Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Massachusetts Delivery Association claimed that a state law is preempted as to motor carriers under the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994, 108 Stat. 1569, which expressly preempts state attempts to regulate "a price, route, or service of any motor carrier," The challenged state law, part of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, sect. 148B(a)(2), which requires that an individual performing a service for another be classified as an employee unless "the service is performed outside the usual course of the business of the employer." The MDA also claimed that the state statute imposes an undue burden which violates the Commerce Clause. The district court found that Younger abstention was appropriate because, while the Association is not itself a party to relevant state litigation, three of its members are defendants in state civil proceedings brought not by the Attorney General (defendant in this case) but by private parties. The First Circuit remanded for the court to exercise jurisdiction, concluding that any decision will not interfere with pending state cases.

Defendant pled guilty to conspiring to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine and one kilogram or more of heroin within 1,000 feet of a public housing project, 21 U.S.C. 841, 846, and 860, and conspiring to unlawfully possess, use, or brandish a firearm in furtherance of or during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A) and 924(o) and was sentenced to 108 months imprisonment and 8 years supervised release. After the conviction was affirmed, defendant challenged the district court's denial of a petition to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that defendant failed to establish prejudice.

Defendant, convicted of second-degree murder for the death of his two-week-old son after admitting to shaking the baby, obtained a reduction to involuntary manslaughter, but the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reinstated the original verdict. The federal district court dismissed a habeas corpus petition. The First Circuit affirmed. The state court's conclusion that admission of the autopsy photographs was proper was not so arbitrary or capricious as to be an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.

Defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty to a charge of possession with an intent to distribute a controlled substance (21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1)) and appealed denial of a motion to suppress. The First Circuit affirmed. An investigatory "Terry" stop and pat-down of defendant was based on reasonable suspicion. A 911 caller from the residence reported a man at the residence, with a gun and making threats and the police stopped men they believed to have just left the residence. Their conduct indicated likely possession of a gun. The court properly determined that defendant's actions in taking a bag out of his pocket, throwing it on the ground, and disclaiming ownership, was an attempt to cooperate, rather than submission to legal authority.

Defendant, a drug dealer who, with another, robbed a crack dealer at gun point, was convicted under the Hobbs Act, which makes it a crime to rob or conspire to rob "in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects" interstate or international commerce, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a)-(b). He was sentenced to six-and-one-half years in prison. The First Circuit affirmed. The indictment sufficiently alleged impact on interstate commerce. The trial court properly found that statements made by the defendant, in an unlocked, unmarked police car, were voluntary and were not made in custody. The evidence was sufficient to support conviction.

Plaintiff, a tenured professor at the University-defendant, was arrested by campus police and charged with stalking and disorderly conduct after unleashing an expletive-filled tirade against a colleague whom he suspected of causing him to receive a parking ticket. Plaintiff was temporarily banned from campus, removed as department head, and required to attend an anger-management class. Although the charges were later dismissed, Collins sued for false arrest, defamation, and violation of his due process rights. The district court granted judgment for the defendants. The First Circuit affirmed, first rejecting an argument that the arrest was illegal because the "violation" was civil in nature. The warrant was supported by probable cause. Suspension with pay for two months was a minimal deprivation that did not entitle plaintiff to pre-deprivation process. Plaintiff was allowed to visit campus several times during the ban and was given adequate process for the minimal deprivation of liberty. An email indicating that plaintiff's presence on campus should be reported was not defamatory.

Defendant was apprehended on a boat in the Caribbean by a Coast Guard counter-narcotics patrol and charged under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act, 46 U.S.C. 70501-70508. The boat, carrying cocaine, did not display a flag or numbers. Columbian and Venezuelan authorities could not confirm its registration. A vessel without nationality is subject to U.S. jurisdiction under the Act. The district court denied a motion to dismiss based on the Confrontation Clause. Defendant argued that use of State Department certifications memorializing the inability of Columbia and Venezuela to confirm or refute the boat's master's claim of national registry, without an opportunity to cross-examine their author, constituted a violation of the Sixth Amendment. The First Circuit affirmed, noting that defendant did not claim that the boat was registered in another country or otherwise outside U.S. jurisdiction.

In 1981 defendant, a habitual sex offender, was sentenced to a term of perpetual imprisonment for rehabilitation, to last a minimum of 12 years. He was not released from prison until 2008. The district court dismissed his suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The First Circuit affirmed. The defendants, high-level government officials, enjoyed immunity. Defendant's general claims of failure to supervise did not state a claim; there was no evidence that specific defendants were even aware of his continuing incarceration.

After attempting to stop defendant for driving with illegal tinted windows, police gave chase and stopped his truck. Inspecting the interior of the abandoned truck, police found two wrapped blocks of what was later found to be cocaine. The chemist who tested the blocks was not available for trial, due to mental illness, and the officers had not observed the testing. Testimony was supplied by another chemist. Defendant was convicted of possession with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine (21 U.S.C. 841). The First Circuit vacated and remanded for a new trial, citing the Confrontation Clause. There were several questions about the reliability of the testing that the witness was unable to answer; the error was not harmless.

In 2002 defendant was convicted under the Massachusetts aggravated rape statute, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, 22(a). He exhausted state appeals. The district court denied a petition for habeas corpus. The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim that the statute was void for vagueness as applied to the case, for failure to define "resulting in serious bodily injury." It was reasonable for the state court to conclude that the phrase was not a technical term and could be understood by non-lawyers.