Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Contracts
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About thirty years ago, the Municipality of Mayaguez and Corporacion Para el Desarrollo del Oeste (CPDO), a local development corporation, executed a contract under which Mayaguez ceded parcels of land to CPDO with the understanding that the land would be used for a project to be developed in accordance with the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) Community Development Block Grant program guidelines and regulations. After the relationship between the parties soured, Mayaguez filed this complaint against CPDO, alleging that CPDO violated several HUD regulations, thus breaching its contract. The district court ruled in favor of CPDO and dismissed Mayaguez's claims without prejudice. The First Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the district court's judgment, holding that Mayaguez's commonwealth law claim did not "arise under" federal law within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 1331. Remanded with instructions to dismiss Mayaguez's claim without prejudice for want of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Municipality of Mayaguez v. Corporacion Para El Desarrollo Del Oeste, Inc." on Justia Law

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The Knowles owned rental property in Clinton, Massachusetts that was mortgaged with Fidelity Co-operative Bank (Fidelity) and insured by Nova Casualty Company (Nova). In 2008, a tropical storm brought heavy rain that caused substantial damage to the interior of the Knowles' building. The Town of Clinton ordered the building to be closed. Because the Knowles could not afford to make repairs to the building, it remained vacant. The Knowles submitted a claim for reimbursement for the water damage with Nova, which denied the claim. The building was later vandalized, causing further damage. Nova also refused coverage on this damage. The Knowles subsequently defaulted on their mortgage. In 2010, Fidelity, individually and as assignee of the Knowles, filed a complaint against Nova seeking a declaration that the physical losses suffered by the property and the loss of business income to the Knowles was covered by their all-risk insurance policy. The district court granted summary judgment for Nova. The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the water damage was covered under the policy because the policy's coverage extended to both damage "caused by" or "resulting from" rain as well as damage resulting from the entry of "surface water." Remanded. View "Fidelity Coop. Bank v. Nova Cas. Co." on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs, current and former employees of Boston Medical Center (BMC), brought this wage-and-hour action against BMC, BMC's former president and COE, and BMC's former senior human resources officer, alleging that Defendants deprived them of their wages through the use of timekeeping policies and employment practices that required them to put in extra work time in addition to their regularly scheduled work shifts and to work through their meal and rest periods. Plaintiffs asserted causes of action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and Massachusetts common law. The federal district court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss in its entirety. The First Circuit Court of Appeals (1) vacated the dismissal of the FLSA claim against BMC and its former CEO, the contract claims, and the money had and received, unjust enrichment, and conversion claims; (2) vacated the district court's order striking the class and collective action allegations; and (3) otherwise affirmed. Remanded. View "Manning v. Boston Med. Ctr. Corp." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff terminated Defendant from employment. Thereafter, Defendant began arbitration proceedings seeking severance compensation he felt was contractually due. After arbitration hearings had commenced, the hearings were postponed for two months due to a medical situation afflicting Plaintiff's counsel. During the recess, Plaintiff formally requested pre-hearing and hearing third-party subpoenas directed at Defendant's current employer. The tribunal denied the issuance of the subpoenas. After the arbitration hearings resumed, the tribunal found Defendant was entitled to compensation pursuant to the terms of his employment agreement dealing with his termination without cause. The tribunal also found Defendant was entitled to pre-award interest. Plaintiff subsequently sought vacatur of the award, which the trial court denied. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the arbitration tribunal did not engage in misconduct by denying the issuance of the pre-hearing and hearing subpoenas; and (2) the tribunal did not exceed its authority in awarding pre-award interest to Defendant. View "Doral Fin. Corp. v. Garcia-Velez" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff sought to open a Victoria's Secret franchise and sought assistance from Richard Domingo, an employee of Rekomdiv International. At the recommendation of Domingo, Plaintiff retained the law firm of Venable, LLP to assist him in establishing a business relationship with Victoria's Secret. Plaintiff paid Venable a $400,000 retainer fee, and paid $225,000 to Rekomdiv. Plaintiff later discovered Victoria's Secret franchise was not available. Plaintiff sued Rekomdiv and Domingo for breach of contract and dolo. The jury found in favor of Plaintiff and assessed damages in the amount of $625,000. In the meantime, Plaintiff sued Venable, and the parties settled. The court later found that it could not offset the damages award in the Rekomdiv suit by the Venable settlement amount. While their appeal was pending in this matter, Rekomdiv and Domingo filed a legal malpractice suit against Lamboy, their trial counsel. The district court dismissed the complaint against Lamboy. The First Circuit Court of Appeals (1) affirmed the district court's denial of offset of the damages award, as offset was not required; and (2) affirmed the court's dismissal of the legal malpractice suit, holding that the allegations in the complaint failed to establish the causation element necessary to make out a plausible legal malpractice claim. View "Portugues-Santana v. Rekomdiv Int'l, Inc." on Justia Law

