Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Alasko Foods, Inc. (“Alasko”), a Canadian corporation that sells frozen produce to retail outlets, and Foodmark, Inc. (“Foodmark”), a Massachusetts corporation that assists food manufacturers in marketing branded-label and private-label products to retailers, entered into a “U.S. Representation Agreement [and] Sales Management Agreement” wherein Alasko retained Foodmark to market Alasko’s products in the United States. Five years later, Alasko terminated the Agreement. Foodmark filed a complaint against Alasko, alleging that Alasko’s refusal to pay the “Non-Renewal Termination Fee” contemplated by the Agreement constituted a breach of the Agreement and of its covenant of good faith and fair dealing. A federal district court entered summary judgment for Foodmark and awarded $1.1 million in damages. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that there were no genuine issues of fact, and Foodmark was entitled to a termination fee in the amount calculated by the district court. View "Foodmark, Inc. v. Alasko Foods, Inc." on Justia Law

Section 1692g(b) of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) requires that a debt collector’s collection activities and communications “not overshadow or be inconsistent with the disclosure of the consumer’s right to dispute the debt or request the name and address of the original creditor.” In this case, Plaintiff, a “consumer” within the meaning of the FDCPA, incurred a debt, which Defendant, a “debt collector,” was retained to collect. Approximately one month after Plaintiff received a collection letter sent by Defendant, Plaintiff sued, alleging that Defendant had violated the FDCPA. The district court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff, concluding, inter alia, that the collection letter violated section 1692g as a matter of law. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) for FDCPA purposes, a collection letter is to be viewed from the perspective of the hypothetical unsophisticated consumer; and (2) the effect of the collection letter on the unsophisticated consumer in this case would be to confuse, and therefore, the letter violated section 1692g.View "Pollard v. Law Office of Mandy L. Spaulding " on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were four customers who purchased cable television, internet, or telephone services from Charter Communications Entertainment I, LLC and Charter Communications, Inc. (together, Charter). After a severe snow storm, Plaintiffs sued Charter on behalf of themselves and a putative class of others claimed to be similarly situated, contending that Charter violated various duties by failing to provide credits to its customers for their loss of service during the storm. Charter removed the case to federal court, invoking the Class Action Fairness Act (Act).. The federal district court subsequently granted Charter’s motion to dismiss, finding that the claims of three Plaintiffs were moot because they had received credits covering the time they were without service and that, as to the fourth plaintiff, the complaint failed to state a claim. The First Circuit vacated in part the district court’s opinion, holding that the district court (1) properly exercised its jurisdiction under the Act; but (2) erred in granting Charter’s motion to dismiss, as all four plaintiffs may pursue their requests for declaratory relief regarding their dispute with Charter over the nature of its obligations to them, and Plaintiffs’ complaint pleaded facts sufficient to plausibly show that they were entitled to relief on some of their claims.View "Cooper v. Charter Cmmc’ns Ents. I, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a class action suit in an Illinois circuit court against Ernida, LLC alleging that Ernida had faxed unsolicited advertisements to Plaintiff and more than thirty-nine other recipients without first obtaining their permission. Ernida’s insurer, American Economy Insurance Company (American), took up Ernida’s defense in Illinois. While the Illinois action was ongoing, Plaintiff filed suit in federal district court against American, asserting diversity jurisdiction and seeking a declaration that American had a duty to defend Ernida in the Illinois action and had a responsibility to indemnify and pay any judgment in that action. The district court granted American’s motion to dismiss, concluding that Plaintiff had not presented a justiciable controversy. On appeal, American claimed that Plaintiff’s claim did not meet the amount-in-controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction since Plaintiff had expressly waived any right to recover anything over $75,000 in its Illinois complaint. The First Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the district court’s order dismissing the case for lack of standing and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, as the matter in controversy did not not exceed the sum or value of $75,000. View "CE Design, Ltd. v. Am. Economy Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Richard Feingold’s mother purchased a life insurance policy from an Insurer listing her husband as the only beneficiary. Feingold's mother died in 2006. In 2012, Richard informed Insurer of his mother's death. The Insurer issued Feingold a check for death benefits but did not provide a copy of his mother's life insurance policy. Feingold filed a class action complaint against Insurer in 2013, alleging that the Insurer owed Feingold and the putative class of similarly situated beneficiaries damages based on the Insurer’s handling of unclaimed benefits under its life insurance policies. Specifically, Feingold claimed that the Insurer had an obligation, arising from a regulatory agreement (“Agreement”) between the Insurer and several states, to discover the death of its insureds and notify beneficiaries. