Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff worked for the Town of Camden for thirty-one years prior to being laid off. The collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the police union and the Town provided for recall of qualified employees based on seniority. During the twelve-month period after Plaintiff was laid off, vacancies opened in the Camden Police Department, but the Town did not recall Plaintiff. Plaintiff and his wife brought this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging that the Town had deprived Plaintiff, without due process of law, of his property interest in his right to be recalled. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim. The First Circuit vacated the dismissal and remanded. On remand, the district court entered judgment for the Town, concluding that the CBA contained a condition precedent requiring Plaintiff to submit his address and phone number to the Town after his layoff in order to assert his recall rights and that Plaintiff did not submit such information post-layoff. The First Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded, holding that the CBA recall provision did not unambiguously create a condition precedent, and therefore, further fact-finding was necessary. View "Clukey v. Town of Camden, Maine" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, property owners, entered into an oral contract with Defendant, a construction firm, for the assembly of a prefabricated house on a lot that they owned. The parties subsequently entered into a second oral agreement for the assembly of a smaller and cheaper home. Defendant failed to complete construction of Plaintiffs’ home as agreed. Citing diversity of citizenship, Plaintiffs filed suit in federal district court alleging breach of contract. Defendant counterclaimed for breach of contract. The jury found Defendant to have defaulted on its contractual obligations and awarded $150,000 in damages. Defendant appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that it could not be said that no rational jury could have found in favor of Plaintiffs. View "Magee v. BEA Constr. Corp." on Justia Law

Labonte Drywall Company signed a statewide agreement with Union, which allowed Labonte Drywall to hire Union carpenters for its business. The agreement required Labonte Drywall to allow an audit of its records. After Labonte Drywall did not respond to certain audit requests, Plaintiffs, the trustees for a group of Union-related benefits funds and their collection agency, filed this action against Labonte Drywall under ERISA and the Labor Management Relations Act, seeking enforcement of the agreement. After a bench trial, the district court found that Labonte Drywall had terminated the agreement, and therefore, Plaintiffs had no legal right to conduct the requested audit. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not clearly err in finding that the Union had actual notice of Labonte Drywall’s letter terminating its obligations under the agreement; and (2) Labonte Drywall had no duty to submit to Plaintiffs’ audit requests. View "New England Carpenters Central v. Labonte Drywall Co., Inc." on Justia Law

This case involved a series of shifting employment arrangements between Plaintiff and Defendant, TSI Semiconductors America, LLC (TSA). In 2009, Plaintiff began working for Tejas Silicon, Inc. under a written employment agreement (Agreement). In 2011, corporate restructuring led to Plaintiff’s termination with Tejas and the offer of new employment with TSA. The parties amended the Agreement in certain respects. After Plaintiff was furloughed in 2012, Plaintiff sued TSA in a California state court alleging breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and California state law claims. TSA removed the case to federal district court. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of TSA, concluding that neither the reorganization, the non-renewal of the Agreement, nor the layoff constituted a termination without cause that triggered the duty to pay severance under the Agreement. The First Circuit reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded, holding (1) because genuine issues of material fact permeated the record, the district court erred in granting summary judgment for TSA on Plaintiff’s claim for severance benefits arising out of the 2011 reorganization; and (2) the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims regarding the 2012 non-renewal and the 2012 layoff. View "Mason v. Telefunken Semiconductors America, LLC" on Justia Law

In 1997, Quality Cleaning Products (QCP) entered into a distribution agreement with SCA Tissue North America (SCA) that designated QCP as a non-exclusive, authorized Puerto Rican distributor and wholesaler of SCA’s “Tork” brand product line. QCP claimed that SCA breached that agreement in 2001. In 2012, QCP filed this breach of contract action. The district court dismissed the action as time barred under the relevant three-year statute of limitations. The First Circuit affirmed after applying Puerto Rico’s statute of limitations and accrual rules, holding that QCP’s claim accrued in 2001, and thus the three-year statute of limitations had been far exceeded. View "Quality Cleaning Prods. R.C., Inc. v. SCA Tissue of N.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed this putative class action against Defendants - Nisource Corporate Services Company and AGL Resources, Inc. - alleging that Defendants engaged in deceptive business practices by disguising credit sales of hot water heaters as leases to avoid making the disclosures required under federal and Massachusetts’ consumer protection laws. Plaintiff alleged three disclosure violations: (1) a federal claim under the Truth in Lending Act; (2) a state law claim under the Massachusetts Retail Installment Sales and Services Act (RISSA) and (3) a state law claim under the Massachusetts Consumer Credit Cost Disclosure Act (CCCDA). The district court found that Plaintiff did not qualify for protection in light of the state-law standards governing these transactions and dismissed her suit. The First Circuit affirmed on alternate grounds, holding (1) Plaintiff’s federal claim under TILA is barred by the statute of limitations; and (2) as to the pendent state law claims, which were timely, the Court affirmed dismissal for failure to state a claim. View "Philibotte v. Nisource Corp. Services Co." on Justia Law

