Justia U.S. 1st Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The federal Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. 2701-2721, establishes a cooperative federal-state-tribal regime for regulating gaming by federally recognized Indian tribes on Indian lands. The Massachusetts Gaming Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 23K, sect. 3(a), establishes a licensing scheme and other standards for gaming. KG, a potential applicant for a gaming license, argued that the state Act provides unauthorized preferences to Indian tribes and on that basis treats the southeast section of the state differently, and this constitutes a classification on the basis of race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause and is inconsistent with congressional intent in the federal Indian gaming statute. The district court dismissed. The First Circuit vacated with respect to the equal protection claim and otherwise affirmed. Whether the tribal provisions are "authorized" by the IGRA such that is subject to only rational basis review is far from clear, presents a difficult question of statutory interpretation, and implicates a practice of the Secretary of the Interior not challenged in this suit. There is apparently no judicial authority addressing the question of whether a state may negotiate a tribal-state compact with a federally recognized tribe that does not presently possess Indian lands. View "KG Urban Enters., LLC v. Patrick" on Justia Law

DEA obtained permission to wiretap telephones. Symonevich arranged by phone to buy heroin at McDonald's off I-495. During a call, "Tony," asked Symonevich what kind of car he was driving; the answer was a green Subaru. Agents sent units to I-495; they observed what they thought was a meeting between Symonevich and a courier. Agents planned to stop Symonevich, but lost sight of the car. Later that day, unrelated to the DEA investigation, officer Sweeney stopped the car for a broken light, observed Symonevich, reaching under the seat and looking "scared." Officers smelled marijuana on Symonevich's clothing. The driver refused permission to search the car; Sweeney searched, fearing a safety threat. During the stop, Sweeney learned that Symonevich was the subject of a DEA investigation. Sweeney found a can of tire sealant under the seat. The weight was unexpected and he felt movement inside. The bottom of the can was separated; he unscrewed it and found bundles that he believed to be heroin. Convicted of conspiracy to distribute, and to possess with the intent to distribute, cocaine and heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 846, Symonevich appealed denial of his motion to suppress. The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to sufficiency of the evidence, admission of certain testimony and charts, and the conspiracy instruction given to the jury. View "United States v. Symonevich" on Justia Law

Carta pled guilty to child pornography in 2002 and was sentenced to five years in prison and three years of supervised release. Prior to his scheduled release, the Bureau of Prisons certified that Carta was a "sexually dangerous person" and commenced civil commitment proceedings under the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, 18 U.S.C. 4248(a). A "sexually dangerous person" is one "who has engaged or attempted to engage in sexually violent conduct or child molestation and is sexually dangerous to others." A determination that an individual is a sexually dangerous person requires proof by clear and convincing evidence that he "suffers from a serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder as a result of which he would have serious difficulty in refraining from sexually violent conduct or child molestation if released." After a district judge ruled that the government had failed to establish that Carta's diagnosis of "paraphilia not otherwise specified characterized by hebephilia" was a "serious mental illness, abnormality or disorder" under the Act, the First Circuit reversed. A different district court judge subsequently ruled in the government's favor. The First Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Carta" on Justia Law

Crooker was charged with possession of firearms and ammunition by an unlawful user of a controlled substance, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(3), and possession of marijuana, 21 U.S.C. 844. He was convicted of possession of marijuana and fined $4000. The First Circuit affirmed, upholding the district court's denial of a motion to suppress statements and evidence recovered during the search of the residence where he lived with his parents and brothers. Given the familiarity of the surroundings in which Crooker was questioned, the calm and peaceable nature of the conversations, and the lack of physical restraint or show of force during questioning, Crooker was not in custody for Miranda purposes. In light of secretive conversations between Crooker’s father and uncle about the biological toxin ricin, their discussion about moving the uncle’s possessions while the uncle was incarcerated, and information provided by confidential informants, including information that the uncle had buried ricin in Crooker's backyard, there was probable cause to believe that evidence of the enumerated crimes would be found at Crooker's house. View "United States v. Crooker" on Justia Law

Police received a tip that Howard, a suspected gang member with an outstanding arrest warrant for armed assault with intent to murder, was at a specific house. Officers knocked, announcing themselves as police, and demanded entry. The door was opened by Knowles, who lived with her son, a friend of Howard’s. Howard was spotted by officers in the yard, peering out a bathroom window. They found Howard in the basement. Once he was arrested, Knowles signed consent to search. In the bathroom where Howard had been spotted, officers found a cell phone containing pictures of Howard; a burning cigarette, with Howard's DNA; and, in the toilet tank, a loaded semiautomatic handgun and a bag of individually wrapped crack cocaine rocks. In the kitchen, officers discovered another bag of cocaine rocks and digital scales. After denial of a motion to suppress, Howard was convicted of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A). He was sentenced to 13 years and three months. The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the search, sufficiency of the evidence, and jury instructions. View "United States v. Howard" on Justia Law

