Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed this putative class action against Defendants - Nisource Corporate Services Company and AGL Resources, Inc. - alleging that Defendants engaged in deceptive business practices by disguising credit sales of hot water heaters as leases to avoid making the disclosures required under federal and Massachusetts’ consumer protection laws. Plaintiff alleged three disclosure violations: (1) a federal claim under the Truth in Lending Act; (2) a state law claim under the Massachusetts Retail Installment Sales and Services Act (RISSA) and (3) a state law claim under the Massachusetts Consumer Credit Cost Disclosure Act (CCCDA). The district court found that Plaintiff did not qualify for protection in light of the state-law standards governing these transactions and dismissed her suit. The First Circuit affirmed on alternate grounds, holding (1) Plaintiff’s federal claim under TILA is barred by the statute of limitations; and (2) as to the pendent state law claims, which were timely, the Court affirmed dismissal for failure to state a claim. View "Philibotte v. Nisource Corp. Services Co." on Justia Law

In May 2006, Sparkle Hill, Inc. and its vice president and owner (collectively, Sparkle Hill), received an unsolicited advertisement on Sparkle Hill’s fax machine from Interstate Mat Corporation (Interstate). Nearly five years later, Sparkle Hill filed suit in federal district court individually and on behalf of others who also received an identical fax from Interstate in May 2006 alleging that Interstate violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. Interstate moved for summary judgment on the ground that a four-year statute of limitations barred Sparkle Hill’s claim. Sparkle Hill did not oppose the merits of Interstate’s limitations defense. The district court entered summary judgment dismissing the case, concluding that Sparkle Hill’s silence constituted a concession and that, on the merits, Sparkle Hill’s claim was time-barred. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Appellant waived its arguments for finding error in the district court’s decision to hold it accountable for its lack of opposition to Interstate’s limitations defense. View "Sparkle Hill, Inc. v. Interstate Mat Corp." on Justia Law

In this putative class action against the manufacturer of Lexapro, Forest Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Plaintiffs claimed that Lexapro’s FDA-approved drug label misleads California consumers by omitting material efficacy information in violation of California’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act, False Advertising Law, and Unfair Competition Law. As relief, Plaintiffs requested that the court permanently enjoin Forest from continuing to sell or market Lexapro with its current drug label and to direct Forest to seek FDA approval of a new drug label. The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding that claims were barred by California’s safe harbor doctrine. The First Circuit affirmed the judgment dismissing the complaint but on other grounds, holding that federal law impliedly preempts Plaintiffs’ claims because the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act prohibits Forest from independently changing its FDA-approved label to read as Plaintiffs say it should have read in order to comply with California Law. View "Marcus v. Forest Pharms., Inc." on Justia Law

AstraZeneca, which sells a heartburn drug called Nexium, and three generic drug companies (“generic defendants”) that sought to market generic forms of Nexium, entered into settlement agreements in which the generic defendants agreed not to challenge the validity of the Nexium patents and to delay the launch of their generic products. Certain union health and welfare funds that reimburse plan members for prescription drugs (the named plaintiffs) alleged that the settlement agreements constituted unlawful agreements between Nexium and the generic defendants not to compete. Plaintiffs sought class certification for a class of third-party payors, such as the named plaintiffs, and individual consumers. The district court certified a class. Relevant to this appeal, the class included individual consumers who would have continued to purchase branded Nexium for the same price after generic entry. The First Circuit affirmed the class certification, holding (1) class certification is permissible even if the class includes a de minimis number of uninjured parties; (2) the number of uninjured class members in this case was not significant enough to justify denial of certification; and (3) only injured class members will recover. View "In re Nexium Antitrust Litig." on Justia Law

When Appellant, a resident of the Pondview Condominiums, did not pay his condominium fees on time, the condominium trustees hired law firm Marcus, Errico, Emmer and Brooks, P.C. (“MEEB”) to collect Appellant’s debt. MEEB filed nine collection actions in Massachusetts state court against Appellant and prevailed in two of them. Displeased with MEEB’s collection activities, Appellant sued MEEB in federal district court, alleging violations of federal and state law. The magistrate judge concluded that MEEB committed numerous violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) and that the FDCPA violations constituted “per se” violations of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A. Upon reconsideration, the magistrate judge reversed in part, finding MEEB not liable under Chapter 93A. The First Circuit reversed the magistrate judge’s determination that MEEB was not liable under Chapter 93A, holding that MEEB’s violations of the FDCPA constituted per se Chapter 93A violations by virtue of the unambiguous statutory language in the FDCPA and the Federal Trade Commission Act. View "McDermott v. Marcus, Errico, Emmer & Brooks" on Justia Law