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Defendant and his company (Defendants) borrowed money from Trust by executing promissory notes in favor of Trust. One note said it was governed by Massachusetts law, and the others said they were governed by New York law. The Trust's trustees (Plaintiffs) subsequently sued Defendants in New York state court for breach of contract. The New York trial court eventually granted Defendants' motion to dismiss based on the expiration of the New York statute of limitations. Plaintiffs subsequently sued Defendant in Massachusetts federal court to recover on the note controlled by Massachusetts law. Although Plaintiffs filed suit within the Massachusetts statute of limitations, the district judge concluded that the dismissal of the New York lawsuit barred Plaintiffs' current claim because the dismissal was on the merits and claim preclusive. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the limitations dismissal under New York law was a judgment on the merits, and thus, the current claim was barred. View "Newman v. Krintzman" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff was withdrawing money from an ATM when Tortfeasor struck her with his car. Tortfeasor was insured under a policy written by Insurer to a limit of $100,000 for bodily injury to one person. Plaintiff and several of her family members brought this action against Tortfeasor and his brother, the named insured on the policy, (collectively, Tortfeasor) and Insurer. The district court originally entered judgment ordering Insurer and Tortfeasor to pay one-and-a-half million dollars to Plaintiffs. Insurer paid into court $75,000, the remainder of its policy limit. The district court later amended its judgment, holding Tortfeasor and Insurer liable for six million dollars in damages. Plaintiffs then unsuccessfully sought to compel Insurer to pay postjudgment interest on the full judgment. The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the deniial of Plaintiff's request for postjudgment interest, holding that Insurer was responsible for postjudgment interest from the date of entry of the original judgment and the date of the deposit of the policy limit. View "Vazquez-Filippetti v. Cooperativa de Seguros Multiples de P.R." on Justia Law

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Doctor, a licensed podiatrist, was driving alone in her husband's vehicle when she was injured in a collision caused by an underinsured motorist. Doctor sought payment from Peerless Indemnity Insurance Co. and Peerless Insurance Co. (collectively, Peerless), who issued business owner's and excess/umbrella policies to Doctor's podiatric practice (Lake Region). Peerless sought a declaratory judgment in federal district court that it had no duty to pay for Doctor's injuries or damages. The district court granted summary judgment for Peerless. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Maine's uninsured/underinsured motorist statute did not apply to the Peerless policies issued to Lake Region, thus precluding Doctor's recovery from Peerless. View "Peerless Indem. Ins. Co. v. Frost " on Justia Law

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These consolidated appeals comprised two putative class actions brought by skycaps affiliated with two major airlines. After Defendants, the airlines, each introduced a $2 per bag fee for curbside service for departing passengers at airports that did not inure to the benefit of the skycaps, Plaintiffs sued the airlines for unjust enrichment and tortious interference, among other claims. The district court dismissed the unjust enrichment and tortious interference claims as preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA). Plaintiffs appealed, contending that the ADA does not preempt common-law claims. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed after an analysis of statutory language, congressional intent, and case law, holding that the ADA preempted Plaintiffs' common-law claims. View "Brown v. United Airlines, Inc." on Justia Law

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Pruco Life Insurance Company sought rescission of a life insurance policy, owned by the Paul E. L'Archevesque Special Revocable Trust on the life of Paul L'Archevesque, after it discovered that the policy application contained material misrepresentations about the health of Paul. Pruco tendered to Wilmington Trust Company, a co-trustee of the trust, a check in the amount of the policy premiums paid along with a letter stating Pruco was rescinding the policy. Wilmington cashed the check. Pruco subsequently filed a complaint seeking a rescission of the policy and a declaration that the policy was void ab initio. The district court granted summary judgment to Pruco, concluding that, under the circumstances, a mutual rescission had taken place as a matter of law. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly interpreted Rhode Island law regarding the standard for mutual rescission; (2) there were no genuine issues of material fact concerning whether Pruco made material misrepresentations in its rescission letter that could have prevented summary judgment; and (3) the district court did not err in finding that the issue of whether Pruco acted in bad faith was irrelevant to the rescission analysis. View "Pruco Life Ins. Co. v. Wilmington Trust Co." on Justia Law