Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A few hours after a domestic disturbance, Austin was spotted trying to get into his former girlfriend's apartment and given disorderly conduct and criminal trespass warnings. He was later spotted, visibly agitated, in a park, in violation of an ordinance closing the park over night. A civil citation issued. In response to a call from a payphone, indicating that a woman had been killed at the girlfriend's address, different officers went to the area and stopped defendant who matched Austin's general description and was walking on the street. A pat-frisk revealed a gun. It later came to light that the call was a hoax and that defendant was not involved with Austin. Defendant was convicted as a felon in possession, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the arrest was based on probable cause, following a valid "Terry" stop that was brief and appropriate to the circumstances.

Puerto Rico requires all motor vehicle owners to pay for compulsory, state-issued auto insurance when they purchase or renew their vehicle registrations, even if they have obtained equivalent private insurance, with limited exceptions P.R. Laws tit. 26, 8051. Privately-insured vehicle owners who pay twice for coverage are entitled to reimbursements of state payments. A lot of the money is not returned during the two-year period for refunds; no statute or regulation provides notice of how to obtain reimbursement and only some insurers provide their insureds with notice of how to obtain reimbursements. After the two-year period, the money is transferred into trust for five years before being transferred to the commonwealth treasury. Individuals entitled to reimbursement receive no notice. The district court entered summary judgment, rejecting challenges to the law. The First Circuit reversed in part, holding that the law violates the notice requirements of the Due Process Clause and directing entry of a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief to that effect. The court rejected substantive due process and takings claims and left claims under Puerto Rico trust law to the Puerto Rico courts.

Defendant, a film company, released a documentary, "The Price of Sugar," in 2007 that depicts treatment of Haitian laborers at sugar plantations in the Dominican Republic. The film mentions plaintiffs, senior executives of family plantations, by name. In a suit for defamation, the court entered summary judgment for defendant and denied a motion to compel production of discovery materials. The First Circuit affirmed in part. The plaintiffs are limited public figures in the entire United States, who used their access to the press to launch a PR blitz, thereby risking public scrutiny. Their conduct was beyond a reasonable reply to negative publicity. The court remanded for consideration of actual malice, based on communications between defendant and a fact-checker, hired at the suggestion of defense counsel.

DEA agents and local police went to a residence with a warrant to arrest a drug dealer, but no warrant to search. When the owner opened the door, they entered and spent 15-20 minutes questioning the owner's wife and looking for the drug dealer, who was not in the house. Agents seized a vehicle that had been used in a drug deal. The district court rejected Fourth Amendment claims, citing qualified immunity, and claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 1346(b), 2671-2680. The First Circuit affirmed. The agents' actions were not manifestly unreasonable.

After a gang fight, officers followed and stopped defendant by blocking his path. They did not recognize defendant or have reason to believe he was involved in gang activity. Based on his hand motions, as if he were protecting his abdomen, an officer placed a hand on defendant's waist. A struggle ensued, officers subdued defendant, and found a gun in his waistband. Defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition despite having a prior felony conviction (18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1)) and possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number (18 U.S.C. 922(k)). The First Circuit reversed, holding that the gun should have been suppressed. The initial detention of defendant constituted a seizure rather than a consensual encounter; the officers lacked an objectively reasonable, particularized basis for suspecting him of criminal activity. Regardless of the validity of the "pat frisk," the evidence was tainted.

Employees of the fire department filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging cronysim and nepotism in employment decisions. The district court granted summary judgment for the department, finding that nothing linked the employment decisions to an identifiable political group, cause, or belief. The First Circuit affirmed. Preferential treatment in public employment decisions, unrelated to protected speech or association, does not infringe upon freedoms secured by the First Amendment.

Police, responding to a 911 call, stopped plaintiff, a pedestrian. While he was standing near the cruiser, it was struck from behind by a second cruiser. Plaintiff, injured in the collision, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed, citing qualified immunity. The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the collision constituted a seizure. The facts could reasonably support the officers' suspicion that plaintiff was the subject of the 911 call and that the stop was reasonable.

Petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder for killing his mother. The district court denied a petition for habeas corpus. The First Circuit affirmed. Admission of expert testimony at trial, based on the expert's review of the autopsy report and photographs, was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court. Precedent cited by petitioner did not "clearly establish" that either the autopsy report or the expert's opinion in partial reliance upon it were inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause.

A federal grand jury issued a subpoena to a law office, commanding production of documents relating to a real estate transaction. The attorney obtained the client's consent and complied. The client changed his mind, notified USAO that the documents were privileged, and moved to quash the subpoena.The district court found that the documents were not privileged. The First Circuit affirmed. The district court acted within its discretion in conducting an in camera review; the client's generalized assertion of privilege did not establish that privilege attached to any particular document. The documents would have been disclosed at closing and the attorney essentially acted as a scrivener and disburser of funds. The request for production did not implicate the privilege against self-incriminating testimony.

In 2006 defendant was convicted of various immigration crimes, including harboring five illegal aliens from Brazil (8 U.S.C. 1324), and sentenced to five years in prison. After the trial, but before sentencing, he was indicted for smuggling those same aliens into the country. The court denied a motion to dismiss. Defendant was convicted and sentenced to another five years. The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument of successive prosecution in violation of defendant's due process rights. The Due Process Clause provides no greater protection than the Double Jeopardy Clause. Defendant conceded that each prosecution required proof of a fact that the other did not require so there was no double jeopardy violation. The district court conclusion that there was no "extraordinary misconduct" by the prosecution justifying a sentence below the mandatory minimum was within its discretion.