With the threat of foreclosure looming on his home, Plaintiff sued Bank for failing to consider him for a mortgage loan modification, which a California class action settlement agreement required Bank to do before attempting to foreclose on Plaintiff’s home. The complaint alleged breach of contract, violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 244, 35A and 35B, violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The district court dismissed the complaint in its entirety. The First Circuit vacated in part and remanded Plaintiff’s claims for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, holding (1) Plaintiff’s statutory causes of action fell short of stating a cognizable claim; but (2) the district court improperly converted Bank’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s contract-based claims into a motion for summary judgment, warranting a remand of those claims. View "Foley v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Alasko Foods, Inc. (“Alasko”), a Canadian corporation that sells frozen produce to retail outlets, and Foodmark, Inc. (“Foodmark”), a Massachusetts corporation that assists food manufacturers in marketing branded-label and private-label products to retailers, entered into a “U.S. Representation Agreement [and] Sales Management Agreement” wherein Alasko retained Foodmark to market Alasko’s products in the United States. Five years later, Alasko terminated the Agreement. Foodmark filed a complaint against Alasko, alleging that Alasko’s refusal to pay the “Non-Renewal Termination Fee” contemplated by the Agreement constituted a breach of the Agreement and of its covenant of good faith and fair dealing. A federal district court entered summary judgment for Foodmark and awarded $1.1 million in damages. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that there were no genuine issues of fact, and Foodmark was entitled to a termination fee in the amount calculated by the district court. View "Foodmark, Inc. v. Alasko Foods, Inc." on Justia Law

Section 1692g(b) of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) requires that a debt collector’s collection activities and communications “not overshadow or be inconsistent with the disclosure of the consumer’s right to dispute the debt or request the name and address of the original creditor.” In this case, Plaintiff, a “consumer” within the meaning of the FDCPA, incurred a debt, which Defendant, a “debt collector,” was retained to collect. Approximately one month after Plaintiff received a collection letter sent by Defendant, Plaintiff sued, alleging that Defendant had violated the FDCPA. The district court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff, concluding, inter alia, that the collection letter violated section 1692g as a matter of law. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) for FDCPA purposes, a collection letter is to be viewed from the perspective of the hypothetical unsophisticated consumer; and (2) the effect of the collection letter on the unsophisticated consumer in this case would be to confuse, and therefore, the letter violated section 1692g.View "Pollard v. Law Office of Mandy L. Spaulding " on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were four customers who purchased cable television, internet, or telephone services from Charter Communications Entertainment I, LLC and Charter Communications, Inc. (together, Charter). After a severe snow storm, Plaintiffs sued Charter on behalf of themselves and a putative class of others claimed to be similarly situated, contending that Charter violated various duties by failing to provide credits to its customers for their loss of service during the storm. Charter removed the case to federal court, invoking the Class Action Fairness Act (Act).. The federal district court subsequently granted Charter’s motion to dismiss, finding that the claims of three Plaintiffs were moot because they had received credits covering the time they were without service and that, as to the fourth plaintiff, the complaint failed to state a claim. The First Circuit vacated in part the district court’s opinion, holding that the district court (1) properly exercised its jurisdiction under the Act; but (2) erred in granting Charter’s motion to dismiss, as all four plaintiffs may pursue their requests for declaratory relief regarding their dispute with Charter over the nature of its obligations to them, and Plaintiffs’ complaint pleaded facts sufficient to plausibly show that they were entitled to relief on some of their claims.View "Cooper v. Charter Cmmc’ns Ents. I, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a class action suit in an Illinois circuit court against Ernida, LLC alleging that Ernida had faxed unsolicited advertisements to Plaintiff and more than thirty-nine other recipients without first obtaining their permission. Ernida’s insurer, American Economy Insurance Company (American), took up Ernida’s defense in Illinois. While the Illinois action was ongoing, Plaintiff filed suit in federal district court against American, asserting diversity jurisdiction and seeking a declaration that American had a duty to defend Ernida in the Illinois action and had a responsibility to indemnify and pay any judgment in that action. The district court granted American’s motion to dismiss, concluding that Plaintiff had not presented a justiciable controversy. On appeal, American claimed that Plaintiff’s claim did not meet the amount-in-controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction since Plaintiff had expressly waived any right to recover anything over $75,000 in its Illinois complaint. The First Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the district court’s order dismissing the case for lack of standing and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, as the matter in controversy did not not exceed the sum or value of $75,000. View "CE Design, Ltd. v. Am. Economy Ins. Co." on Justia Law