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, noting that the Agreement was a contract only between Insurer and participating states. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that because Feingold was neither a party nor a third-party beneficiary of the Agreement, he had no authority to enforce the terms of the Agreement. View "Feingold v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Appellee, which manufactures and distributes specialized products for use in the defense, security, and aerospace industries, entered into a consultant agreement with Appellant, under which Appellant agreed to identify buyers for Appellee’s products. Three years later, Appellee acquired the rights to manufacture and sell RH1280B field-programmable gate array (“FPGA”)s, which are semiconductor integrated circuits that are used in satellites and other space equipment. Operating under the terms of the consultant agreement, Appellant found customers for RH1280B FPGAs, accepted delivery of the PFGAs, and resold the goods to its customers. Before Appellant accepted delivery, however, Appellee warned it that the RH1280Bs failed to meet certain specifications. Appellant subsequently refused to pay an outstanding balance of $1,800,000, alleging that Appellee breached its express warranty regarding the performance characteristics of the RH1280B. Thereafter, Appellee terminated the consultant agreement. The district court granted summary judgment in Appellee’s favor. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, the district court correctly granted summary judgment in Appellee’s favor. View "BAE Sys. Info. & Elec. Sys. Integration, Inc. v. SpaceKey Components, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant, a citizen and resident of Puerto Rico, borrowed $700,000 from Plaintiff, a citizen and resident of Greece. Plaintiff’s loan was not evidenced by "even a single scrap of paper." The parties subsequently disputed who the borrower was, whether Caribbean Carrier Holding (Panama), Inc., as Defendant claimed, or Defendant, as Plaintiff claimed. When the parties could not agree on the identity of the borrower, Plaintiff brought a collection action against Defendant in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico. The district judge ruled that Plaintiff had not sustained his burden of proof and entered judgment for Defendant. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the district judge (1) substantially complied with the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(1), and (2) applied the correct substantive law standard in adjudicating Plaintiff’s claim. View "Valsamis v. Gonzalez-Romero" on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s nine-year-old daughter, N.K., was injured when N.K.'s sandals, popularly known as CROCS, were caught in an escalator, causing N.K. to sustain injuries. Plaintiff invoked diversity jurisdiction and brought suit against Crocs, Inc. (Defendant) in the United States District Court for, inter alia, failure to warn and breach of an implied warranty of merchantability. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendant. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Plaintiff failed to adduce significantly probative evidence that CROCS present a heightened risk of escalator entrapment sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to find in her favor. View "Geshke v. Crocs, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, property owners, filed an action against Defendant, a bank, alleging eleven counts of state law violations for Defendant’s decision to deny Plaintiffs’ application for a loan modification under the Home Affordable Modification Program and to foreclose on Plaintiffs’ home. The district court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ amended complaint, holding that the district court properly dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims for breach of the implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing, violation of the Massachusetts Consumer Credit Cost Disclosure Act, rescission, negligence, and promissory estoppel. View "MacKenzie v. Flagstar Bank, FSB" on Justia Law

Appellant filed two amended qui tam actions against her employer, a pharmaceutical company and its subsidiary (collectively, Appellees), under the federal False Claims Act (FCA), alleging that Appellees failed adequately to disclose the risks associated with some of their drugs and that this failure resulted in the submission of false claims by third-party patients and physicians for government payment. The district court dismissed both of Appellant's actions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) for failure to plead fraud with particularity and under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Appellant subsequently sought to amend the second amended complaint, asserting more theories of FCA liability, but the district court refused to allow further amendment. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's rulings regarding the dismissal of Appellant's claim under Rule 9(b) and the denial of Appellant's proposed amendments, holding (1) Appellant's claims on all theories which were presented failed under Rule 9(b); and (2) the district court did not err in denying Appellant's motion to amend. View "United States ex rel. Ge v. Takeda Pharm. Co. Ltd." on Justia Law