Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The defendant had sexually explicit online conversations with an officer posing as a 12-year old girl. Agents obtained a warrant to search his residence for evidence of violation of 18 U.S.C. 1470 (transfer of obscene material to a minor) and 18 U.S.C. 2422(b) (coercion or enticement of a minor), seized a computer system and cds, and found child pornography. Defendant was charged with transferring obscene material to a minor under age 16 (18 U.S.C. 1470) and possession of child pornography (18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(4)(B)). The district court granted a motion to supress, holding that the agents lacked probable cause to search for child pornography. The First Circuit reversed, based on the inevitable discovery doctrine. The agents had probable cause to search the digital media and, in searching for evidence of interaction with minors, had to thoroughly search the electronic files.

Police obtained warrants, believing that the suspect had beaten a victim with a nightstick, went to the apartment before dawn, broke down the door, and promptly removed the suspect. The suspect's 15-year-old sister claims she was pushed down, injured her knee, and was handcuffed. The parents claim to have had guns held to their heads; the mother was wearing only underpants. The suspect's girlfriend claims that officers threatened to take her baby. They were detained for 40-60 minutes. In a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action, the court denied officers' motions for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The First Circuit reversed with respect to claims based on detention of the plaintiffs. Officers had an interest in protecting their own safety and in an unimpeded search; plaintiffs were cuffed only for the duration of the search. There was no clear constitutional violation. The court affirmed with respect to other claims. The sister's injuries were sufficient to support a Fourth Amendment claim; no reasonable officer would think it clearly necessary to point an assault weapon at a handcuffed 15-year-old girl with no history of violence. Similarly, it was not clearly reasonably necessary to point a gun at the head of a woman, not a suspect, and nearly naked. The court also declined claims of state-law official immunity.

After gang-member shooting victims were taken to the hospital, police officers watching the emergency room entrance, observed the defendant and another known gang member leaving. They followed and pulled over the speeding car. Believing the occupants to be acting "nervous" and to have a gun, the officers conducted a thorough search of the car and found a gun and crack cocaine hidden in an access panel. A second search, by an expert familiar with "hides," revealed ammunition. Defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty as a felon in possession (18 U.S.C. 922(g)). The district court denied a motion to suppress and sentenced defendant to 188 months incarceration. The First Circuit affirmed. The officers had reasonable suspicion, the five-minute duration of the search before the gun was found was reasonable, and the scope of the search, including the easily accessible hidden compartment, was reasonable.

Pursuant to a permit issued by the Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management Council (CRMC), the developer built 26 of 79 planned homes and installed infrastructure between 1992 and 2007. The Rhode Island Historic Preservation and Heritage Commission (HPHC) became interested in the site and recommended withdrawal of the permit or requiring a complete archaeological data recovery project. In 2009, after informal negotiations, the developer notified the HPHC that it would resume construction absent some response from the agencies. The developer resumed construction and a stop-work order issued. CRMC hearings are ongoing. The district court dismissed the developer's takings claims as unripe, rejecting an argument that the state litigation requirement was excused; that argument was foreclosed by a binding First Circuit holding that Rhode Island's procedures were available and adequate. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the developer did not prove that state remedies were unavailable or inadequate.

The defendants, arrested in a reverse sting operation after they drove to a sham drug deal in a vehicle containing $100,000 in cash, were each convicted of a single drug conspiracy count. The First Circuit vacated and remanded. The court first acknowledged that, taking into account only unchallenged evidence, the record was sufficient for a jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was more than an innocent bystander to the transaction. However, tainted evidence was central to the prosecution's case and potentially disastrous to the defense. The court erred in allowing "overview" testimony by the lead officer, announcing the defendants' roles in the conspiracy, although the officer was not a witness to many of the events; the witness was no better suited than the jury to put the pieces together. The testimony also implicitly "vouched" for later testimony. The officer's testimony about the post-arrest interview statements of a third defendant, who offered to cooperate, violated the Confrontation Clause, even though the cooperating defendant was not directly quoted.

After a tip led them to a website containing the male defendant's phone number and pornographic pictures of the female defendant's eight-year-old daughter, the police obtained a warrant and searched the woman's home. They seized electronics containing pornographic images; the woman admitted to abuse of the girl. The district court denied a motion to suppress. The male defendant was sentenced to 30 years imprisonment; the mother was sentenced to 27 years. Each was ordered to pay $67,600 in restitution. The First Circuit vacated and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the motion. The defendants had an expectation of privacy on their password-protected website, which was searched without a warrant. It is not clear whether they shared the password with others and risked loss of privacy; whether the police search exceeded the tipster's private search; whether the tipster was assisted by authorities; whether the police expected to find something significant beyond pornography described by the tipster; whether the police had a reasonable belief that harm was imminent; or whether the evidence would have inevitably been discovered independently. The district court acted within its discretion in denying a "Franks" hearing, based on its finding that the tipster's affidavit established a link between the pornography and the female defendant's home.

After receiving information from an informant, conducting a controlled drug buy, and surveillance of the defendant, officers obtained warrants to search a house, an apartment, and the defendant's person. The defendant spotted the surveillance and led police on a high-speed chase before leaving the car in his mother's driveway and running. He was apprehended with $1,081 on his person. Police found a loaded gun and cocaine in the car, cocaine and needles in the house, and cocaine, a scale, and chemicals in the apartment. The defendant was convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, being a felon in possession of a firearm, and gun possession in furtherance of a drug crime. The First Circuit affirmed, finding the evidence sufficient to support the jury verdict. The trial court properly refused to suppress the gun; there was probable cause for a search of every part of the car, despite it being unoccupied and parked on a private driveway. The court affirmed the 25-year sentence, imposed months before the effective date of the 2010 Fair Sentencing Act, which reduced the sentence for certain drug crimes. The Act does not apply retroactively.

The inmate, convicted of second-degree murder in 1993 and violation of a domestic relations restraining order in 2010, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, based on a decision that he was ineligible for a pre-parole community diversion program. The district court dismissed. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the claims were barred as res judicata. While the federal case was pending, the Puerto Rican Court of Appeals affirmed that the inmate was not entitled to participate in the program. The court took judicial notice of the decision, despite failure to provide a timely English translation and the government's failure to argue res judicata below.

After Massachusetts rejected the petitioner's appeals from his conviction on charges relating to distribution of cocaine, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, holding that chemical analysts were witnesses for purposes of the Sixth Amendment and must be available for cross-examination and confrontation. The district court denied a subsequent petition for habeas corpus and the First Circuit affirmed. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. 2254, the issue is whether the state's decision violated clearly established federal law. Federal law was not clearly established at the time of the state decision.

The Puerto Rico Examining Board of Accountants required a CPA to submit to involuntary practice review and denied a requested postponement. The CPA failed to appear at a hearing. The Board did not respond to a request to reschedule, but suspended his license. Following a request for reconsideration, the Board sent notice that did not comply with statutory requirements, held a hearing, and declined to lift the suspension. The CPA completed the practice review after the deadline; the Board again declined to lift the suspension. The Board sent another non-compliant notice, held another hearing, and revoked the CPA's license. A Puerto Rico court ordered reinstatement. The federal district court dismissed claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the individual Board defendants perform functions similar to judges and are protected by immunity. They act under a statute that provides for due process and their actions are reviewable in Puerto Rico courts. Although they made serious procedural errors, the Board members had jurisdiction to take the actions at issue.