Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Police, responding to a 911 call, stopped plaintiff, a pedestrian. While he was standing near the cruiser, it was struck from behind by a second cruiser. Plaintiff, injured in the collision, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed, citing qualified immunity. The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the collision constituted a seizure. The facts could reasonably support the officers' suspicion that plaintiff was the subject of the 911 call and that the stop was reasonable.

Petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder for killing his mother. The district court denied a petition for habeas corpus. The First Circuit affirmed. Admission of expert testimony at trial, based on the expert's review of the autopsy report and photographs, was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court. Precedent cited by petitioner did not "clearly establish" that either the autopsy report or the expert's opinion in partial reliance upon it were inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause.

A federal grand jury issued a subpoena to a law office, commanding production of documents relating to a real estate transaction. The attorney obtained the client's consent and complied. The client changed his mind, notified USAO that the documents were privileged, and moved to quash the subpoena.The district court found that the documents were not privileged. The First Circuit affirmed. The district court acted within its discretion in conducting an in camera review; the client's generalized assertion of privilege did not establish that privilege attached to any particular document. The documents would have been disclosed at closing and the attorney essentially acted as a scrivener and disburser of funds. The request for production did not implicate the privilege against self-incriminating testimony.

In 2006 defendant was convicted of various immigration crimes, including harboring five illegal aliens from Brazil (8 U.S.C. 1324), and sentenced to five years in prison. After the trial, but before sentencing, he was indicted for smuggling those same aliens into the country. The court denied a motion to dismiss. Defendant was convicted and sentenced to another five years. The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument of successive prosecution in violation of defendant's due process rights. The Due Process Clause provides no greater protection than the Double Jeopardy Clause. Defendant conceded that each prosecution required proof of a fact that the other did not require so there was no double jeopardy violation. The district court conclusion that there was no "extraordinary misconduct" by the prosecution justifying a sentence below the mandatory minimum was within its discretion.

Police arrested plaintiff for driving without license. A confidential informant, who had provided reliable information in the past, told police that plaintiff had inserted a package of crack cocaine into his anal cavity just prior to the arrest. Over plaintiff's objection, officers conducted a visual inspection, then obtained a warrant and took plaintiff to the hospital, where a physician conducted a digital search, followed by an x-ray. The only type of x-ray that covers the entire anal cavity also captures images of other organs. No drugs were found. The district court rejected plaintiff's suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act. The First Circuit affirmed, finding that the x-ray was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and state law.

Defendants, jointly tried and convicted of drug-related crimes, unsuccessfully petitioned for habeas corpus (18 U.S.C. 2255). The First Circuit affirmed with respect to one defendant and vacated with respect to the other. A partial courtroom closure during jury selection based on crowding likely violated the Sixth Amendment because there was not a substantial justification, but one defendant procedurally defaulted the claim and did not show cause to excuse the default. Defendant's counsel's failure to object to the closure did not amount to ineffective assistance. The other defendant is entitled to a new habeas hearing because the lower court did not address an allegation that his attorney was not aware of the closure nor present to object; defendant is entitled to appointed counsel in connection with a hearing on the issue. The fact that the clerk, not the judge, effectuated the courtroom closure, was not an impermissible delegation. The judge was responsible for the decision.

In 2010 defendant, then serving a sentence in Rhode Island state prison for parole and probation violations, was charged with a 2000 armed robbery and murder of a gas station manager (18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A); 924(j)(1) and 1951(a)). The governor refused to transfer defendant to federal custody because doing so would expose a Rhode Island citizen, to a potential death sentence on federal charges, in contravention of the state's longstanding rejection of capital punishment. Defendant agreed to plead guilty to state charges. Unable to obtain custody under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, 18 U.S.C. App. 2, the federal prosecutor filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum. The district court granted the motion. The First Circuit issued a writ of prohibition, reasoning that the writ of habeas corpus should be treated as a request for custody under the IAD and that the governor has a right to refuse such transfer. To grant the federal government custody would be to allow it to circumvent the IAD.

The buyer of a personal computer found child pornography on the hard drive and contacted authorities. The seller, a non-commissioned Naval officer, was ordered to return to his home, where police were questioning his pregnant wife. His house was searched and he was questioned at the house and at the station. He entered a guilty plea under 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(5)(b) and 2258(8)(A), reserving the right to appeal denial of a motion to suppress. The First Circuit remanded. Given the influence of military authority, defendant was in custody when he was questioned at home without having received a Miranda warning. The situation at the house would have left any member of the armed services reasonably feeling that he lacked free choice to extricate himself, and sufficiently compelled to answer to authority. Authorities deliberately planned to subject defendant to unwarned questioning, so a warning issued after leaving the house may have been inadequate to cure the situation with respect to statements made at the station.

Defendant pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to smuggle illegal aliens into the U.S. (8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A)(i), (v)(I) and was sentenced to 12 months and one day of imprisonment, followed by three years supervised release. Shortly after defendant's release, her probation officer filed a motion requesting a written reprimand and warning because defendant had tested positive twice for cocaine use. The court never acted on the motion, but defendant entered a treatment program. After she left the treatment program, the probation officer filed another motion, which remained pending until defendant was arrested about four years later. The district court revoked her supervised release and sentenced her to time served and 26 months of additional supervised release. The First Circuit affirmed. The district court had relation-back jurisdiction under the Delayed Revocation Statute, 18 U.S.C. 3583(i), even though the warrant on which defendant was arrested was not based on an oath or affirmation.

Officers executed a search warrant at defendant's residence and found a loaded firearm, defendant's identification, five bags of heroin, a bag of cocaine, $500 in cash, a razor blade, and empty baggies. In custody, he waived his Miranda rights and told the police that the gun belonged to him. Convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), defendant was sentenced as an armed career criminal, 18 U.S.C. 924(e), to 226 months in prison. The First Circuit affirmed the conviction, but vacated the sentence. Because two of defendant's prior convictions were for serious drug offenses and drug-dealing is notoriously linked to violence, the court rejected a challenge to the constitutionality of the felon-in-possession law. The prosecution's reference to defendant as a drug dealer was not improper, despite the fact that he was not charged with drug crimes. In sentencing, the court relied on two Massachusetts assault and battery convictions as predicate offenses without evidence that the felonies involved violence.