Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

With the threat of foreclosure looming on his home, Plaintiff sued Bank for failing to consider him for a mortgage loan modification, which a California class action settlement agreement required Bank to do before attempting to foreclose on Plaintiff’s home. The complaint alleged breach of contract, violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 244, 35A and 35B, violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The district court dismissed the complaint in its entirety. The First Circuit vacated in part and remanded Plaintiff’s claims for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, holding (1) Plaintiff’s statutory causes of action fell short of stating a cognizable claim; but (2) the district court improperly converted Bank’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s contract-based claims into a motion for summary judgment, warranting a remand of those claims. View "Foley v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Defendant, a Canadian company, contracted with Plaintiff, a Massachusetts investment bank, to be its exclusive financial advisor for the sale of its business. The parties negotiated and executed the agreement from their respective home offices, contacting each other by phone, e-mail, and internet. Plaintiff later sued in Massachusetts Superior Court alleging breach of contract, among other claims. Defendant removed the case to federal district court. The district court subsequently dismissed the case, concluding that it could not exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendant consistently with the Due Process Clause. The First Circuit reversed, holding that, in light of the nature, number, origin, and duration of the parties’ contacts in this case, the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction by Massachusetts was consistent with fair play and substantial justice. View "C.W. Downer & Co. v. Bioriginal Food & Sci. Corp." on Justia Law

This interlocutory appeal concerned a preliminary injunction entered against Joshua Powell in litigation resulting from several contracts between the company Powell founded and a new joint venture formed with a non-party. At issue before the First Circuit was whether the district court abused its discretion in issuing the preliminary injunction. The First Circuit left the preliminary injunction temporarily in place and remanded with instructions, directing that the district court review the matter of irreparable injury and vacate the preliminary injunction if it finds irreparable harm to be lacking, and if the court find irreparable harm and an otherwise sufficient basis for injunctive relief, that it hear the parties’ arguments on the appropriate scope and language of the injunction. View "JL Powell Clothing LLC v. Powell" on Justia Law

Alasko Foods, Inc. (“Alasko”), a Canadian corporation that sells frozen produce to retail outlets, and Foodmark, Inc. (“Foodmark”), a Massachusetts corporation that assists food manufacturers in marketing branded-label and private-label products to retailers, entered into a “U.S. Representation Agreement [and] Sales Management Agreement” wherein Alasko retained Foodmark to market Alasko’s products in the United States. Five years later, Alasko terminated the Agreement. Foodmark filed a complaint against Alasko, alleging that Alasko’s refusal to pay the “Non-Renewal Termination Fee” contemplated by the Agreement constituted a breach of the Agreement and of its covenant of good faith and fair dealing. A federal district court entered summary judgment for Foodmark and awarded $1.1 million in damages. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that there were no genuine issues of fact, and Foodmark was entitled to a termination fee in the amount calculated by the district court. View "Foodmark, Inc. v. Alasko Foods, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s property was subject to a mortgage. Plaintiff discussed refinancing with a predecessor in interest to Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., as well as a mortgage broker and his firm, whom Plaintiff referred to as “agents” of Wells Fargo. Based on these discussions, Plaintiff began making improvements to increase the property’s appraised value. Ultimately, Plaintiff was unable to refinance her mortgage. Plaintiff brought suit against Wells Fargo, alleging, among other claims, a violation of N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 397-A:2(VI) (count one) and promissory estoppel (count five). The district court dismissed counts one and five of Plaintiff’s complaint, concluding both claims were inadequately pleaded. Plaintiff appealed, arguing, among other things, that although she could not claim a private right of action under section 397-A:2(VI), she did state a claim for common law fraud. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court properly dismissed any state law fraud claim that Plaintiff belatedly attempted to advance and correctly dismissed Plaintiff’s promissory estoppel claim.View "Ruivo v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, citizens of Rhode Island, brought state law contract claims against Defendants, alleging, among other claims, breach of an oral contract. After the Rhode Island state court dismissed the only non-diverse defendant from the case, the remaining defendants removed the lawsuit to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. Plaintiffs filed a motion to remand to state court, correctly pointing out that, at the time of removal, the dismissal of the non-diverse defendant was not final. The district court denied Plaintiffs’ motion to remand, granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, and awarded attorneys’ fees to defendant Southworth-Milton, Inc. (Southworth). Plaintiffs appealed the judgment in favor of Southworth and argued that the case should be remanded to state court. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) remand to state court was not required, and the district court had jurisdiction, because despite Defendants’ failure to comply with the statutory removal requirements, complete diversity existed at the time of judgment, and Plaintiffs failed to object to the statutory procedural defect in a timely manner; and (2) the district court correctly granted summary judgment and awarded attorneys’ fees in favor of Southworth.View "Universal Truck & Equip. Co. v. Southworth-Milton, Inc." on Justia Law

