Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

These interlocutory appeals were from a district court order that, inter alia, compelled a law firm (Mintz Levin) to produce documents relating to a fraud allegedly committed by David Gorski in his operation of Legion Construction, Inc. in order to qualify for and obtain government contracts. Gorski and Legion appealed the portion of the order that required attorney-client privileged documents connected with Mintz Levin’s representation of Legion to be produced under the crime-fraud exception. The government cross-appealed the portion of the district court decision to exclude communications between Gorski and his personal attorney from the production order. The First Circuit (1) dismissed Gorski’s appeal for want of appellate jurisdiction, holding that the Court did not have jurisdiction over Gorski’s appeal but did have jurisdiction over Legion’s appeal and the government’s cross-appeal; (2) affirmed the production order as to Mintz Levin, holding that a prima facie case for the crime-fraud exception had been made; and (3) vacated the district court’s decision to exclude Gorski’s communications with his personal attorney from the production order, holding that the district court employed incorrect legal reasoning with regard to these documents. View "United States v. Gorski" on Justia Law

Mark Galvin was the guarantor of a defaulted promissory note on a loan secured by an interest in a Cessna 421C aircraft. The note and security agreement were assigned to Harley-Davidson Credit Corp. After the borrower defaulted on the note, Harley-Davidson repossessed and sold the aircraft through a third-party dealer for $155,000 and then sought to collect $108,681 from Galvin. Galvin did not pay. Harley-Davidson subsequently filed a breach of contract action against Galvin to collect the deficiency. The district court entered partial summary judgment in favor of Harley-Davidson, concluding that there was no dispute of material fact that the sale was “commercially reasonable.” The First Circuit reversed, holding that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the sale was “commercially reasonable,” and therefore, summary judgment should have been denied. Remanded. View "Harley-Davidson Credit Corp. v. Galvin" on Justia Law

Relator filed a qui tam action on behalf of the United States, twenty-five states, and the District of Columbia, naming his former employer as the defendant and asserting several claims under the False Claims Act (FCA) and analogous state statutes. Thereafter, Relator filed three amended complaints adding five defendants. Defendants filed motions to dismiss. Relator subsequently filed a fourth amended complaint, asserting that he had an absolute right to amend his complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). The district court granted Defendants’ motion to strike the fourth amended complaint after construing Relator’s filings as a request for leave to amend, concluding that Relator had not established good cause for amending his complaint once again. The district court then dismissed the case with prejudice, concluding that the FCA’s public disclosure bar deprived it of jurisdiction over certain allegations and that, as to the remaining allegations, the third amended complaint failed to state a cognizable claim. The First Circuit vacated the judgment below and remanded, holding that the district court (1) did not err in concluding that Relator exhausted his one-time right to amend under Rule 15(a)(1); but (2) appraised Relator’s request for leave to amend under the wrong legal standard. View "D'Agostino v. ev3, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked for the Town of Camden for thirty-one years prior to being laid off. The collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the police union and the Town provided for recall of qualified employees based on seniority. During the twelve-month period after Plaintiff was laid off, vacancies opened in the Camden Police Department, but the Town did not recall Plaintiff. Plaintiff and his wife brought this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging that the Town had deprived Plaintiff, without due process of law, of his property interest in his right to be recalled. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim. The First Circuit vacated the dismissal and remanded. On remand, the district court entered judgment for the Town, concluding that the CBA contained a condition precedent requiring Plaintiff to submit his address and phone number to the Town after his layoff in order to assert his recall rights and that Plaintiff did not submit such information post-layoff. The First Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded, holding that the CBA recall provision did not unambiguously create a condition precedent, and therefore, further fact-finding was necessary. View "Clukey v. Town of Camden, Maine" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, property owners, entered into an oral contract with Defendant, a construction firm, for the assembly of a prefabricated house on a lot that they owned. The parties subsequently entered into a second oral agreement for the assembly of a smaller and cheaper home. Defendant failed to complete construction of Plaintiffs’ home as agreed. Citing diversity of citizenship, Plaintiffs filed suit in federal district court alleging breach of contract. Defendant counterclaimed for breach of contract. The jury found Defendant to have defaulted on its contractual obligations and awarded $150,000 in damages. Defendant appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that it could not be said that no rational jury could have found in favor of Plaintiffs. View "Magee v. BEA Constr. Corp." on Justia Law