In 1998, Holmes pled guilty to second-degree murder and received a sentence of life in prison, the mandatory sentence. Mass. G.L. ch. 265, 2. Holmes claims that he pled guilty because his attorney, Graham, told him that the prosecutor had proposed that if Holmes entered the plea and if the prosecutor wanted information from Holmes, Holmes would be able to reduce his sentence by filing a Motion to Revise or Revoke. Holmes filed the Rule 29 motion, but did not identify any grounds. The motion was futile; the trial judge had no discretion in sentencing. In 2000, Holmes filed pro se a motion to withdraw the plea, alleging that Graham was constitutionally ineffective. Graham stated that he had advised Holmes to accept the plea because there was significant risk of a first degree murder conviction. In 2004, Holmes filed an amended motion, claiming that he would not have pled guilty had he known that the Rule 29 Motion would have been futile. After successive denials Holmes filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court dismissed the petition as untimely. The First Circuit remanded for consideration of whether the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled. View "Holmes v. Spencer," on Justia Law

Officers searched a home inhabited by Clark and her adult son, Matthew. The warrant, issued the previous day, authorized a search for evidence of animal cruelty and unlicensed operation of a breeding kennel. Officers entered the Matthew's bedroom. Near a computer work station, they saw a list of web sites with titles suggestive of child pornography and nude photographs appearing to depict underage males. The officers immediately halted their search and obtained a supplementary warrant that authorized a search for child pornography. Officers seized evidence that formed the basis for indictment of Matthew for possessing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A (a)(5)(B). The trial judge rejected an argument that the first warrant was defective because the affidavit submitted with the application did not make out probable cause to believe that evidence of animal cruelty or an unlicensed kennel would be found and that the second search would not have occurred but for the evidence uncovered during the initial (illegal) search. The court relied on defendant's two prior convictions for indecent acts involving children as a basis for an offense-level enhancement and sentenced him to a 210-month term (the bottom of the guideline sentencing range). The First Circuit affirmed the conviction and the sentence. View "United States v. Clark" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former trust employee of the Metropolitan Bus Authority of Puerto Rico, sued public officials under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that a decision not to install him in a career attorney position in the MBA was politically motivated and was effected without due process of law, in violation of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court dismissed. The First Circuit affirmed dismissal of the due process claim as to all defendants, finding that plaintiff was afforded adequate process, and affirmed dismissal of the First Amendment claim as to all defendants, save for defendant Delgado. Plaintiff's allegations of participation in the decision were speculative and inadequate with respect to all of the defendants except Delgado. View "Rodriguez-Ramos v. Hernandez-Gregorat" on Justia Law

Mead was fired from her job as administrator of 15 assisted living facilities operated by IA and licensed by the Maine Department of Health and Human Services. She sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983,alleging that her termination without a hearing infringed her procedural due process rights. She also asserted state law claims.The district court dismissed the due process claims, explaining that IA was a nonstate actor and thus could not be held accountable under section 1983, and that the complaint failed to allege a constitutional violation by the DHHS employees. The First Circuit affirmed. View "Mead v. Independence Ass'n" on Justia Law

An FBI agent went online, undercover, to search for child pornography, using LimeWire, a commercially available peer-to-peer filesharing program. He used a special version developed by the FBI, known as EP2P, to assist child pornography investigations. Modifications permit agents to download a file from a single source, learn the general location of the source, and facilitate the identification of child pornography as such. The agent downloaded files and confirmed that they contained graphic depictions of young girls, served a subpoena on the ISP, traced the IP address to a residence owned by the defendant's father, executed a search warrant, and spoke to defendant, who took responsibility for seized computers and admitted to using LimeWire. He denied that he had ever searched for, or downloaded, child pornography. Forensic analysis revealed over 5,000 images and videos of child pornography on the desktop and nearly 2,000 on the laptop. Convicted of two counts of possessing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(4)(B), and one count of distribution, 2252(a)(2), defendant was sentenced to 97 months plus a life term of supervised release and payment of $10,000 to each of two victims who requested restitution. The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims of multiplicity and upholding evidentiary rulings. View "United States v. Chiaradio" on Justia Law