Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner is serving a life sentence in a Massachusetts state prison for first-degree murder. The state's highest court affirmed the conviction. A federal district court denied habeas relief. The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate and present a defense that petitioner's Tourette's Syndrome exacerbated the effects of alcohol and Artane, and that he was legally insane at the time of the killing on account of the Tourette's Syndrome and other mental illness.

Having lost his bid for a Maine Senate seat, plaintiff sued Republican party leadership for defamation libel, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and publicly placing him in a false light. The complaint referred to flyers, brochures, and radio and TV ads days before the election that conjured up imaginary wrongs that he had supposedly done as a selectman for the town of Blue Hill, primarily concerning discontinuance of fireworks on the Fourth of July. The complaint referred to "actual malice." The district court dismissed. The First Circuit affirmed, finding that false statements were made negligently, not with actual malice. Defamation law "does not require that combatants for public office act like war-time neutrals, treating everyone evenhandedly and always taking the high road. Quite the contrary. Provided that they do not act with actual malice, they can badmouth their opponents, hammering them with unfair and one-sided attacks"

After being extradited from Columbia, petitioner was convicted in federal court for his part in a drug conspiracy. He twice sought relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255, without success. He then sought relief under 28 U.S.C. 2241 for alleged violations of the extradition treaty. The district court denied relief, deeming the petition an attempt to circumvent the limits on section 2255. The First Circuit affirmed. Relief under section 2255 does cover violations of treaties and petitioner cannot circumvent the limits on multiple section 2255 petitions by resorting to section 2241 to assert a treaty claim that could as easily have been advanced in his original section 2255 petition.

Petitioner, serving two life terms for first degree murder, exhausted state appeals and was denied habeas corpus. His trial counsel had conceded that petitioner committed the shootings, but attempted to establish insanity. The First Circuit affirmed. Any errors committed under state law with respect to establishing competence or intoxication did not create federal constitutional issues.

The Massachusetts Delivery Association claimed that a state law is preempted as to motor carriers under the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994, 108 Stat. 1569, which expressly preempts state attempts to regulate "a price, route, or service of any motor carrier," The challenged state law, part of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, sect. 148B(a)(2), which requires that an individual performing a service for another be classified as an employee unless "the service is performed outside the usual course of the business of the employer." The MDA also claimed that the state statute imposes an undue burden which violates the Commerce Clause. The district court found that Younger abstention was appropriate because, while the Association is not itself a party to relevant state litigation, three of its members are defendants in state civil proceedings brought not by the Attorney General (defendant in this case) but by private parties. The First Circuit remanded for the court to exercise jurisdiction, concluding that any decision will not interfere with pending state cases.

Defendant pled guilty to conspiring to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine and one kilogram or more of heroin within 1,000 feet of a public housing project, 21 U.S.C. 841, 846, and 860, and conspiring to unlawfully possess, use, or brandish a firearm in furtherance of or during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A) and 924(o) and was sentenced to 108 months imprisonment and 8 years supervised release. After the conviction was affirmed, defendant challenged the district court's denial of a petition to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that defendant failed to establish prejudice.

Defendant, convicted of second-degree murder for the death of his two-week-old son after admitting to shaking the baby, obtained a reduction to involuntary manslaughter, but the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reinstated the original verdict. The federal district court dismissed a habeas corpus petition. The First Circuit affirmed. The state court's conclusion that admission of the autopsy photographs was proper was not so arbitrary or capricious as to be an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.

Defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty to a charge of possession with an intent to distribute a controlled substance (21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1)) and appealed denial of a motion to suppress. The First Circuit affirmed. An investigatory "Terry" stop and pat-down of defendant was based on reasonable suspicion. A 911 caller from the residence reported a man at the residence, with a gun and making threats and the police stopped men they believed to have just left the residence. Their conduct indicated likely possession of a gun. The court properly determined that defendant's actions in taking a bag out of his pocket, throwing it on the ground, and disclaiming ownership, was an attempt to cooperate, rather than submission to legal authority.

Defendant, a drug dealer who, with another, robbed a crack dealer at gun point, was convicted under the Hobbs Act, which makes it a crime to rob or conspire to rob "in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects" interstate or international commerce, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a)-(b). He was sentenced to six-and-one-half years in prison. The First Circuit affirmed. The indictment sufficiently alleged impact on interstate commerce. The trial court properly found that statements made by the defendant, in an unlocked, unmarked police car, were voluntary and were not made in custody. The evidence was sufficient to support conviction.

Plaintiff, a tenured professor at the University-defendant, was arrested by campus police and charged with stalking and disorderly conduct after unleashing an expletive-filled tirade against a colleague whom he suspected of causing him to receive a parking ticket. Plaintiff was temporarily banned from campus, removed as department head, and required to attend an anger-management class. Although the charges were later dismissed, Collins sued for false arrest, defamation, and violation of his due process rights. The district court granted judgment for the defendants. The First Circuit affirmed, first rejecting an argument that the arrest was illegal because the "violation" was civil in nature. The warrant was supported by probable cause. Suspension with pay for two months was a minimal deprivation that did not entitle plaintiff to pre-deprivation process. Plaintiff was allowed to visit campus several times during the ban and was given adequate process for the minimal deprivation of liberty. An email indicating that plaintiff's presence on campus should be reported was not defamatory.