Labonte Drywall Company signed a statewide agreement with Union, which allowed Labonte Drywall to hire Union carpenters for its business. The agreement required Labonte Drywall to allow an audit of its records. After Labonte Drywall did not respond to certain audit requests, Plaintiffs, the trustees for a group of Union-related benefits funds and their collection agency, filed this action against Labonte Drywall under ERISA and the Labor Management Relations Act, seeking enforcement of the agreement. After a bench trial, the district court found that Labonte Drywall had terminated the agreement, and therefore, Plaintiffs had no legal right to conduct the requested audit. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not clearly err in finding that the Union had actual notice of Labonte Drywall’s letter terminating its obligations under the agreement; and (2) Labonte Drywall had no duty to submit to Plaintiffs’ audit requests. View "New England Carpenters Central v. Labonte Drywall Co., Inc." on Justia Law

This case involved a series of shifting employment arrangements between Plaintiff and Defendant, TSI Semiconductors America, LLC (TSA). In 2009, Plaintiff began working for Tejas Silicon, Inc. under a written employment agreement (Agreement). In 2011, corporate restructuring led to Plaintiff’s termination with Tejas and the offer of new employment with TSA. The parties amended the Agreement in certain respects. After Plaintiff was furloughed in 2012, Plaintiff sued TSA in a California state court alleging breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and California state law claims. TSA removed the case to federal district court. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of TSA, concluding that neither the reorganization, the non-renewal of the Agreement, nor the layoff constituted a termination without cause that triggered the duty to pay severance under the Agreement. The First Circuit reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded, holding (1) because genuine issues of material fact permeated the record, the district court erred in granting summary judgment for TSA on Plaintiff’s claim for severance benefits arising out of the 2011 reorganization; and (2) the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims regarding the 2012 non-renewal and the 2012 layoff. View "Mason v. Telefunken Semiconductors America, LLC" on Justia Law

In 1997, Quality Cleaning Products (QCP) entered into a distribution agreement with SCA Tissue North America (SCA) that designated QCP as a non-exclusive, authorized Puerto Rican distributor and wholesaler of SCA’s “Tork” brand product line. QCP claimed that SCA breached that agreement in 2001. In 2012, QCP filed this breach of contract action. The district court dismissed the action as time barred under the relevant three-year statute of limitations. The First Circuit affirmed after applying Puerto Rico’s statute of limitations and accrual rules, holding that QCP’s claim accrued in 2001, and thus the three-year statute of limitations had been far exceeded. View "Quality Cleaning Prods. R.C., Inc. v. SCA Tissue of N.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed this putative class action against Defendants - Nisource Corporate Services Company and AGL Resources, Inc. - alleging that Defendants engaged in deceptive business practices by disguising credit sales of hot water heaters as leases to avoid making the disclosures required under federal and Massachusetts’ consumer protection laws. Plaintiff alleged three disclosure violations: (1) a federal claim under the Truth in Lending Act; (2) a state law claim under the Massachusetts Retail Installment Sales and Services Act (RISSA) and (3) a state law claim under the Massachusetts Consumer Credit Cost Disclosure Act (CCCDA). The district court found that Plaintiff did not qualify for protection in light of the state-law standards governing these transactions and dismissed her suit. The First Circuit affirmed on alternate grounds, holding (1) Plaintiff’s federal claim under TILA is barred by the statute of limitations; and (2) as to the pendent state law claims, which were timely, the Court affirmed dismissal for failure to state a claim. View "Philibotte v. Nisource Corp. Services Co." on Justia Law

Arborjet, Inc. (Plaintiff), which manufactures and sells an emamectin benzoate solution used to protect trees from pests called TREE-age, granted Rainbow Treecare Scientific Advancements, Inc. (Defendant) an exclusive right to distribute TREE-age pursuant to a sales agency contract. After termination of this agreement, Defendant began marketing and distributing ArborMectin, another emamectin benzoate combination meant to compete directly with TREE-age. Plaintiff sued Defendant seeking to enjoin Defendant’s sales of ArborMectin and alleging several claims. The district court granted Plaintiff a preliminary injunction to run during the litigation that was meant to enforce the contractual agreement and prohibit a trademark violation. The First Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the order comprising the preliminary injunction, holding (1) it was not clear error to find a likely showing that Defendant contributed to the creation of ArborMectin; (2) the district court did not err in entering the portion of the preliminary injunction based on Arborjet’s contract claim; but (3) ordering proper attribution of “Arborjet” and “TREE-age” was improper given the district court’s rulings on the Lanham Act claims. View "Arborjet, Inc. v. Rainbow Treecare Scientific Advancements, Inc." on Justia Law