Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, convicted of a 1984 Massachusetts murder, exhausted state appeals. After hearing new evidence that, according to a witness, another man had made self-incriminating about the murder, the district court denied habeas relief. The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Petitioner did not establish prejudice.

Plaintiff was arrested for using his cell phone camera to film police officers arresting a man on the Boston Common. Charges included violation of the Massachusetts wiretap statute and two other state-law offenses, were subsequently dismissed. Plaintiff's suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming violation of the First and Fourth Amendments, the district court denied the officers qualified immunity. The First Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff was exercising clearly-established First Amendment rights in filming the officers in a public place and his clearly-established Fourth Amendment rights were violated by his arrest without probable cause.

In April 1999, a Massachusetts jury convicted petitioner of rape, kidnapping, assault and battery with a dangerous weapon, and carjacking. After unsuccessful attempts at post-trial relief in state court, he filed an unsuccessful petition for habeas corpus. The district court also denied a motion by which petitioner sought to subject evidence to DNA testing. The First Circuit affirmed. The court properly denied the discovery motion, given petitioner's speculative theories and baseless allegations. The court also rejected an argument that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. 2254, pursuant to which the district court evaluated the petition, unconstitutionally restricts review to existing Supreme Court precedent.

National Organization for Marriage challenged the constitutionality of Maine election laws (Me.Rev.Stat. title 21A sec. 1052) as overbroad under the First Amendment and so vague in its terms, particularly with respect to the phrase "for the purpose of influencing," as to violate due process. The laws govern registration of political action committees and reporting of independent expenditures. The district court upheld the law. The First Circuit affirmed, first holding that the organization had standing. The record showed that its fears were objectively reasonable and led to self-censorship. With respect to the overbreadth claim, the court rejected an argument based on the distinction between issue discussion and express advocacy, characterizing the distinction as irrelevant and applying the "exacting scrutiny" standard because the law does not prohibit, limit, or impose any onerous burdens on speech, but merely requires maintenance and disclosure of certain financial information. There is a "substantial relation" between Maine's informational interest and each of the laws at issue. The terms "promoting," "support," "opposition," "influencing," "expressly advocate" and "initiation" are sufficiently clear.

National Organization for Marriage challenged the constitutionality of Rhode Island election laws as overbroad under the First Amendment and so vague in its terms as to violate due process. The laws govern registration of political action committees, contributions to and expenditures on behalf of candidates, and reporting of independent expenditures. The organization claimed that it would refrain from certain political activities if required to register as a PAC, but would comply with independent expenditures under protest. After receiving assurances that the organization could engage in its planned speech without registering as a PAC, the district court denied a preliminary injunction, noting the minimal burden imposed by the law and the valuable governmental interest underlying it. The First Circuit affirmed, finding that the organization had not demonstrated likelihood of success on the merits.

During a raid of a motel room in which he was a guest, defendant was place on the floor and handcuffed in the wake of his host's arrest on drug charges. Defendant consented to a search of his pants pocket to locate identification; the search turned up seven small bags of crack cocaine. A dozen rounds of .38-caliber ammunition were later discovered in the pocket of his jacket. After unsuccessfully moving to suppress this evidence, he entered a conditional guilty plea to charges of simple possession of cocaine and possession of a firearm after a prior felony conviction. The First Circuit affirmed. Given consent to retrieve an object from a cramped space, like a pocket, it is objectively reasonable to assume that the consent extends to the removal of items that either may constitute the object of the search and cannot be immediately identified or that obstruct further access to other items in the pocket. The consent was voluntary. The circumstances justified use of handcuffs and drawn guns. Defendant was experienced in dealing with law enforcement and showed no signs of intimidation.

In 2001, a jury convicted defendant of reckless second-degree murder, five counts of second-degree assault, endangering the welfare of a minor, and simple assault in connection with the death of his girlfriend's 21-month-old daughter. The trial court ordered a term of 28 years to life on the murder conviction, but imposed suspended sentences on the remaining charges. A few months before sentencing, New Hampshire changed the law to allow the state as well to apply for review of sentences. An appellate court imposed sentences of 5 to 10 years on one of the second degree assault charges and 10 to 30 years on a second such charge, increasing defendant's minimum term from 28 to 43 years. The state's highest court affirmed. The federal district court denied a petition for habeas corpus. The First Circuit affirmed. If Supreme Court cases give no clear answer to the question presented, a state court's resolution of a constitutional question may not serve as a basis for habeas relief. In this case, no one can be sure what the Supreme Court would do in a case involving Ex Post Facto doctrine in this new and different context.

Alleging violations of the First Amendment, Equal Protection (42 U.S.C. 1983), and Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000cc, an Orthodox Jewish former inmate at the New Hampshire State Prison, challenged a rule requiring inmates to be clean-shaven, unless they obtain a waiver based on medical condition or religious beliefs. With a waiver, an inmate may maintain a 1/4-inch neatly-trimmed beard. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the prison. The First Circuit affirmed. Although the plaintiff has been released, the claims are not moot. The rule is related to the prison's substantial interests in hygiene, easy identification of prisoners, and preventing concealment of weapons and contraband and those goals cannot be readily achieved by other means. The rule meets the RLUIPA "least restrictive means" test. The prison provides alternative means of expressing religious beliefs. While inmates in some high-security units go one-two weeks without shaving, the different treatment is justified.

In 2000 the planning board approved a development and the developer began purchasing land. In 2002, the Department of Justice issued an opinion that the land could be sold without legislative action, although it was gained from the sea. Construction began; the developer invested $200 million. Because of protests, the legislature investigated and concluded that the developer lacked valid title. A 2007 Department of Justice opinion stated that the land belonged to the public domain. The governor suspended permits and froze construction. Pending a hearing, the developer filed a quiet title action. The Regulations and Permits Administration upheld suspension of construction. The Puerto Rico appeals court ordered the administration to hold an evidentiary hearing (which did not occur), but did not lift the stay on construction. The developer succeeded in its quiet title action; in 2008 construction resumed. The supreme court held that the developer's due process rights had been violated. The district court dismissed a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The First Circuit affirmed. Although the plaintiff did state a procedural due process claim, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. The defendants were not on clear notice they they were required to hold a meaningful pre-deprivation hearing.

The inmate, convicted in 1978 of murder, gained a reputation as a "jail house lawyer" while serving his life sentence and acquired a number of "separations," a term used to indicate a conflict counseling against assignment of one inmate to the same institution as another inmate or staff member. Because of the separations, Pennsylvania began billeting him in other states' institutions pursuant to the Interstate Corrections Compact. In 2001 he was transferred to Maryland. A letter, written in connection with the transfer, noted that the inmate is not a discipline problem, but is a "nuisance" as a jailhouse lawyer. The district court rejected a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that there was no evidence of a causal connection between the inmate's protected First Amendment activities and the transfer. The timing of the transfer and the use of the term "nuisance" did not establish retaliatory motive.