Jeffrey Healey and Edward Given, residents of the Massachusetts Treatment Center, were each civilly committed as a sexually dangerous person. Plaintiffs brought separate suits, which were later consolidated, challenging the conditions of their confinement and the adequacy of their sexual offender treatment. Plaintiffs sought equitable relief against the Massachusetts Department of Corrections and other state officials (collectively, the DOC). Both plaintiffs alleged violations of the Constitution and state statutory provisions, and Healey alleged that the DOC was not in compliance with the terms of a management plan (Plan) for the Center developed by the DOC during the course of prior litigation. The district court granted Plaintiffs declaratory and injunctive relief on some claims and entered judgment in favor of the DOC on the remaining claims. The First Circuit (1) reversed the declaratory judgment in favor of Healey on his contempt claim as well as injunctive relief compelling the Commonwealth’s compliance with the Plan’s provisions; and (2) affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of Defendants in all respects with the exception of the judgment for Plaintiffs regarding the constitutionality of the pharmacological evaluation and treatment provided by Defendants, as that portion of the judgment was not challenged on appeal.View "Healey v. Dennehy" on Justia Law

Defendant, a law firm, contracted with Plaintiff for Plaintiff to provide title insurance on two mortgages that Defendant took as security from a client indebted to Defendant. Upon foreclosure of liens that were superior to those of Defendant, Defendant sought coverage from Plaintiff under the insurance policies, which seemingly provided coverage for priority liens. Defendant requested indemnification, and Plaintiff sought declaratory judgment, arguing that coverage for priority liens was not intended by either party. A federal district court granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff, concluding that because Defendant was aware of the prior mortgages, it could not expect to receive coverage it did not bargain for. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiff had conclusively shown that Defendant was aware that its bargain with the client for security of its debt would result in junior mortgages, and the insurance policies clearly excluded such encumbrances from coverage.View "First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Lane Powell PC" on Justia Law

Police officers discovered Thomas Locke, a US Airways mechanic at Logan International Airport, filching company property. US Airways entered into a “Last Chance Agreement” with Locke in lieu of termination and provided for Locke’s return to work. Logan International Airport, however, denied Locke’s application for renewal of his security badge. Thereafter, US Airways concluded that Locke had violated the terms of the Agreement and terminated his employment. Locke subsequently filed suit against US Airways, alleging that US Airways breached the Agreement by interfering with his application for a security badge at Logan Airport and by preventing him from transferring to Philadelphia International Airport. The district court granted summary judgment for US Airways. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that there was no triable basis for Locke’s contentions in the record. View "Locke v. US Airways, Inc." on Justia Law

From 2005 to 2010, Plaintiff, a Maine resident, worked as a salesman for Alpha Networks, which was based in California, pursuant to a written employment agreement. Plaintiff left Alpha having received no commissions on his sales in 2009 or 2010. Plaintiff then filed suit. A jury concluded that Alpha had not promised to pay Plaintiff commissions after 2008 but concluded that Plaintiff was entitled to damages in the amount of $70,331 under quasi-contract. After trial, the parties disputed whether California or Maine law governed whether and to what extent the jury’s damages award should be augmented with additional remedies. Under California law, Plaintiff would be entitled to an additional award of $7,799, but under Maine law, Plaintiff would be entitled to an additional $140,663, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs. The district court concluded that California law applied. The First Circuit vacated the award and remanded, holding that Maine substantive law governed enforcement of the quasi-contractual relationship found to exist between the parties in 2009 and 2010.View "Dinan v. Alpha Networks, Inc." on Justia Law