The First Circuit reversed, in favor of the employee, finding that the insurer's interpretation of the plan was unreasonable.

The insured was treated as an outpatient for "mental or nervous disorder" in 2005-2007, allegedly incurring expenses of more than $125,000. In 2006 the company informed her that it had already paid $8,506 and would pay only $1,494 more toward the lifetime cap of $10,000. The district court held that the contract was not ambiguous and that the limit was not prohibited by New Hampshire law. The First Circuit affirmed. The policy limit for mental health benefits, stated as "the amount shown on page 3" is not ambiguous simply because that page refers to both the "Mental and Nervous Disorder Limit" of $10,000, and the "Maximum Benefit Limit Per Covered Person" of $1 million. A state law prohibiting unfair trade practices, including discrimination in insurance does not provide a private right of action until after the claimant obtains a favorable ruling from the insurance commissioner.