Arborjet, Inc. (Plaintiff), which manufactures and sells an emamectin benzoate solution used to protect trees from pests called TREE-age, granted Rainbow Treecare Scientific Advancements, Inc. (Defendant) an exclusive right to distribute TREE-age pursuant to a sales agency contract. After termination of this agreement, Defendant began marketing and distributing ArborMectin, another emamectin benzoate combination meant to compete directly with TREE-age. Plaintiff sued Defendant seeking to enjoin Defendant’s sales of ArborMectin and alleging several claims. The district court granted Plaintiff a preliminary injunction to run during the litigation that was meant to enforce the contractual agreement and prohibit a trademark violation. The First Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the order comprising the preliminary injunction, holding (1) it was not clear error to find a likely showing that Defendant contributed to the creation of ArborMectin; (2) the district court did not err in entering the portion of the preliminary injunction based on Arborjet’s contract claim; but (3) ordering proper attribution of “Arborjet” and “TREE-age” was improper given the district court’s rulings on the Lanham Act claims. View "Arborjet, Inc. v. Rainbow Treecare Scientific Advancements, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant, a family-owned retail clothing and footwear business with two stores in Massachusetts, had sold Nike footwear for approximately twenty-eight years before Nike notified Appellant that it was terminating the parties’ business relationship. Appellant sued Nike in Massachusetts state court, alleging contractual claims and a claim under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A. Nike removed the suit to federal court and then moved to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), alleging that its invoices included a forum selection clause requiring Appellant to file its claims in Oregon, not Massachusetts. The district court agreed and dismissed Appellant’s complaint. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the forum selection clause was valid and enforceable, and the district court properly dismissed the present action. View "Carter's of New Bedford, Inc. v. Nike, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff entered into a salvage contract with Defendant to obtain help when his boat went aground one night. Plaintiff later attempted to rescind the contract, claiming that he signed the contract under duress and disputing the sum owed to Defendant. The parties submitted the dispute to a panel of arbitrators pursuant to a binding arbitration clause in the salvage contract. Plaintiff then filed this lawsuit seeking a preliminary injunction against the arbitration and a declaration that the salvage contract was unenforceable. The district court denied the motion and stayed the case pending the outcome of the arbitration. The arbitration panel found in favor of Defendant and ordered Plaintiff to pay a salvage award. The district court affirmed the award. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the district court erred in confirming the arbitration award without first addressing his claim that the arbitration clause was unenforceable. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that, where Plaintiff’s challenge to the validity of the arbitration clause itself came only after Defendant moved to confirm the panel’s award, the district court had no proper basis on which to refuse to confirm the arbitration panel’s award. View "Farnsworth, III v. Towboat Nantucket Sound, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an attorney, filed a lawsuit against the Narragansett Indian Tribe alleging breach of contract. Plaintiff alleged that the Tribe contractually waived the sovereign immunity that would otherwise have prevented him from bringing this suit outside the tribal courts. The district court denied the Tribe’s motion to dismiss the case on sovereign immunity grounds. The Tribe did not appeal the denial of the motion to dismiss. Instead, the Tribe filed an untimely Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion for reconsideration. The district court denied the Rule 59(e) motion. The Tribe subsequently filed a notice purporting to appeal from both the denial of the motion to dismiss and the denial of the untimely Rule 59(e) motion. A prior duty panel of the First Circuit dismissed as untimely any appeal from the denial of the motion to dismiss. The First Circuit subsequently denied interlocutory review of the order denying its motion to reconsider, holding that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain such an appeal because the denial of the Tribe’s untimely 59(e) motion did not qualify as a collateral order that the Court may review prior to the end of the litigation in the district court. View "Luckerman v. Narragansett Indian Tribe" on Justia Law